Russia is in the grip of a second fuel crisis. Meduza analyzed nearly half a million crowdsourced reports to find out how bad it really is.

In early August, the fuel situation in Russia sharply worsened again. Ukraine is once again striking oil refineries, and long lines have formed at gas stations in many cities. The second wave of the crisis has looked markedly different from the first. Some regions are barely affected, while in others it arrived immediately on the heels of the first, and the return to normal promised by the authorities never came. Meduza obtained complete data from the GdeBENZ service (whose developer we spoke with recently), the most popular tracker of fuel availability at individual gas stations in Russia. We examined the data, and here’s what we found.

What data did we examine?

The short version. Half a million messages from the “GdeBENZ” service, which drivers use to report whether a given gas station has gasoline — across Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories.

Here’s the longer version. GdeBENZ lets drivers report whether a given gas station has fuel, whether there’s a line, and whether any sales restrictions apply. Stations in city centers or along busy highways tend to draw more reports; those in remote areas draw fewer.

In total, Meduza analyzed nearly half a million such messages submitted through the service between July 4 and August 23, 2026.

We then compared that data with information on drone attacks on Russian oil refineries, daily gasoline and diesel sales figures from the St. Petersburg exchange, and databases from Sberbank, T-Bank, and Alfa-Bank.

Can this data be trusted?

The short version. Yes — we checked the data against several independent sources and confirmed it was accurate.

Here’s the longer version. GdeBENZ is a mass-market service — in early July 2026, more than a million drivers a day used it. But because station statuses depend on user reports, deliberate manipulation is possible. Russia’s Energy Ministry stated that services with these kinds of fuel-availability maps could be manipulating the data, though that comment comes from officials with no interest in spreading accurate information about the fuel crisis.

The NAFO community on Reddit, meanwhile, published detailed instructions on how to post false statuses for Russian gas stations deliberately. GdeBENZ’s developer said the system filters out these suspicious reports: during one attack, more than 50,000 fake votes never made it onto the map.

There’s no way to independently verify how effective that filtering is, which is why we compared user reports against data from banking services.

Amid the crisis, Sberbank, T-Bank, and Alfa-Bank launched their own GdeBENZ-style services, though the banks build their gas-station maps from card-payment data at specific stations. If a driver filled up with 95-octane gasoline on a trip from St. Petersburg to Moscow and paid with a T-Bank card, that purchase would show up in the T-Bank service; pay with an Alfa-Bank card, and it appears in Alfa-Bank’s service; with a Sberbank card, in Sberbank’s.

The banks don’t share data with each other — though GdeBENZ does incorporate bank data, and T-Bank, for one, also surveys drivers about fuel availability — so their figures don’t match exactly. But because all three banks are popular and process a large volume of gas-station payments, overall trends are fairly easy to identify.

To double-check GdeBENZ, Meduza used 3.9 million records from the T-Bank, Sberbank, and Alfa-Bank services in total — data provided by our colleagues at the independent Russian news outlet Mediazona, who conducted their own study of gasoline availability in Russia. Those records show how specific gas stations in different regions were operating.

The data show that GdeBENZ reports do correlate with bank-card purchases: fuel is actually bought more often at stations where reviews say it’s available, and less often where reviews say it isn’t. An exact match between user reports and bank data isn’t possible, since conditions at gas stations shift quickly — reviews and purchases happen at different times, and fuel can appear and run out in between. But the correlation shows that GdeBENZ data reliably tracks the dynamics of fuel availability.

What new information did we learn about the start of Russia’s fuel crisis?

The short version. The crisis was worst in the first half of July, when buying gasoline without a line was nearly impossible and roughly half of stations had no fuel at all. The situation improved by the end of the month.

Here’s the longer version. The hardest stretch of the first wave came July 8–11, 2026, following a series of Ukrainian strikes on oil refineries. At that point, gasoline could be bought without a line at only 17–29% of gas stations on the GdeBENZ map; counting stations with lines, fuel was available at 56–64%.

Predictably, the longest lines and the strictest fuel sales limits began immediately afterward. On July 11, for instance, drivers reported lines at 55% of gas stations that had any fuel at all; of the reports describing restrictions, 75% cited a 30-liter-per-person cap and another 23% cited a 20-liter limit.

Even when gasoline did appear at a station, it could be bought without a line the next day only 32–43% of the time, and with a line only 62–64% of the time — most likely reflecting a recurring cycle in which a limited shipment would arrive, sell out quickly, and leave the station empty again.

By mid-July, the situation began to improve: several damaged refineries resumed operations, and authorities allowed the sale of lower-grade gasoline, halted exports, and boosted imports.

The Reuters news agency reported that at least 60,000 tons of gasoline were shipped to Russia from India alone, with planned imports from other countries — primarily Belarus — estimated at 400,000 tons a month. By comparison, industry sources cited by Reuters put Russia’s summer gasoline consumption at a minimum of 110,000 tons a day, against average daily production of about 90,000 tons in June.

As a result, by July 20 gasoline could be bought without a line at 33–43% of stations, with fuel overall available at 63–71%. By August 1, those figures stood at 37–45% and 60–64%, respectively. Gasoline hadn’t reached every station, in other words, but buying it without a line had grown significantly easier on average — a sign the situation had improved in many regions.

We consider this improvement the formal end of the crisis’s first wave.

Exchange data — where smaller companies and independent gas stations buy their fuel — confirms the improvement. Daily sales of gasoline and diesel there sometimes dropped to 42,000–51,000 tons in early July but exceeded 92,000–93,000 tons by July 30–31.

That’s still 18% below the same period in 2025, when about 114,000 tons sold per day. For gasoline alone, the gap is wider still: 18,000 tons versus 39,000, a 55% decrease. Across all of July, combined gasoline and diesel sales ran 42% below the previous year’s level, 67,000 tons a day versus 117,000.

Where in Russia was the gasoline situation worst? Where Ukraine bombed oil refineries?

The short version. The first wave hit the entire country. Among the hardest-hit regions were both those where Ukrainian drones struck oil refineries and those where things were otherwise calm.

Here’s the longer version. During the first wave, gasoline was hardest to find — even with lines factored in — in the Kirov region and Karachay-Cherkessia, where fuel was reported at only 27–31% and 29–42% of surveyed stations, respectively, on July 8–11. In Mari El, gasoline was available at 39–42% of stations; in Stavropol Krai, 38–53%. Other regions had gasoline but almost no way to buy it without a line: in the Lipetsk region, fuel was found at 55–77% of stations counting lines, but without a line at only 7–15%; in Mordovia, those figures were 48–68% and 6–11%; in Udmurtia, 49–60% and 4–17%.

These regions sit in different parts of Russia, and it’s hard to pin down exactly why they struggled so much. The only thing they share is that none rank among Russia’s largest or wealthiest territories.

None of their local refineries were attacked during the first wave. Mordovia and Udmurtia, however, also receive fuel from refineries in Nizhnekamsk (Tatarstan), Ufa, and Yaroslavl — all struck by drones just before the crisis hit its worst point.

Authorities in several of these regions also reported a sharp spike in gasoline demand, apparently as drivers rushed to stock up. In Saransk (Mordovia), demand doubled compared with usual levels; in the Yaroslavl region, it rose three- to fourfold. In the Stavropol region, sales on some days exceeded 3,000 tons against typical consumption of about 2,200 tons, while in the Kirov region they rose from 380 to 800 tons a day.

Drone strikes had a direct impact on regions with attacked refineries: in most of them, conditions were worse than the national average. But how badly a strike hurt a region depended on the scale of the damage, existing fuel reserves, and how quickly supplies could be rerouted.

The clearest example is the attack on the Perm oil refinery on July 30. Before the strike, gasoline without a line could be found at 45–49% of gas stations in Perm Krai; in the five days after, that fell to 30–42%. Overall fuel availability at local stations dropped from 55–59% to 44–53%.

After the attack on the refinery in Orsk (Orenburg region), the share of stations without a line fell from 35% to 18%, and overall fuel availability in the region dropped from 48% to 33%. After the strike on Nizhnekamsk, the share of stations offering gasoline without a line fell from 49% to 24%, and even counting lines, from 62% to 52%.

After the July 12 attack on the Syzran oil refinery, the Samara group of refineries sold no fuel at all on the exchange for several days, and gas station supplies in the region declined even as the national situation was improving. The same thing happened after the attack on the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat plant in Bashkortostan and the strike on the Saratov oil refinery.

The Yaroslavl region is an exception. In the three days before the attack on the YANOS refinery on July 16, gasoline without a line was found at just 28% of the same set of stations; in the following five days, that figure rose to 52%. Counting lines, it rose too, from 64% to 69%. The plant’s exchange sales didn’t decline at all: YANOS sold about 86% of its usual volume both before and after the strike.

It’s not entirely clear why the attack didn’t worsen the situation, though it likely left the plant’s main production and shipping capacity untouched. There were no reports that it had stopped operating.

One caveat bears repeating: the exchange reflects only part of the market, since large gas station chains don’t buy fuel there. Exchange data also doesn’t show where purchased fuel ended up or when it reached a gas station — gasoline sold by the Ufa oil refinery might have stayed in Bashkortostan, or it might have gone to a neighboring region, or to Moscow.

By the way, what happened in Moscow and St. Petersburg?

The short version. You’ve probably already guessed the answer: conditions were far better there than in Russia’s non-capital regions.

Here’s the longer version.

Fuel appears to have been directed to Moscow and St. Petersburg on a priority basis during the crisis’s first wave.

The gap with the national average was already visible at the crisis’s peak, July 8–11. In Moscow, gasoline without a line was found at 49–50% of stations, and counting lines, at 70–76%. In St. Petersburg, the figures were 32–34% and 65–74%. Nationally, the averages were only 17–29% and 56–64%.

By mid-July, gasoline without a line was available at 60–68% of Moscow’s gas stations and 63–66% of St. Petersburg’s; counting lines, the figures were 72–73% and 71–84%, respectively.

That confirms what market participants told Reuters. After the attack on the Moscow oil refinery in mid-June, authorities redirected gasoline from Siberia and the Urals to the capital region. A source cited by the Irkutsk-based outlet Potok said 60% of the fuel from the Angarsk oil refinery was ordered sent to Moscow, and one trader said at the time that the additional shipments from other Russian regions to Moscow alone could amount to several hundred thousand tons.

In other words, the improved situation in the capitals didn’t mean Russia had enough fuel overall. A limited resource was simply redirected to where shortages would have been most visible and politically sensitive.

What about prices? Gasoline must have gotten a lot more expensive during the crisis, right?

The short version. Prices did rise, but not by much in most regions — though in some of the hardest-hit spots, there was simply no gasoline to buy at all.

Here’s the longer version. Over the first three weeks of July, 92-octane and 95-octane gasoline rose in price by about 5 rubles. Between June 29 and July 20, the average price of 92-octane gasoline in Russia rose from 69 to 73.5 rubles per liter, an increase of 4.8 rubles, or 7%. 95-octane gasoline rose from 74 to 79 rubles, or 6.8%. Most of that increase came in the first half of July, when fuel was hardest to find at gas stations.

Official prices rose most sharply in occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, where the situation was especially dire: Ukrainian forces targeted not refineries but the fuel trucks and other vehicles trying to deliver fuel to the peninsula. Gasoline for Crimea was supposed to come primarily from southern Russia, but drone strikes had hit that region too.

As a result, Rosstat data show the average price of gasoline in Crimea rising from 154 to 222 rubles per liter between July 6 and 20, and in Sevastopol from about 133 to 211 rubles. Those prices, naturally, don’t convey the scale of the crisis: open gasoline sales on the peninsula were completely halted for a time, with fuel reserved only for government services and critical needs, while resellers were asking 200–350 rubles per liter.

Gasoline rose noticeably in parts of Russia too: the average price in Dagestan climbed from about 96 to 114 rubles per liter, in Tuva from 105 to 123 rubles, and in Mari El from 77 to 90 rubles.

But these are heavily averaged figures that mask large differences between chains, even within a single city. Between July 20 and August 3, at Neftmagistrali gas stations in Moscow and the Moscow region, 92-octane gasoline rose from 78 to 85 rubles and 95-octane from 86.99 to 93.99 rubles. Both gained 7 rubles. Over the same period, Rosneft’s 92-octane price didn’t move at all, and its 95-octane price rose by just 10 kopecks.

That gap is partly rooted in how the market is structured: large oil companies supply their own gas stations directly, while independent chains lean more heavily on middlemen and the exchange. In late June, small fuel shipments cost independent stations roughly twice the usual price. As a result, some stations held their old prices while others sold gasoline for more than 100 rubles per liter, or shut down entirely.

What do we know about the second wave of the crisis?

The short version. The second wave is now comparable in scale to the first, but looks very different — it has hit Moscow and the Moscow region hard, while St. Petersburg, for some reason, remains fine for now.

Here’s the longer version.

The temporary improvement in the fuel situation — now over — coincided with a brief pause in attacks on major oil refineries.

After July 16, Ukraine spent about a week targeting Wildberries warehouses instead. But strikes on fuel infrastructure resumed closer to the end of the month: between July 25 and August 20, Ukrainian drones struck Russian oil refineries 15 times, hitting some more than once, in Tyumen, Ryazan, Perm, Volgograd, Ufa, Syzran, Yaroslavl, Ilsky, Nizhnekamsk, Orsk, and Salavat.

Conditions at gas stations worsened again: on August 11–13, gasoline without a line was found at only 25–33% of stations, and counting stations with lines, at 46–48%. By that second measure, the August drop was even steeper than July’s: fuel had been available at 56–64% of stations even at the worst of the first wave, on July 8–11. During the first wave, in other words, gasoline more often remained at stations but with lines forming for it, while during the second, it’s more often absent entirely.

To make sure this drop wasn’t simply the result of a shift in the underlying data set — drivers filling up at entirely different gas stations in August than in July, say — we separately compared 2,176 gas stations that drivers reported on through GdeBENZ both at the end of July and in mid-August. At these stations, the share with gasoline available without a line fell from 46% to 32%, and counting lines, from 61% to 47%. The situation has started to improve in recent days, though: by August 23, the figures had risen to 38–46% and 63–75%, respectively. It’s not yet clear how durable that trend will prove.

St. Petersburg has remained an exception during the second wave, though the situation is gradually worsening there too: on August 21–23, gasoline without a line was found at about 81% of stations, and counting lines, at 86%.

In Moscow and the Moscow region, the second wave has hit much harder. Looking at the same set of gas stations from late July to mid-August, we found the share with gasoline available without a line fell in Moscow from 75% to 30%, and counting lines, from 85% to 49%. In the Moscow region, the figures fell from 72% to 25% and from 78% to 44%, respectively. By August 21–23, fuel had reappeared at more than half of the surveyed stations in Moscow and the Moscow region, but only about 28% offered it without a line.

Many other regions are struggling as well. In the first half of August, gasoline without a line was found at 13–19% of surveyed gas stations in the Smolensk region, 16–25% in the Tambov region, 14–22% in the Lipetsk region, 13–25% in the Voronezh region, and 6–24% in the Ryazan region. The Kurgan region deteriorated especially sharply in the past week, with fuel without a line found at just 8–19% of stations. Even counting lines, fuel was available at fewer than half of stations across all of these regions — 26–46%. Accordingly, most gas stations had no gasoline at all.

Outside Central Russia, conditions remained especially difficult in the Arkhangelsk region, where gasoline without a line was available at 5–20% of stations in the first half of August, and in the Samara region, at 16–26%. Even counting lines, fuel was available at only about half of stations: 48–49% in the Arkhangelsk region and 44–45% in the Samara region.

The southern regions near the front line remain especially vulnerable too. Local refineries there continue to come under attack even as the regions try to supply Crimea with fuel, host tourists, and bring in the harvest all at once; Meduza reported in detail on how the shortage spread through the southern regions and Crimea here.

In early July, gasoline without a line was found at 8–13% of gas stations in Stavropol Krai, and counting lines, at 38–53%. By the end of the month, the figures rose to 41–45% and about 62%, then fell again by mid-August to 9–30% and 34–39% — though here too, there’s been a noticeable improvement in recent days. Krasnodar Krai has followed roughly the same pattern.

On the exchange, 74,000–83,000 tons of combined gasoline and diesel sold daily between August 7 and 14, averaging about 78,000 tons — gasoline alone accounted for about 16,000 tons. That’s less than in late July but well above July’s low point. Between August 17 and 20, total volume fell to an average of about 73,000 tons per trading day, even as gasoline sales edged up to about 18,000 tons a day and diesel sales slipped to about 55,000.

That supply is far below last year’s levels. Comparing average sales per trading day, we found that about 29,000 tons of gasoline sold in June 2026, versus 42,000 in 2025; about 20,000 in July, versus 41,000; and 18,000 from August 1–20, versus 40,000. By August, in other words, gasoline sales were 55% below last year’s levels, and combined gasoline and diesel volume was down 34%.

Authorities widened that gap further with a decision made amid the crisis: starting July 1, they lowered the mandatory share of output gasoline producers must sell on the exchange, from 15% to 10%.

Taken together, everything we examined points to one clear conclusion: after a brief improvement, Russia’s fuel system has once again failed to keep up with demand.

The situation improved slightly after August 20, but it’s too early to call the crisis over. It could just as easily get significantly worse this fall, when a seasonal rise in demand will coincide with scheduled maintenance shutdowns at major refineries in both Russia (though those shutdowns could still be rescheduled) and Belarus, which is currently helping Russia cope with the fuel crisis.