The most difficult year A military expert, a political scientist, and a sociologist weigh in on how Russia’s war changed Ukraine in 2024
In 2024, the third year of Moscow’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine suffered significant territorial losses in Donbas and launched an incursion into western Russia, gaining a foothold in several districts of the Kursk region. Ukrainian authorities, meanwhile, tightened mobilization procedures and postponed elections until the end of martial law, which has been repeatedly extended since February 2022. For insight into how the third year of all-out war with Russia has changed Ukraine, Meduza asked a military expert, a political scientist, and a sociologist to weigh in on the situation at the front, the state of domestic politics, and what to expect next year.
William Courtney
Former U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia, and a leading expert at RAND
On the situation at the front
The situation at the front hasn’t really changed much since the end of last year. Ukraine has destroyed a third of the Black Sea Fleet, but its armed forces are experiencing setbacks in the Kursk region, where the Russian military has managed to recapture some territory. In addition, Russia’s offensive in Ukraine’s east is making small gains. However, from the point of view of the pro-war radicals in Russia who wanted a quick victory, the conflict has reached a relative stalemate.
If you look at the Russian economy, you can see that the sanctions needed time to take effect. But this is the usual story with sanctions. We see that they’re having a significant impact. Capital for investment in Russia is drying up. Traditionally, Russian oligarchs exported their capital to the West for themselves, while Russia imported capital to support its industry and agriculture. Now, this is no longer feasible.
I think it’s unwise to make predictions [for next year]. It’s safer to assume that the stalemate on the ground may continue. Russia is tired of the war and so is Ukraine. Both sides are facing troop shortages: Russia has turned to North Korea for support, while Ukraine is debating lowering the mobilization age from 25 to 18 years old. So, next year will likely bring some changes.
Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and we are committed to reporting objectively on a war we firmly oppose. Join Meduza in its mission to challenge the Kremlin’s censorship with the truth. Donate today.
The Ukrainian military appears to be strengthening its defenses now. The U.S. has started supplying Ukraine with antipersonnel mines for this purpose, which could make it difficult for Russian forces to advance beyond Ukraine’s current defensive lines. Despite the fact that Russian forces made some gains in certain areas, they didn’t capture a single major city [in 2024]. Again, from the point of view of the pro-war radicals in Russia, this is a failure.
Losing territory inside Russia is a humiliation for the Kremlin — and it’s an ongoing one because the Russians have failed to get it back. Ukraine didn’t plan to wage war on Russian territory, so if in 2025 the AFU loses all of the territory [it captured] in the Kursk region, it won’t have a big negative impact [politically]. Ukraine’s main goal is to defend its own territory. [Any] forces that leave the Kursk region will most likely return to the eastern front to strengthen it. For the same reason, the return of these territories to Russia won’t be a great achievement for its army.
On Western aid for Ukraine
Ukraine will likely face some uncertainty [when it comes to Western military aid]. It’s not yet clear what [U.S. President-elect Donald] Trump will do. During the election campaign, he said he’d end the war in a day, before taking office in January. However, after Trump was elected, he took a more responsible and careful stance. He appointed retired General Keith Kellogg as a special envoy for Ukraine and Russia. The [Trump] administration clearly wants to take some steps, but what exactly those steps will be remains unclear.
This uncertainty also affects the Europeans’ actions, although it seems that Europe’s [material] support for Ukraine is gradually increasing. The main problem for Ukraine at the moment is a lack of soldiers. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers at the front is about 40 years old. This is too old: a war requires young soldiers who can run faster, carry heavier loads, and are easier to train. Now, the age of [Ukraine’s] soldiers is as much a key issue as weapons supplies. That said, lowering the draft age carries demographic risks.
On the risks of nuclear war
I see no such risks rights now. The Kremlin starts talking about the nuclear threat every time Russian troops run into difficulties on the battlefield. We saw this in 2022. At the time, there were concerns that the Russian leadership was seriously thinking about it. Then, [China’s] Xi Jinping and [India’s] Narendra Modi spoke out against Putin using nuclear weapons. The Chinese leadership has repeated this warning several times since then. I think this is a real limitation, since Russia is dependent on China to some extent.
Another problem for Russia is that using nuclear weapons wouldn’t change the military situation much. Russian troops aren’t trained to conduct military operations on a nuclear battlefield after the detonation of such a weapon, so it’s unclear what military advantage using one would bring. The Russian authorities may think that the nuclear threat has a deterrent effect, but the West has shown that it’s prepared to support Ukraine, without shying away from threats.
On peace talks
It seems that more and more Ukrainians are tired of the war and would like to negotiate [a peace deal]. However, we don’t see public opinion surveys in which Ukrainians say that they’re prepared to make territorial concessions to resolve the conflict. It’s likely that once negotiations start, the attitude towards a peace settlement could change. Right now, many don’t believe that Russia would comply with the terms of a peace agreement.
It’s possible to imagine that peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will lead to a complete political settlement, but it’s much more likely that they will reach a ceasefire agreement. In this case, political questions will remain unresolved. This resembles what happened after the Korean War: there was no comprehensive peace agreement, but both sides stopped fighting.
Volodymyr Paniotto
Ukrainian sociologist, director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS)
On Ukraine’s demographic crisis
Mortality and birth rates have little influence on the demographic situation in Ukraine. The outflow of people from the country has a much greater impact. Interestingly, despite the war, the number of deaths in Ukraine has decreased [compared to the number recorded during the coronavirus pandemic]. For example, Ukraine registered 714,000 deaths in 2021 and 542,000 in 2022 — that is, almost 200,000 fewer [deaths]. In 2023, [there were] 496,000. I think the figures this year will be approximately similar.
There are several reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, in 2021, Covid still impacted the statistics. Secondly, after the start of the war, many people left Ukraine. The population in government-controlled territories has declined significantly. [But] statistics are difficult to assess right now: there is still a high level of migration and the statistics services aren’t working very well.
The birth rate is declining, as well. If in previous years Ukraine registered around 273,000 newborns, now this figure has dropped to about 200,000. Such changes are common during a war, and the consequences will be felt for another 20 years after it ends.
Since 2023, the number of Ukrainians in Europe has increased by five percent, meaning that not very many people are continuing to leave [the country]. The fact that some people constantly go back and forth and essentially live in two countries further complicates the estimates. External migration is the main demographic problem, in my opinion. Several months ago we conducted research in several European countries and the results showed that two-thirds of Ukrainians living abroad plan to obtain citizenship where they now live. There are even people who have already managed to obtain it.
In all likelihood, these two-thirds won’t return to Ukraine. As such, of the six million [Ukrainian refugees living in European countries], around four million will probably stay abroad. But it’s also worth noting that not all of them plan to give up their Ukrainian passports. However, there may be an additional wave of migration, [namely of] men who will go to [reunite with] their families who have already settled abroad.
On divisions among Ukrainians
The only positive consequence of the war is the near-complete disappearance of regional differences [of opinion] in Ukraine. Whereas in 2021 there was strong regional differentiation on most issues, now these differences have practically disappeared. For example, [people on opposite sides of the country] had different attitudes towards NATO even after 2014. Now, there are no such differences.
However, new grounds for social stratification have emerged over these few years. Now, what a person did and where they were during the war has become a dividing factor. For example, there are refugees in Europe, those who didn’t change their place of residence, internally displaced people (IDPs), and those who remained in the occupied territories. The last category faces the most noticeable reaction in society. While attitudes towards IDPs are generally positive, people living in the occupied territories evoke some social tension. By the same principle, there’s also a divide between soldiers and civilians.
On attitudes towards the Russian language
People in Ukraine haven’t stopped speaking Russian as quickly as their attitude toward [the language] has changed. For example, in 2019, only eight percent of Ukrainians believed the Russian language should not be taught in schools. By 2023, this figure had grown to 52 percent. The percentage of those who think the Russian language should be removed from official communication throughout the country has also increased significantly. [But] although differences in attitudes towards the Russian language have decreased significantly, they still persist.
In terms of everyday [language] use, more and more people now say they’re switching to Ukrainian in their daily lives. According to surveys, today, 60 percent of Ukrainians use the Ukrainian language in everyday communication, whereas around nine percent speak Russian. The rest say that they use both languages equally.
On trust in Volodymyr Zelensky
In general, people have a worse attitude towards the administration than towards Zelensky as a [political] figure. He’s still the leader in public trust. The only one Ukrainians trust more than him is probably [former Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief] Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
When Zelensky came to power in 2019, the level of trust in him was 80 percent. With time, it gradually decreased and before the start of the war it was at 37 percent. But by May 2022, support for Zelensky had increased to 90 percent. This figure decreased very slowly, dropping to 77 percent by December 2023 (which is unprecedented for Ukrainian presidents).
In 2024, the level [of trust in Zelensky] decreased more quickly. This was due to both the Ukrainian army’s failed counteroffensive and the public perception that the war is dragging on, as well as the dismissal of the very popular Zaluzhnyi. Nevertheless, in our latest survey, the level of trust [in Zelensky] was 53 percent. It’s possible that trust in him will continue to decline. To a great extent, this will depend on how the situation at the front develops.
The level of trust in Zaluzhnyi is higher than in Zelensky — 77 percent as of November 2024. He doesn’t appear in public often, but he’s probably the only one who has a chance of beating Zelensky in elections, if they were to be held.
On ending the war
For some reason there’s a belief that Ukrainians aren’t prepared to negotiate, even though they’ve been ready [practically] since day one. For example, in a survey we conducted in May 2022, 60 percent of Ukrainians expressed readiness for peace talks. This figure fell when the Ukrainian Armed Forces achieved successes at the front, to 44 percent and then to 29 percent. Then it started to grow again, from 33 percent to 57 percent.
Readiness for territorial concessions is another issue. In the first two years [of the full-scale war,] it was very low — 10 percent in May 2022, for example. This figure didn’t change much until 2023. After it became clear that the Ukrainian army was no longer continuing the fight so successfully, readiness [to make territorial concessions] increased: in September 2024, 33 percent of respondents said Ukraine could give up some territories. [However,] it’s important to add that there’s no talk of recognizing these territories as Russian. Rather, their liberation should be postponed and this issue should be resolved through diplomatic means.
Volodymyr Fesenko
Ukrainian political scientist, director of the Penta Center for Applied Political Research
On the mood in Ukraine
The [full-scale] war has been going on for more than 1,000 days already and in two months, it will be three years since it began. Of course, this has a very ambiguous effect on the mood among Ukrainians. On the one hand, the majority of Ukrainians are against concessions to Russia: They want peace, but not at such a price. On the other hand, there’s certainly a sense of [battle] fatigue. The number of internal contradictions in society has increased. For example, until September of last year, there was an informal taboo around criticizing the president and the military. Now, everyone is under fire — from the military command to Zelensky.
We’re also seeing a difficult situation at the front. From a military point of view, 2024 may have been the most difficult year for us. There are problems with mobilization and finding effective frontline tactics, especially in the Donetsk region. In some cases, the Russian army had a significant advantage for most of the year — both in terms of manpower and artillery, and in the air. This also contributes to the mood among Ukrainians.
On the appointment of Oleksandr Syrskyi
Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal became grounds for criticism of Zelensky and it affected his poll numbers. This clearly shows that Zelensky doesn’t just make decisions that draw applause from the public. If he’s convinced that an unpopular decision has to be made, he’s prepared to take that step.
When [Oleksandr Syrskyi] was first appointed [Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces,] attitudes towards him were very complicated. On the one hand, Zelensky’s opponents and Zaluzhnyi’s fans harshly criticized Syrskyi, ascribing him the reputation of a “butcher” and claiming that he didn’t spare soldiers. On the other hand, many Ukrainian and foreign military experts recalled that Syrskyi was behind the most successful military operations in 2022: for example, he commanded the defense of Kyiv, and planned and implemented the Kharkiv offensive. He really is a talented military leader.
Zaluzhnyi is a very charming and mythologized figure. He has political talent: he had great authority in the armed forces but at the same time provoked sympathy among people outside of the army. Syrskyi is a classic military man: he’s closed, tough, and demands subordination and following orders. Before his appointment, he wasn’t very well-known and was criticized for being too harsh. He was perceived as a representative of the old school, whereas Zaluzhnyi was seen as the face of a new generation of Ukrainian servicemen. Syrskyi’s approach is not for everyone. Over time, attitudes towards him have improved, but he still hasn’t won the same kind of popular love.
Syrskyi’s main problem isn’t Syrskyi himself, but the accumulated problems of the Ukrainian army. Some are the legacy of Soviet traditions, others have to do with the fact that many people came to the army from civilian life. They often have a negative perception of the military’s tough approach, which doesn’t always pay attention to human dignity. This is difficult to correct in wartime, but the system must be reformed.
Syrskyi’s fate depends on the future [development of] the military situation. If the Russian offensive can be stopped and the situation stabilized, he will likely remain the commander. If the problems continue, the question of replacing him may arise. However, there are no [obvious] candidates for this role.
On mobilization
At the end of last year it became obvious that it was necessary to carry out mass mobilization. The first draft [of the new mobilization] law turned out to be quite harsh and provoked sharp criticism. As a result, a compromise version was adopted in April, which turned out to be largely ineffective. It has a lot of gaps and unclearly defined norms that can be broadly interpreted. In practice, the mobilization process still frequently occurs not in accordance with the law, but according to informal rules.
The main problem with mobilization is that a significant number of people are afraid to go to the front. The banal fear of dying at war has a strong influence on people. It’s not uncommon to encounter a situation where people support the idea of Ukraine’s victory and the liberation of occupied territories, but at the same time want to protect their loved ones from military service.
Active discussion [about lowering the draft age to 18 years old] really began with the help of Western media. At the start of the war, the mobilization age was 27. The core of the army’s rank and file is the generation [made up] of 40- to 50-year-olds. This, by the way, is the generation that came of age with their country and has more pronounced patriotic beliefs. However, by the end of last year it became clear that it was necessary to carry out mass mobilization and, accordingly, lower the conscription age.
Zelensky and many other politicians and public figures are against it. For some, it’s a political issue: 18-year-olds and their families are their future electorate. However, there are also serious social risks. Demographers believe that if the draft age is lowered to 18, Ukraine will find itself in a demographic hole. In addition, many soldiers say this still won’t solve the army’s problems. So, if the [draft] age is lowered, it will happen gradually.
On elections in Ukraine
It’s incorrect to say that elections were cancelled in Ukraine this year. Rather, they simply weren’t called. Martial law restricts a range of democratic norms and, in particular, prohibits elections.
The reasons for this are understandable. Holding elections is a domestic political struggle that would inevitably weaken the country from within during a war. Especially if the war is being fought on [your own] territory. How can you hold elections if there are air raid sirens going off every day and frontline cities are under constant attack? During intense fighting, it’s impossible to ensure security and normal conditions for voters.
The approach of the presidential election provoked a broad discussion [about the need to hold them] — interestingly, delaying parliamentary elections provoked no such discussion. According to sociologists, about 70 percent of Ukrainians ultimately opposed holding elections. So, when Zelensky made this decision, he was guided by public opinion.
On peace talks
Do you know what the paradox of this situation is? Firstly, everyone is talking about peace talks, but there are no talks and no one knows when they’ll begin. Although, of course, Trump clearly wants to end the war.
Secondly, both Russia and Ukraine are critical of a scenario that would freeze the war. However, freezing it is the only realistic compromise scenario for ending the war. The other [possible] scenarios are either a Russian victory or a Ukrainian victory (most likely, a partial one). However, Trump is unlikely to promote [these options].
I believe that in [2025] we may face a situation where negotiations start, but the war continues. In all likelihood, Putin will use military operations to put pressure on the negotiation process.
Interviews by Kira Kiseleva
Abridged translation by Eilish Hart
Meduza survived 2024 thanks to its readers!
Let’s stick together for 2025.
The world is at a crossroads today, and quality journalism will help shape the decades to come. Real stories must be told at any cost. Please support Meduza by signing up for a recurring donation.