1,000 days What open-source data tell us about the evolution of Russia’s war against Ukraine
November 19, 2024, marks 1,000 days since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine. From the outset, Meduza’s analysts have been gathering and examining open-source information from the front lines to deliver accurate reports on a war the Kremlin has tried to censor. Our first report, published just three days into the 2022 invasion, included only 33 geolocated videos of Russian troop movements, verified by our team and other OSINT analysts. Today, after 153 updates, our maps feature over 15,000 geolocated videos and serve as a detailed chronicle of the territories occupied by Russia and liberated by Ukraine. This wealth of data has allowed us to track the war’s stages and identify significant trends over the course of the conflict. Here’s what we’ve learned.
Before diving into recent developments and calculating how many square kilometers of territory Russian forces have captured, it’s helpful to look at the overall picture from the start of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, beginning with the annexation of Crimea. The graph below shows how many square kilometers of internationally recognized Ukrainian territory have been controlled by Russia or Russian-backed forces since 2014.
Because reliable data on territorial control in Donbas during the intense fighting of 2014–2015 and in Crimea is limited, the graph provides only two static snapshots:
- Crimea’s land area as of March 26, 2014, when Russian forces had effectively secured control of the peninsula.
- The territory of “certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk” as of September 16, 2014, when Ukrainian authorities passed a law granting those designated areas special self-governance, effectively conceding they were no longer under Kyiv’s control.
The main takeaway from this graph is the minimal scale of changes on the front lines over the past two years. The last period of significant movement came when Russian forces pulled back from the western bank of the Dnipro River in the Kherson region, followed by Ukraine’s counteroffensive near Balakliya and Kupyansk — a shift that’s clearly visible on the graph. Since then, the conflict has transitioned into a largely positional war, resembling the near-standstill that characterized the years before the full-scale invasion. In fact, from February 24, 2023, to February 24, 2024, the total area controlled by both sides remained virtually unchanged, shifting by only about ten square kilometers (four square miles). Still, Russian casualties (and likely Ukrainian ones) almost doubled over that same period.
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This doesn’t mean that events on the front over the past two years have been less consequential than in phases marked by more visible territorial shifts on the front line. Instead, it underscores that meaningful analysis of territorial shifts is only possible when comparing similar phases of the war. It doesn’t make sense to compare land gains during fast-moving battles to what happens in a drawn-out war of attrition. For a clearer analysis, it’s best to focus on the period starting in late 2022–early 2023, when the front settled into a nearly two-year stalemate. The status quo started shifting only recently, and not in Ukraine’s favor.
Russia now controls nearly 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory
The graph below details the advances of both Ukrainian and Russian forces, as well as the overall balance of territorial control, showing the difference between the areas held by each side. This breakdown is important because, even when the overall balance appears stable, each side may still be making significant gains on different fronts. Alternatively, all shifts may result from the advances of just one side, as has been the case with Russia’s offensive operations in recent months.
The graph clearly confirms several key points:
- The pace of Russian advances in recent weeks is the fastest recorded since early 2023, with gains of up to 300 square kilometers (115 square miles) per week.
- Comparable speeds of territorial capture have only been seen twice during this period: when Ukrainian forces pushed into Russia’s Kursk region in early August 2024, and when Russian troops secured positions near Kharkiv and Vovchansk in May of the same year.
- These operations, however, had markedly different impacts on territorial control. Despite Ukraine’s swift progress near Sudzha in Russia, the operation didn’t slow Russia’s advance in Donbas over the long term. As a result, the overall balance quickly shifted back in Russia’s favor within just three weeks.
- Ukraine’s last significant gains before the Kursk operation date to late 2023 and early 2024, when Kyiv sought to counter Russia’s push around Avdiivka by establishing a foothold on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River near the village of Krynky in the Kherson region and launched counterattacks south of Bakhmut and near Horlivka.
A separate graph, showing the total area of occupied mainland Ukraine rather than the pace of advances, provides a clearer view of the broader phases of the war:
- The steady increase in Russian-occupied territory from spring to June 2023 during the battle of Bakhmut.
- A sharper reverse trend tied to Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia in June 2023.
- The accelerating Russian gains starting in November 2023, which allowed Russian forces to take back all the territory (by total area) that Ukraine had liberated in the summer.
- A pronounced downward spike connected to Ukraine’s operation in the Kursk region.
Since the start of 2023, Russian forces have expanded their control over Ukrainian territory by 2,067 square kilometers (798 square miles), from 85,700 to 86,800 square kilometers, or 33,089 to 33,513 square miles (excluding Crimea). Most of this increase has occurred in the past six months.
Including Crimea, Russian forces control 18.8 percent of Ukraine’s territory as of mid-November 2024. Ukraine currently holds 650 square kilometers (about 250 square miles) in Russia’s Kursk region.
Putin isn’t near achieving his (current) territorial demands
At the start of the full-scale war, the Kremlin framed its objectives with vague terms like “denazification” and “demilitarization,” leaving room for almost any outcome to be declared a victory. But in June 2024, ahead of a peace summit organized by Kyiv in Switzerland, Vladimir Putin issued a more concrete ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the entire territory of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.
Even though Ukraine’s army has faced severe setbacks in recent months, this demand appears highly unrealistic — especially given that a large part of the Kherson region lies on the western bank of the Dnipro River, and crossing it would require a total collapse of Ukraine’s defenses.
If Moscow’s territorial goals remain unchanged, then the graph below suggests that the Russian army has made only limited progress in achieving them.
Currently, Russia controls 78 percent of the territory of these four Ukrainian regions. At the start of 2023, when Russian casualties were about six times lower than they are now, that figure stood at 76 percent. The most significant Russian gains have been in Donetsk, where occupied territory has increased from 57 percent to 65 percent of the region’s total area since early 2023.
More casualties don’t equate to more ground covered
Meduza’s data clearly illustrates how the nature of the war has changed many times over the 1,000 days since the full-scale invasion began. Territorial shifts are, without a doubt, linked to losses in both manpower and equipment, but in complex ways.
Russian military deaths in 2023 were double those in 2022, and in 2024, weekly personnel losses hit record levels of 200 to 250 soldiers per day. But even as casualties rise, the front can remain practically stable. Conversely, if this stability gives way to a more maneuver-driven phase of the conflict, it doesn’t necessarily follow that there will be higher losses.
Keeping this in mind, it’s still possible to compare loss rates and territorial gains over short periods, though the insights from such comparisons are limited. Still, some patterns emerge. For instance, the intense fighting around Bakhmut in early 2023 coincided with a sharp increase in both Russian casualties and territorial gains. Another notable pattern is the surge in equipment losses that accompanied Russian advances near Vovchansk, north of Kharkiv, and near Ocheretyne, north of Avdiivka.
It’s also important to consider that information on territorial control can often be confirmed through geolocation data within days, while reports on equipment losses — and especially personnel losses — may lag by several months. As a result, recent loss figures are almost certainly underreported. Over time, it may become clear that Russia’s current record territorial gains came with equally high losses in troops and military equipment.
