Gerrymandering à la russe: To preserve United Russia’s supermajority, the Kremlin is pressuring Communists to sideline their strongest candidates in September’s elections

Russia’s Communist Party will not field strong candidates in most single-member State Duma districts this fall, sidelining even the politicians who defeated United Russia’s candidates in the 2021 campaign. Meduza learned of the situation from four sources: a contact within the Communist Party leadership, a regional Communist legislator, an official at one of the presidential envoy’s offices, and an official from a region where the local Communist branch has historically been considered strong.

Russia’s 450-seat State Duma fills its seats through two parallel systems: 225 go to party lists, allocated proportionally based on each party’s share of the national vote, and 225 to single-member districts, where individual candidates compete head-to-head. With its strongest candidates benched in district races, United Russia would be well positioned to win most single-member seats and keep its constitutional supermajority in the State Duma (preserving the party’s ability to pass any measure, including constitutional amendments, on its own).

Meduza’s source within the Communist Party leadership said, for example, that Oleg Mikhailov — a State Duma deputy from the Komi Republic — will most likely not run in a district race. In the late 2010s, Mikhailov supported a grassroots protest against the construction of a garbage dump not far from Komi and stood up to the region’s notorious governor, Vladimir Uiba, an outside appointee with no ties to the region. In 2022, he did not vote on recognizing the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or on the later annexation of those territories along with Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The party is also considering not fielding Pyotr Ammosov, a lawmaker from Yakutia. Both Ammosov and Mikhailov will likely be offered spots on the party list, but those positions do not guarantee them seats in the Duma.

Not the Commies’ first rodeo

The Communist Party used the same tactic in the last election. In Buryatia’s single-member district, it did not field popular local politician Vyacheslav Marhayev. A former commander of Buryatia’s riot police unit, Marhayev had spoken out against the heavy-handed conduct of security forces during the 2019 protests in Moscow. In his place, the party ran a young Communist, Bair Tsyrenov, who lost to a United Russia candidate.

Former Irkutsk Governor Sergei Levchenko was also passed over for a district race. (In 2015, he had won the gubernatorial election against Sergei Eroschenko, a Kremlin-backed independent.) The presidential administration did agree to give one district in the region to Mikhail Shchapov — a local Communist, businessman, and former FSB officer. In return, Shchapov ran a deliberately passive campaign that kept Communist turnout low, allowing United Russia outsider Igor Kobzev to win the governorship.

Both Marhayev and Levchenko received party-list seats and ultimately made it into parliament. Neither will run in a district this time, even though fielding them would be “logical from the standpoint of real competition and a genuine race,” according to Meduza’s source within the Communist Party. He calls the candidacies of Mikhailov and Ammosov equally “logical.” But, he explains, “the party has to honor certain arrangements [with the authorities],” which is why the systemic opposition (parties that operate within a framework the Kremlin permits) will not put its likely front runners into district races.

The presidential administration has a long-standing practice of handing the Communists and other parties “cleared” districts — constituencies where United Russia agrees to stand down. In 2021, for example, United Russia did not field strong challengers against Communist candidates Oleg Smolin (in Omsk), Leonid Kalashnikov (in Samara), or party member and Mari El businessman Sergei Kazankov.

That same year, Oleg Mikhailov, Pyotr Ammosov, Maria Prusakova (Altai Krai), and Mikhail Matveyev (Samara) all won genuinely competitive races against United Russia candidates. A Meduza source close to the presidential administration recalls that these Communist victories “were deemed a problem.” “United Russia didn’t win the planned number of districts, even though it still secured more than a constitutional majority,” the source said.

The same source notes that incumbent status would give these politicians an additional boost in the September campaign and help them post strong numbers. The Kremlin therefore suggested that Communist Party leadership “dial down the competitive intensity in certain districts.” In the cases of Mikhailov and Ammosov, an agreement was reached: party leadership is now persuading the deputies that they would be better off running on party lists.

In Altai Krai, district boundaries were gerrymandered to make things harder for Maria Prusakova. She had spent years cultivating her constituents and building a local reputation. Because of the redrawn district lines, she will now have to win over a new electorate at the last minute.

Here comes the fuzz

The Communist Party’s regional ranks are also under pressure from the security services, with several popular deputies already facing criminal prosecution.

In November 2025, Lyudmila Klyushnikova, a Communist member of the Altai Krai legislative assembly, and her aide Svetlana Kerber were detained on fraud charges. In February 2026, security forces arrested two more lawmakers — Andrei Chernobai and Yuri Kropotin. In April 2026, they detained Anna Yartseva, an aide to Communist Krai deputy Igor Galkin; and in May, Vitaly Buldakov, the secretary of the Altai Krai Communist Party committee, and Natalya Chistokletova, the regional branch’s former chief accountant.

Meduza’s source close to the presidential administration does not rule out that criminal cases could also be brought against prominent and uncooperative State Duma deputies who run in districts.

“Maria Prusakova will run in a district, though [party leadership] understands that her campaign will be very difficult,” the source within the Communist Party said. “It’s important for Zyuganov to signal his support when there’s heavy pressure — it’s his way of showing that he doesn’t abandon his own.”

Mikhail Matveyev, a Samara-based lawmaker, is also expected to be nominated in his district, with a political brand that appeals to the party’s top brass. “He’s a pro-war populist, conspiracy theorist, and nationalist,” a source said.

Despite this pressure, the Communists will still receive negotiated districts for Oleg Smolin in Omsk and Leonid Kalashnikov in Samara. In one of Irkutsk’s regional districts, the party is also set to nominate cosmonaut Oleg Novitsky, who has no prior connection to either the region or the Communist Party. An Irkutsk official told Meduza that the nomination came at the Kremlin’s initiative, and that “neither the local Commies nor the regional government is thrilled about it.” “Getting an outsider elected — and under the red flag, no less — that’s a tall order,” the official said with a sigh.

Several young Communist deputies — at both the regional and local levels — and political consultants working with the party are frustrated with the Communists’ approach to candidate nominations in district races. “For example, in one of the central St. Petersburg districts, they’re putting forward Sergei Lovenetsky, an ‘SVO man’ [a veteran of Russia’s war in Ukraine]. It’s obvious that for the electorate there, he’s about the most unacceptable candidate possible,” one of the consultants said.

A source close to the presidential administration told Meduza that as United Russia’s poll numbers have fallen and its key performance indicators have been revised downward, the question of single-member districts has become even more pressing. “If the party-list share comes in lower, that means more districts will have to be won. The math is simple,” the source said.

The Kremlin has long wanted to knock the Communists out of second place in the polls. According to Meduza’s source, pressure on the Communist Party — including from the security forces — is likely to continue, and during the campaign, the Communists will be cast as “ban supporters.” Examples of this framing are already appearing in pro-Kremlin media. A Gazeta.ru story with the headline “United Russia Decides Not to Support a Social Media Ban for Children Under 14” pointedly noted that Communist Party members voted for the ban.