‘The West has full control’ Ukraine has begun using American-made ATACMS missiles to hit Russian territory. Could it change the course of the war?
On November 19, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine had fired six U.S.-made ATACMS missiles at Russia’s Bryansk region (Ukrainian media reported that the country’s General Staff “does not have information about this strike,” though the attack was first reported by the outlet RBC Ukraine). Two days earlier, The New York Times reported that U.S. President Joe Biden had finally granted Kyiv permission to use the ballistic missiles on Russian territory after months of pleading from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. To find out how Ukraine’s use of ATACMS could change the course of the war in the coming months, Meduza spoke to Anton Barbashin, a political analyst and the editorial director of Riddle Russia. This interview has been edited and abridge for length and clarity.
What restrictions has the U.S. imposed on where Ukraine can use ATACMS?
As far as I understand, the U.S. has set a condition that strikes should not go deep within Russia but only target areas where active combat is taking place — for example, in the Kursk region. And as with any Western equipment or military aid, the main restriction is that only military facilities can be targeted.
Western society is democratic; there are voters observing everything. The theoretical scenario of an ATACMS strike hitting a target and causing significant civilian casualties would be a major issue for the West. Therefore, only purely military targets are considered legitimate: military bases, supply transit points, and troop concentrations.
Do you think the U.S. would ever allow Ukraine to use these missiles to target Russian energy infrastructure?
No. All the damage to Russian oil storage facilities and refineries has been caused by either drones, saboteurs, recruited agents, or Ukrainian intelligence services. A strike on civilian infrastructure using American weapons would be extremely problematic, so I expect the authorization to remain strictly limited to military targets.
Russia isn’t going to bomb the U.S. or Poland in response — its retaliation will target Ukraine’s own infrastructure. The potential for strikes on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure is far from exhausted, and there’s also the so-called decision-making center — Russia could send several missiles straight to the president’s office on [Kyiv’s] Bankova Street.
Both Ukraine and Western countries understand that Russia can wage an even harsher war. However, if military means are used exclusively on military targets, Russia’s reaction might be somewhat less severe. But again, the boundaries are unclear: it’s not uncommon for Russia to announce strikes on Ukrainian military targets, only for them to hit an apartment building. And we don’t fully understand whether this was deliberate, the result of debris from air defense interception, or simply a targeting error. These mistakes, whether intentional or accidental [in the case of Ukraine damaging civilian infrastructure], could become significantly more frequent.
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What could happen if Ukraine started targeting not just Russia’s border areas but other territories as well?
The West has full control over the situation: Ukraine is directly dependent on ongoing [weapons] supplies, and much of the aid allocated by Biden has yet to arrive. The main [deterrent] mechanism is simply cutting off future supplies and financial assistance. This process can be slowed down at any moment, leaving Kyiv without the support it’s already counting on.
Back in early fall, Putin said that strikes on Russian territory using American missiles would mean that NATO is directly involved in the war. Now that this scenario is effectively playing out, how do you think Russia might respond?
At various levels, Russia has already stated that it understands the West is involved, at least by providing Ukraine with intelligence. I think Russia has the technical capacity to escalate the situation: striking supply routes for Western weapons coming from Poland to Ukraine, so somewhere near Lviv. It could increase strikes on Kyiv and other cities; become even less precise in its strikes, ramp up attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, escalate sabotage operations in Europe, and conduct more cyberattacks. If things escalate to the brink of nuclear war, Russia could even stage some kind of technological disaster to temporarily halt everything.
But I think the situation will more or less continue as it is right now — though with a growing number of casualties. The destruction of civilian infrastructure and loss of civilian lives will continue.
Three days ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called Vladimir Putin for the first time in nearly two years. According to the German tabloid Bild, Scholz coordinated the call with other Western leaders and informed President Zelensky in advance. Axios reports that the U.S. informed Ukraine of Biden’s decision “about three days ago” as well, suggesting the call may have taken place right after the U.S. president authorized Ukraine to use missiles in the Kursk region. Right after Scholz’s call, Ukraine came under the most intense bombardment of the last three months. Do you think these events are connected?
It’s entirely possible. Until the documents are declassified, we won’t know for sure. I don’t have any insider information about this, but I can say that the call itself was rather strange. From what we see on the Kremlin’s website, Putin simply reiterated the same demands that he’s made many times before: “This is all NATO aggression, and we want Ukraine’s full capitulation.”
I find it hard to understand Scholz’s reasoning, especially since he’s likely to lose his position soon. Why did he make the call? What was he hoping to achieve? This seems to be part of some diplomatic maneuver, but we don’t have enough information to say definitively what happened before and after.
Shortly before calling Putin, Scholz also telephoned U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, who claims he plans to act as a mediator in peace negotiations. How do you think Joe Biden’s decision to allow longer-range missile strikes inside Russia might affect Moscow’s view of Trump’s plan?
I don’t know the details of Trump’s peace plan, but I don’t think it will make the situation significantly easier for Putin. So far, all the statements we’ve heard suggest that the U.S. is indeed willing to reduce its support for Ukraine, but only if Russia makes concessions as well. However, we’ve seen no indication that Moscow is willing to compromise.
Russia has consistently signaled that its sticking to its original set of demands: a neutral status for Ukraine, having it cede territories Russia considers its own, and so on. Meanwhile, we can clearly see that despite significant losses, the Russian army is making advances. It’s clear that Russia isn’t doing this just to solidify the current front line and stop there.
I find it hard to imagine that Trump’s team has a concrete plan. After all, we saw how Trump approached North Korea during his first term as president: he visited and took photos [with Kim Jong-un]. Did that change North Korea’s behavior in any way? Not at all.
Even before the decision to authorize ATACMS, I thought Trump’s attempt to broker peace wouldn’t lead to anything meaningful. He might try, fail, and then things would continue as they are now.
So in your view, the likelihood that Russia will be willing to soften its terms for peace is approaching zero?
Russia might be willing to make some compromises, say, regarding the amount of military equipment and weapons Ukraine will have left after a peace agreement. But these are secondary issues. Russia’s main demands are not so much about territories (because right now they’re just rubble), but rather about securing Ukraine’s neutral status and its disarmament. But it’s hard for me to imagine Ukraine agreeing to that. And what guarantees are there that after this, Russia won’t start military actions again to depose Zelensky or capture Kyiv?
Russia is unlikely to reconsider its positions regarding neutrality and its effective partial control over Ukrainian sovereignty. What would be the point of so much blood spilled if Putin will [ultimately] get a situation where Ukraine becomes a strong state that will take back its territories? If that doesn’t happen during his lifetime, it certainly will after his death.