As rumors swirl about Russia’s next mobilization drive, Meduza’s sources say the Kremlin is still weighing its options
Rumors in Russia about an impending wave of mobilization have been growing in recent months. They picked up steam in early August 2024 after Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, and then flared up again earlier this month against the backdrop of the authorities testing a new electronic draft registry system and Putin ordering the military to add 180,000 troops to the army’s ranks. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin bloggers and “war correspondents” have been advocating for a new draft campaign since at least July, arguing that Russia needs it in case tensions with the West escalate further. Meduza spoke to sources within the Russian government about whether they expect the Kremlin to declare another round of mobilization in the foreseeable future.
Meduza discussed the rumors that Vladimir Putin is planning a new wave of mobilization with:
- two sources close to the Putin administration;
- one source close to the Russian government;
- two regional officials (regional authorities play a significant role in the recruitment of contract soldiers).
All of these sources said that they don’t see any obvious signs that the authorities are preparing for mobilization and that they doubt a new round will be declared “in the near future,” referring to the next two to four months.
“Everything has been quiet on our end as far as preparations for any [mobilization-related] activities, transport, or locations for assembling new draftees. There haven’t been any directives; there hasn’t even been any discussion about estimates for how many people to expect,” one regional official said. A source close to the federal government who works closely with regional administrations confirmed that officials haven’t received any instructions about a future mobilization.
However, another regional government source noted that governors and their subordinates could be the last to learn about an upcoming draft. “It’s an unpopular topic,” he explained. “People [in the regions] are worried, and [mobilization] often comes up in conversations. If something starts happening on our level, it won’t be long before everyone knows about it.” (A June survey from the independent research group Russian Field found that a majority of Russians wouldn’t support a new wave of mobilization.)
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It’s indeed the case that Vladimir Putin and his inner circle usually withhold information about major decisions until the last minute, including from high-ranking officials. As late as February 2022, for example, many members of the Russian government were unaware of the president’s plans to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
According to Meduza’s sources close to the Kremlin, the topic of mobilization is currently “one of the predominant fears” among Russians. “There’s a constant negative backdrop: rising prices, the special military operation itself,” one source said. “And mobilization is one of the main negative future scenarios that [people] are constantly turning over in their minds.”
Russian society reacted harshly to the country’s 2022 mobilization. Several hundred thousand people, most of them draft-age men, fled the country (though 15–45 percent of those who left after the war began have since returned to Russia). At the same time, Dagestan was the only region to see notable protests, likely because any expression of anti-war sentiment in Russia is banned and met with harsh punishment.
The president’s office also believes another mobilization drive could have a negative impact on the president’s approval ratings. However, Meduza’s sources are reluctant to speculate about whether a new draft could push people to take to the streets. “Society’s reactions are often unpredictable. Protests can be sparked by seemingly minor issues like environmental concerns, while more significant developments often fail to trigger serious protests,” one source explained.
According to sources close to the Putin administration, high-ranking security officials support the idea of a new mobilization wave, while civilian officials from the government and the president’s team claim to be opposed. Civilian authorities have argued that another draft would do serious damage to the labor market, which is already suffering from a severe worker shortage.
Additionally, a new wave of mobilization would be seen as a “betrayal,” according to one source close to the Kremlin. “The official narrative is that there are enough contract soldiers [already] and no mobilization is necessary,” the sources said. “People also see indirect signs of this: job ads for army contracts with huge payouts are everywhere. The conclusion is clear: for that kind of money, someone must be signing up.”
Pumping up the numbers
The Russian officials who spoke to Meduza believe that for the moment, there are “generally enough troops at the front” (though some note that the soldiers currently fighting are “tired”). Available data on the size of the Russian Armed Forces indicates that since the beginning of 2023, the army has not only compensated for its losses but continued to grow by attracting new contract soldiers.
However, other data indicates that the Russian authorities have exaggerated the success of their recruitment efforts. In 2023, according to federal budget data, 345,400 people joined the military — far fewer than the 540,000 that were officially announced. In early 2024, recruitment rates dropped significantly: budget data shows that in the year’s first quarter, the government paid 73,400 one-time bonuses for signing contracts, which corresponds to roughly 295,000 new recruits for the year.
Aware of these numbers, the Kremlin increased the federal payment for contract soldiers once again in late July, raising it from 195,000 rubles ($2,100) to 400,00 rubles ($4,300). Many regions, facing recruitment challenges, have also raised their payouts; in Moscow and St. Petersburg, for example, new contract soldiers can now expect a one-time payment of about two million rubles ($21,500). As a result, in the second quarter of 2024, 25 percent more Russians were sent to the front compared to the year’s first quarter. In total, more than 166,000 people were sent to fight in the first half of the year — only slightly fewer than during the same period in 2023.
Nevertheless, the Russian army continues to face a personnel shortage, especially among infantry. This is due both of the expansion of the front (amid the current combat situation in the Kharkiv and Kursk regions) and to an increased casualty rate. According to Meduza’s estimates, by mid-September 2024, the total number of Russian soldiers killed since the start of the war had reached 135,000–140,000 people. If we add this to the number of soldiers discharged due to severe injuries, Russia’s total irrecoverable losses could range from 270,000 to 420,000. Contract soldier recruitment is offsetting these losses, but there are very few people left to expand the army’s size.
At the same time, the Kremlin’s ability to increase the size of the army is hindered by a shortage of equipment. Most of the tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery weapons supplied by industry are refurbished and taken from Soviet-era stockpiles, which aren’t unlimited.
The officials who spoke to Meduza indicated that the decision to declare a new round of mobilization will depend on a “multitude of factors.” One source close to the Russian government explained as follows:
What will happen on the front lines? If there are setbacks, mobilization will become necessary. If the leadership determines that the army is making slow progress in Donbas, that will also prompt the decision. If there are successes, there might be a desire to consolidate them even further. Strikes [from long-range Western weapons] on Russian territory? We may respond with a new call-up. Or we might avoid it so as not to exacerbate the domestic situation.
Still, Meduza’s sources are confident that due to the introduction of the new electronic draft registry system, a new mobilization wave shouldn’t lead to the level of emigration that the last one sparked — because draft notices will simply block individuals from leaving the country. “Everything will be ready if we need it, and we won’t have the kind of chaos we saw in the fall of 2022,” said one source close to the Putin administration. “Essentially, someone from the General Staff would go to the president and say, ‘Alright, we need to mobilize.’ And the infrastructure would already be in place.”
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