Telegram has become a key tool for the Russian military. Why does Moscow continue to rely on a Dubai-based civilian messaging app?

Tech billionaire Pavel Durov’s arrest in France has reignited debate in Russia over the Telegram messenger app’s role in the war in Ukraine. The last round of discussion surrounding the issue came as recently as July, when the State Duma passed a law allowing new punishments for soldiers who use “civilian” devices while deployed. After a wave of criticism from pro-war bloggers and state media “war correspondents” who feared the new policy would leave Russian troops with no reliable means of communication, the law was watered down. Now, the same groups are discussing whether the “keys to Telegram” are at risk of being handed over to the West, and whether the messenger could be blocked by the Russian authorities. According to these commentators, Telegram has become the main communication tool of the war, linking various military branches and hierarchy levels into a single management, intelligence sharing, and target engagement complex, though this is a gross exaggeration. Meduza explains what we know about how the Russian military actually uses Telegram, what other programs its uses for battlefield communication, and why it still hasn’t developed its own platform to replace the Dubai-based app.

How is Telegram used on the battlefield?

Telegram is actively used by Russian soldiers, especially at the tactical level and in the rear, but this wasn’t inevitable. For a brief period at the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the service was in competition with WhatsApp to become the army’s main communication tool. It ultimately won out thanks to rumors about WhatsApp’s security: the idea that U.S. intelligence agencies, which share information with Ukraine, have access to all chats on platforms belonging to Facebook parent company Meta (which owns WhatsApp) quickly spread among Russian troops.

Here’s what we know for sure:

• Most divisions of the Russian Armed Forces (for example, platoons) have Telegram chats where they discuss their logistical needs (such as fundraising for munitions and equipment). The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU), for their part, often use other messengers like WhatsApp and Viber for similar purposes.
• The use of messenger apps is much less common among Russian assault units, in part due to their lack of Internet access on the front line. For many formations (especially “elite” ones such as reconnaissance, special forces, and drone units), this problem has been addressed by purchasing Starlink antennas through volunteers. But for most Russian infantry assault groups, Starlink remains an unaffordable luxury. At the same time, stormtroopers do still use “civilian” devices for tasks such as viewing pre-downloaded maps.

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• Occasionally, Telegram is used at higher levels of Russia’s military hierarchy — for example, to create improvised “reconnaissance-strike networks” (in which military intelligence directly provides artillery and aviation troops with target coordinates, bypassing the higher command). More often, however, these “networks” rely on standard equipment like reconnaissance drones from units working in coordination with artillery, as well as drones from artillery and missile units themselves. Over the last 2.5 years, coordination within these “networks” has significantly improved, allowing the army to strike complex mobile and camouflaged targets, such as Ukrainian artillery and missile installations and air defense systems. However, this isn’t due specifically to the use of Telegram or any other messenger; rather, it reflects lessons learned from mistakes made earlier in the war.
• Both the Russian Armed Forces and the AFU also use software that would be much harder to replace, such as Discord, which allows live drone feeds to be streamed into command centers, making it possible for officers to micromanage operations by radio.
• As noted above, Russian forces also actively use offline maps — including ones on which combat conditions can be marked before assault troops set out on missions. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, which have more expansive and reliable access to Starlink terminals, have access to special online maps equipped with data exchange and management systems.

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• Finally, Telegram is crucial for combat units’ external communications — and in this case, it does seem largely irreplaceable. The app has enabled a sprawling network of interaction between frontline troops and pro-Kremlin “war correspondents.” The soldiers provide the bloggers with exclusive content (including combat videos), which the bloggers then use to grow their popularity and convert it into fundraising for military equipment and uniforms. This cycle is a key part of how the war works, and it’s difficult to imagine it without Telegram. It’s also why Russia’s “war correspondents” are some of the most vocal proponents of maintaining soldiers’ access to the app; they benefit from exaggerating the service’s importance.
• It’s highly likely that senior staff from both the Russian and Ukrainian armies use Telegram to exchange information (just like civilian officials do), despite this constituting a serious violation of security protocols.
• Pavel Durov’s arrest in France was a stark reminder that Telegram is not suitable for military use. A unified system for managing a network-centric war cannot be based on a civilian messenger app — even if individual units have successfully used it to accomplish localized tasks.

Why doesn’t the Russian military create a Telegram substitute?

Moscow began developing a unified digital management system (which included a messenger for military purposes) during the Soviet period and continued working on it throughout the 2000s and 2010s. The Russian authorities have conducted numerous exercises involving elements of these systems, and even used them in combat in Syria. In 2021, in the lead-up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the company Sozvezdie, a subsidiary of Rostech, was set to provide 40 brigade sets worth 300 billion rubles ($3.3 billion) to the army to be used with the unified tactical-level management system Sozvezdie-M2.

This system (which included a reconnaissance, control and communications complex called Strelets-M that had a built-in messenger tool) was intended to connect command centers, officers managing weaponry such as artillery and missile systems, reconnaissance units, infantry commanders, and combat aviation. The equipment was to be installed on tanks, artillery installations, armored command vehicles, planes, and helicopters. Mobile portable systems (with special tablets for displaying maps and transmitting data) were issued to reconnaissance units and their commanders.

The purpose of the management system was to transmit reconnaissance data and designate targets in real time, track unit movements (down to individual soldiers), and create a unified system for orchestrating strikes against targets identified by reconnaissance. In other words, the goal was to build a system for conducting network-centric warfare.

By 2024, however, Sozvezdie-M2 had still not become operational. Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels have attributed the failure to critical shortcomings with the system itself as well as to the bureaucratic issues endemic to the Russian military. But another factor also likely played a role: despite manufacturers’ claims that they created unique equipment, some of the “hardware” they used was sourced entirely from Western manufacturers. For example, the messenger system for artillery gunners, which ended up in the hands of Ukrainian forces, included a surveying tablet developed in Germany and manufactured in Taiwan. It’s possible that as Western sanctions tightened, obtaining this “unique equipment” became impossible.