From Cold War interceptors to Ukraine: how Russia came to park spy satellites next to the West’s most sensitive tech in orbit
Two Russian satellites have spent years quietly maneuvering along Earth’s geostationary belt — the ring of orbits 36,000 kilometers (roughly 22,370 miles) above the equator, where satellites appear stationary relative to the planet. There, they park alongside Western commercial spacecraft and, by most expert assessments, intercept their transmissions. An investigation by the Financial Times in early February 2026 revealed that European military officials now fear the satellites could do more than eavesdrop — that the intelligence gathered could enable Russia to interfere with, or even seize control of, satellites that provide communications and television broadcasts across Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Africa. The two spacecraft — known in open sources as Luch and Luch-5X, and internally as Olimp and Yenisei-2 — have a paper trail connecting them to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), a mission profile that evolved in lockstep with the war in Ukraine, and a habit of tailing the very satellites that Western militaries depend on.
You’re currently reading Meduza, the world’s largest independent Russian news outlet. Every day, we bring you essential coverage from Russia and beyond. Explore our reporting here and follow us wherever you get your news.
Nobody’s first rodeo
The concept of the “inspector satellite” dates back to the late 1950s, when the U.S. Air Force developed the SAINT (Satellite Interceptor) program to approach, inspect, and potentially disable Soviet spacecraft. SAINT was canceled in 1962, but the United States later operated a covert satellite called Prowler (discovered by amateur astronomers in the 1990s) and launched officially acknowledged MiTEX inspection satellites in 2006. Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden revealed additional American intelligence satellites, including one called PAN — part of a program whose stated goal was to intercept transmissions from foreign commercial satellites unreachable by “conventional means.”
America is not alone in this research. China’s SJ-21 spacecraft has similarly maneuvered close to other satellites, docking with a “dead” Beidou navigation satellite in 2022 and towing it to a graveyard orbit above the geostationary belt. Russia’s own program stretches back to Soviet anti-satellite projects and extends into the post-Soviet era, producing the Kosmos-2542 and Kosmos-2543 inspector satellites, the latter of which prompted a Pentagon assessment in 2020 that Russia might be testing anti-satellite weapons.
The truth behind Luch-1 and Luch-2
The satellites the Financial Times calls Luch-1 and Luch-2 appear in the U.S. military’s satellite catalog at Space-Track.org as LUCH (OLYMP) and LUCH (OLYMP) 2, according to Bart Hendrickx, an independent researcher who specializes in Russia’s space program. Hendrickx argues that Russian officials deliberately assigned the “Luch” cover names — borrowed from an unrelated series of data-relay spacecraft — to obscure the satellites’ true purpose.
Luch-1 was launched in September 2014 and spent more than nine years roaming Earth’s geostationary belt. According to tracking data compiled by Dutch satellite tracker Marco Langbroek, between 2014 and 2021, it parked near at least 22 telecommunications satellites operated primarily by Intelsat and Eutelsat. It would typically position itself about 0.1 degrees (roughly 70 kilometers, almost 45 miles) away from a target, close enough to be within range of the uplink signals directed at the neighboring spacecraft, and remain there for weeks or months at a time.
In October 2015, Intelsat publicly criticized Russia for what it called Luch’s “not normal behavior.” In 2017, Luch-1 maneuvered close to Athena-Fidus, a communications satellite jointly developed by the French and Italian militaries. The following year, French Defense Minister Florence Parly called the episode “an act of espionage.”
In October 2025, Russia moved Luch-1 to a graveyard orbit, where it broke apart on January 30, 2026, shedding at least three fragments, according to the space analytics firm Aldoria.
Luch-2 was launched from Baikonur in March 2023. Its United Nations registration listed its function as “relaying information” — the language used for civilian spacecraft — rather than the defense ministry designation typically associated with military satellites. After reaching orbit, it began performing maneuvers nearly identical to its predecessor’s. As of March 2025, Langbroek’s tracking data showed that Luch-2 had parked near Intelsat and Eutelsat satellites, staying near each target for one to four months before repositioning.
Luch-2 was built using components manufactured in France and the United States, despite Western sanctions. Procurement documents show that the Krivosheev National Research Center for Telecommunications — the Russian state institute that handles payload development for the Olimp/Luch program — ordered French and American microchips through Standard Research and Production Center, a St. Petersburg intermediary that supplies electronic components to Russian defense contractors.
The FSB connection
In 2014, Kommersant journalist Ivan Safronov, citing sources inside Roscosmos, reported that the FSB both operated and commissioned Luch-1, and that the satellite had been designed for signals intelligence. While Hendrickx notes that no definitive proof has emerged that the Luch satellites are operated by the FSB rather than Roscosmos or the Defense Ministry, a trail of circumstantial evidence points in that direction.
A 2008 article in a Russian broadcasting trade journal identified Olimp as a project of FAPSI — the federal agency that had inherited the functions of the KGB’s 16th Directorate, which was responsible for intercepting foreign electronic communications. When FAPSI was reorganized in 2003, its functions were transferred to the FSB. Separately, the Krivosheev Center holds a contract with FSB Military Unit 71330 — the agency’s 16th Center, which investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan have linked to cyberattacks on American energy companies.
The Ukraine connection
The likeliest explanation for what the Luch satellites are hunting is signals intelligence of immediate military value. Many commercial satellites transmit a portion of their traffic without encryption, and a 2025 study by researchers at the University of California, San Diego, and the University of Maryland characterized the problem as widespread. The study found, for example, that intercepted traffic included the call signs of U.S. Navy vessels and data from the internal logistics systems of Mexican military and law enforcement agencies.
The Intelsat and Eutelsat satellites the Luch inspectors parked alongside are not purely civilian infrastructure. Intelsat provides maritime connectivity services to the Pentagon. Eutelsat supplies bandwidth to military and government clients across Europe. The Intelsat satellites that Luch-1 targeted in the months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — Intelsats 33e, 39, and 37e — all transmit Ku- and C-band frequencies over Ukraine, frequencies commonly used for military communications.
On February 24, 2022, just hours before Russian forces crossed the border, Russia launched a major cyberattack against Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite broadband network, knocking out thousands of modems used by Ukrainian military and government agencies and disrupting Internet access for tens of thousands of users across Europe. A German energy company lost remote access to its wind turbines. Luch-2‘s very first stop after reaching orbit, in May 2023, was KA-SAT.
Hendrickx has noted that while Luch-2 is unlikely to have direct electronic warfare capabilities, data gathered during a close approach to a target satellite could facilitate subsequent cyberattacks against it. As of early 2025, Langbroek noted, Russia appears to be systematically moving Luch-2 from target to target along the geostationary belt, staying for a few months, then moving on to the next satellite of interest.
