‘Deal with the stronger enemy first’ Exiled Russian tycoon and opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky on the rumored Navalny negotiations, the politics of the 1990s, and his support for Prigozhin’s mutiny
On Wednesday, Russian YouTuber Yuri Dud released a lengthy interview with exiled former oligarch turned opposition figure Mikhail Khodorkovsky. During the nearly three-hour conversation, Khodorkovsky discussed the 1990s and its political figures, the rumored negotiations for Alexey Navalny’s release in a prisoner swap, and Yevgeny Prigozhin’s ill-fated mutiny. Meduza shares some notable excerpts from the interview.
On supporting Prigozhin’s mutiny
I suggested helping him reach Moscow. I think that besides the regime coming to its natural end, there could be a situation where the elites become divided. Then, the elites split because of relative failures on the front. [Even] if we get lucky again and this elite begins to fracture, it won’t split into good and bad — it will split into bad and very bad. We must take advantage of this division in order to bring this regime to an end sooner than it would naturally die. […]
[Prigozhin] was an enemy who could weaken the other enemy. […] If there’s an enemy ready to clash with another enemy of mine and potentially weaken him so much that he loses his power and the war ends sooner, I’ll turn a blind eye to anything. This doesn’t mean that I’d sit down for tea with Prigozhin later. It means that you need to deal with the stronger enemy before you deal with the weaker one. That’s the only way to win such battles. […]
When there’s a war, you shoot. Unfortunately, this inevitably leads to some innocent casualties. Still, you keep shooting, because it’s the only way to win. Your missile might go astray… This has happened during this war: missiles have gone completely off course, causing the deaths of innocent people. Yet, missiles continue to be launched — because it’s war. […]
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If you have the opportunity to use a missile against Putin… Yes, there’s a chance it might hit a residential building. There’s always that chance. But should we just sit on our hands and do nothing because our missile might go off course? Prigozhin was this kind of missile. […]
Had Prigozhin reached the Oka River, Putin would have had to withdraw troops from Moscow, leaving it defenseless from a security standpoint. At that moment, if we managed to mobilize 20,000 to 30,000 people to seize government buildings, then, as you know — and I know this for sure from the experiences of 1991 and 1993 — whoever captures the Kremlin captures power in the country. This was a very real possibility. Don’t tell me that this missile [Prigozhin’s mutiny] was definitely off course. It didn’t reach its target, unfortunately.
This was a situation where everyone needed to call people to the streets. That’s why the opposition needs to develop the habit of working together. Because in this situation the opposition, acting together, could have won. This was a real chance. And if such a chance arises, and if any brute is part of that chance, I will use and urge others to use that person so that ultimately both brutes are eliminated.
On negotiations for Alexey Navalny’s release
To date, I’ve learned two things, which were confirmed by all the people I dealt with, both on the American and the German side. There was a request to exchange [Vadim] Krasikov for [Alexey] Navalny — both from my side and from the FBK [Anti-Corruption Foundation]. However, even the German side hadn’t made a decision on the matter. Based on what I was told, the German Foreign Ministry was opposed to exchanging Krasikov for Navalny. I don’t know whether this is true or not. That’s what I was told, and I’m now sharing it. Discussions about this [exchange] weren’t held with the Russian side.
What I was told from the Russian side came from people associated with Roman Abramovich who, in various iterations, conveyed exactly what Vladimir Putin later confirmed. My personal impression is that Putin was not only playing his own game, pretending to be a humanitarian, but also giving additional legitimacy to Abramovich, whom he needs for his games with peace negotiations, which Putin uses at various times to spread disinformation and reduce the willingness of some Western countries to supply weapons to Ukraine. I’m not sure [negotiations about exchanging Navalny] were in the form that Putin describes. But I know for sure that neither the Germans nor the Americans came forward with a concrete proposal.
On Vladislav Surkov
The time when [Surkov and I] worked together was good. It’s hard for me to accept what he did while working for Putin. But that’s the kind of person he is — he chooses a master and then serves that master. You can ask him to answer for what he does, but his psyche is such that you need to hold his master accountable because it’s pointless to hold him responsible. He’ll do exactly what he’s told to and do it very professionally.
At the same time, he remained a relatively decent person in personal relationships, even when I was in prison. And believe me, there weren’t many government officials at that time who were willing to touch anything associated with me, even peripherally. Surkov, on Putin’s orders, relentlessly attacked me using propaganda. A huge number of myths circulating today, including the myth that I proposed selling Russia’s nuclear capability to the Americans, were all fabricated by Surkov. Yet, at the same time, when my wife had a problem with our children (they were forced out of school), the only person she could turn to and who resolved the issue was Surkov.
On Boris Yeltsin
For my generation, it was natural that we had no role in appointing the head of state. We all understood when we went to the polls that these weren’t real elections. In the Soviet Union, everyone understood this perfectly. For me, it was natural that there was a person who somehow ended up in power without any involvement from me, and I coexisted with this person. This person could be a benevolent tsar, or a cruel tsar, or not a tsar at all. Yeltsin was a great tsar, both magnanimous and very tough, and deeply reverent towards his power. And in all other respects, he was generous and didn’t bother with trifles. So when people tell me that an apartment or some money mattered to him, well, it’s completely inconsistent with the Yeltsin I knew. He didn’t give a damn about any of that. But power — that he did give a damn about.
On Gennady Zyuganov
We were staying at the same hotel [in Davos in 1996]. He came to see me in the evening, said we should sit and have a drink. Well, we did. He said: “[Mr. Khodorkovsky], we really respect you. We really need industry leaders like you. You’ll definitely stay as general director, no doubt about it. But it’s clear the property will have to be returned.” We talked generally about his plans. At that moment, he was confident he’d win [in the 1996 Russian presidential elections].
When I listened to him, it was just a catastrophe. Picture a school teacher with all the typical beliefs of a school teacher. A wonderful person, but with absolutely no connection to the industry he was planning to lead. No experience in the state-building he planned to undertake. I thought to myself with horror: “We already went through this once in 1991, when we transitioned from the Soviet Union to Russia — it was a catastrophe then, and now a second time? Never, God forbid it.” And that was it, I went up to Boris [Berezovsky] and said, “[Mr. Berezovsky], we need to do something.” […]
I never said that Zyuganov could bring back the Soviet Union. If Zyuganov could have brought back the Soviet Union, he would’ve been the president of Russia. He could’ve ruined what had started to gradually take shape by then yet again, at yet another stage. He could have destroyed Russia due to his inability to govern it. He could have destroyed industry and caused the next crisis, resulting in a dictator possibly coming to power.
On Team Navalny’s film Traitors
I was deeply upset by the attitude [displayed by the filmmakers] toward the era, toward Boris [Yeltsin]. I understand everything about him. Maybe even more than you do. For me, [Yeltsin] is not only a tsar, he’s the person who, in many ways, gave everyone, including me, the freedom that [Mikhail] Gorbachev either didn’t want to or couldn’t give. [Yeltsin] was also a battle commander. He was a person with whom I risked my life. And purely psychologically, it turns out that it’s extremely difficult to get over that, even now. I snapped. Simply because the memory of risks we took together and the shared anticipation of prison or death suddenly triggered me, even 30 years later. […]
I understand all this, I reflect on it, I evaluate it. In some places, you and I see things similarly; in some, we see them differently. But on an emotional level, it turns out, no. On an emotional level, it’s hard for me, so I stand up for Yeltsin immediately and without thinking, and I start thinking later.
On criticisms of oligarchs backing Yeltsin in 1996
I was a private individual who made a private decision that Zyuganov wasn’t [an acceptable candidate] to me. I spent my personal money and the time of the people who worked with me to prevent Zyuganov from coming to power. I didn’t bribe voters or falsify ballots, and I wasn’t a government official for whom the type of work I did would have been inappropriate. I did everything that was possible and necessary at that moment. I don’t approve of what Yeltsin’s presidential administration did during that election campaign at the state’s expense and using state resources. But, sorry, what issues can you have with me on this point? I was a private individual. […]
I won’t accept any criticism related to the 1996 elections, simply because I wasn’t involved in them. I might accept criticism to the extent that I wasn’t as involved as I should have been. I should have actually stopped focusing on business and gotten involved in the elections, tried to push the balance we’d convinced Yeltsin to shift — from a state of emergency toward elections — even further toward more or less democratic elections because we’d have beaten Zyuganov regardless.
