A missile with a message Russia has cheaper and more effective ways to strike Ukraine. So why does it keep using the Oreshnik?
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When Vladimir Putin unveiled the Oreshnik missile in late 2024, he described its power in almost biblical terms, claiming it could “turn everything to dust.”
Russia has now launched the missile at Ukraine three times.
The latest followed a May 22 Ukrainian strike on a dormitory in occupied Starobilsk that killed 21 young people, according to Russian emergency services. Moscow says Ukraine deliberately targeted students in a “terrorist attack.” Kyiv says it was aiming at a headquarters used by Rubicon, the Russian military’s elite drone warfare unit. Military analyst Ruslan Leviev, founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team, has suggested the strike may have been the result of faulty intelligence — an assessment shared by Meduza military analyst Dmitry Kuznets.
Two days later, during a massive drone and missile attack on Kyiv and the surrounding region that killed four people and injured nearly 100, Russia once again reached for the Oreshnik. Yet for all the attention the missile attracts, the lion’s share of the destruction came from Russia’s conventional weapons.
Why does Russia keep using the Oreshnik if it makes so little military sense?
Dmitry Kuznets discussed that question on a recent episode of Meduza’s daily podcast. His answer: the Oreshnik’s main value lies not in the damage it causes, but in the political message it sends. In the latest strike, Kuznets said, the missile was “not the main dish” but more like “the spices” sprinkled on top. Conventional missiles and drones did the real damage. The Oreshnik supplied the symbolism.
More bark than bite
The Oreshnik is a strategic ballistic missile. So far, however, Russia has used it without a nuclear payload — or any explosive warhead at all. Instead, it strikes targets through kinetic energy, hitting them with metal projectiles traveling at enormous speed. That looks dramatic and sounds terrifying. But without a nuclear charge, Kuznets says, the missile needs extreme accuracy to destroy a valuable target. And that’s exactly where this type of weapon falls short.
As the missile’s reentry vehicles descend through the atmosphere, a plasma sheath forms around each one, blocking the signals that would normally help correct their course. Winds shift. Air density varies. Small errors compound. For a nuclear strike, being a few dozen — or even a few hundred — meters off target doesn’t make much difference. For a conventional or kinetic strike, Kuznets says, the missile would need to land within meters of its target. Otherwise, it risks landing near an airfield or factory without destroying anything of consequence.
If Russia simply wanted to destroy a target, it has far cheaper and more effective options. Even if the Oreshnik hit its target dead on, its effect would be comparable to a strike by several Iskander-M missiles carrying conventional high-explosive fragmentation warheads. An Iskander costs roughly $3 million. The Oreshnik is believed to be derived from the Yars ICBM, which cost an estimated $30 million in 2011 — roughly ten times as much.
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Sending a message
When Putin first launched an Oreshnik at Ukraine, in November 2024, he called it a response to Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles against targets inside Russia. Putin tied the second strike, in January 2026, to Russian claims (debunked by Western intelligence) that Ukrainian drones had targeted his residence in Valdai. The latest launch came after the strike on the dormitory in Starobilsk.
The Kremlin presented all three incidents as extraordinary provocations requiring an extraordinary response.
That explains why Russia keeps reaching for a missile that, at least in its current configuration, offers little practical advantage on the battlefield. For years, Russia has discussed using strategic missiles without nuclear warheads to deliver a “deterrent” strike that would demonstrate the reach of its strategic arsenal.
The Oreshnik’s military performance, then, is almost beside the point. Russia has plenty of easier ways to destroy targets. The Oreshnik serves a different purpose: reminding its audience that the next thing to arrive could be a nuke.
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