explainers
Putin claims that Ukraine has no ‘antidote’ to Russia’s new jet-powered drones. Kyiv has already shown it can shoot them down, but doing it at scale could cost billions.
Source: Meduza
The Dan-T drone at the El Alamein International Airshow 2026 in Egypt, September 2026
Rostec
Speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the Cultural Forum, Vladimir Putin said Ukraine was seeking an “air ceasefire” out of weakness — especially because it feared Russia’s new jet-powered drones. The Russian president believes Kyiv has no “antidote” to these weapons. They are dangerous, but they lack the chief advantage of the earlier “Geran” drones: low cost. Developing defenses against the faster drones will also be expensive for Ukraine. Here is how the latest turn in the technological arms race could drain — and is already draining — both countries’ budgets.
What exactly was Putin talking about, and is he right?
An “air ceasefire” would mean a mutual halt to strikes on energy and transport targets behind the front lines. Putin believes Kyiv made the request solely because its infrastructure is vulnerable: “Apparently, they particularly need us to stop striking with our modern ‘Gerans.’ At least for now, they have no way to counter them — no antidote.”
By “modern ‘Gerans,’” Putin apparently means a new generation of drones that could more accurately be called small cruise missiles. These jet-powered aircraft are indeed nearly impervious to the layered defenses Ukraine built against older drones. Russia fielded large numbers of the new models from the start precisely because the old ones had become ineffective.
Jet engines have made the new weapons several times faster than their piston-powered predecessors. But that advance came at the expense of the older “Gerans’” main advantage: Estimates suggest the new models cost several times as much to produce.
Still, Kyiv is not entirely without an “antidote.” Ukraine has the technological capacity to build effective defenses. Paying for them is a harder problem.
Why did the old ‘Gerans’ stop being effective?
The Russian military received its first jet-powered drone in early 2025. It was essentially a standard “Geran-2” fitted with a small Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine in place of its piston engine. The modified drone was named the “Geran-3.” Its speed roughly doubled, reaching 300–350 kilometers per hour (about 185–220 miles per hour), compared with its predecessor’s 150–180 kilometers per hour (about 95–110 miles per hour). Its range and payload — its warhead — were smaller, however.
The jet-powered version was developed in response to Ukraine’s increasingly effective air defenses. By then, Kyiv had deployed an effective interception network built around electric-powered interceptor quadcopters. Those drones were connected to a network of sensors: radar; acoustic sensors that located “Geran-2” drones and tracked their direction of flight by the distinctive sound of their piston engines; and optical and infrared sensors that could detect passing aircraft by day and night.
The main source is less than fully reliable: statements from Ukrainian military intelligence and the Security Service of Ukraine. The agencies give detailed accounts of their successes against Russian drones and of the new equipment Russia is using. Ukrainian intelligence officials have an obvious stake in the conflict and are engaged in information warfare.
There is also more objective evidence: photos and videos of downed aircraft and their parts, including engines; videos of interceptions by air defenses; and visual confirmation of the strikes themselves. Russian media outlets and military personnel have also shared technical details of the new weapons, though they, too, have a stake in the outcome. Taken together, this material gives a general picture of the new equipment and how it is being used.
The interceptors themselves had video cameras and onboard computers with some machine-vision capability. Automated systems guided them toward their targets in the final stage of flight, making interceptions much more effective and reducing the skill required of operators: They only had to launch an interceptor toward a Russian drone.
The interceptors also cost less than a “Geran-2” — under $10,000 each, according to Ukrainian and Western manufacturers. Although Ukrainian military personnel said it took three or four interceptors to bring down one “Geran,” the cost was manageable, even before accounting for the value of targets the Russian drones might otherwise have hit. Ukraine’s armed forces used these systems to reliably defend Kyiv and Odesa and their surrounding areas, two of the places Russia attacked most often: Kyiv and its surroundings, and Odesa and its surroundings. By early 2026, attacking those areas with “Geran-2” drones had become entirely uneconomical: It took too many drones to hit a single target.
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What are the new ‘Gerans,’ and what has changed?
The first jet-powered drone, the “Geran-3,” was not very successful. Its Telefly JT80 engine lacked power: With 80 kilograms-force of thrust (about 175 pounds of force), the drone could not reach speeds typical of cruise missiles — more than 500 kilometers per hour (about 310 miles per hour). It also could not carry enough fuel to match the “Geran-2’s” range. The same engine limitations meant it had to carry a relatively less powerful warhead.
Russia therefore quickly began developing new jet-powered drones and miniature cruise missiles. In fact, they are all cruise missiles; the distinctions between them are largely a matter of classification. To address the first model’s shortcomings, developers chose much more powerful turbojet engines, also made in China. By fall 2026, the Russian military had received four models produced in large numbers:
- “Geran-4.” Its delta-wing airframe still resembles the Iranian “Shahed” drone from which Russia’s entire “Geran” family evolved. That wing design distinguishes this model from a cruise missile, though it is probably ill-suited to jet-powered flight. Ukrainian sources say the airframe had to be reinforced for higher speeds. Russia apparently cannot yet abandon the old shape because the factory in Tatarstan’s “Alabuga” Special Economic Zone, which produces thousands of drones each month, is set up to make it. The “Geran-4” uses a Chinese Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet engine with 2.5 times the thrust of the Telefly JT80, substantially increasing its speed and range compared with the “Geran-3.”
- “Geran-5.” This jet-powered drone has a conventional aircraft layout and looks like an ordinary cruise missile. It uses the same Telefly TF-TJ2000A engine as the “Geran-4.” It can be launched from aircraft or helicopters as well as ground launchers, increasing its operational range. Judging by the number of videos showing strikes, Russia is using the “Geran-5” more often than the “Geran-4.” The factory in Alabuga also produces this more aerodynamic model. The drone has enough range to strike anywhere in Ukraine. In late September, for example, it was used to attack a border crossing with Poland almost 600 kilometers (about 370 miles) from Russia.
- The S8000 “Banderol” missile. Russia uses it to blockade Ukrainian ports, regularly striking maritime infrastructure and other targets around Odesa. The “Banderol” can be launched from the ground, helicopters, aircraft, or “Orion” attack drones. Unlike the “Geran-5,” its airframe is shaped to make it less visible to radar. Its engine — at least in early examples — is also said to be Chinese. The missile carries a warhead twice as heavy as the “Geran-5’s.”
- The “Dan-T” missile. Based on the “Dan-M” air-defense target drone, it is also used in attacks on Odesa and the surrounding area. Ukrainian sources say it is intended to become Russia’s most widely produced drone, with plans to produce up to 10,000 a year. Some believe the “Dan-T” is a version of the “Banderol” that Russia may be planning to export.
Who else is trying, so far without success, to produce jet-powered drones on a large scale?
Ukraine, above all. Destinus, a company based in the Netherlands and founded by entrepreneur Mikhail Kokorich, who renounced his Russian citizenship, produces the small Ruta cruise missile for Ukraine’s armed forces. Its stated range and payload exceed those of comparable Russian weapons. Ukraine used these missiles to attack the Rostov Optical and Mechanical Plant overnight on September 25–26.
By contrast, Russia is producing and using thousands of jet-powered drones a month, just a year after launching its program. Ukrainian intelligence believes Russia now makes more jet-powered drones than the older, piston-powered “Geran-2.” In that sense, Moscow has achieved something the United States and other countries have spent years trying to do: create weapons that can be produced easily in large numbers and fully meet an army’s needs during a prolonged war.
The U.S. Air Force’s latest version of such a program, planned to run through 2031, is called Family of Affordable Mass Munitions (FAMM). The war with Iran prompted its urgent launch: After just a month of intense fighting, the Pentagon faced an acute shortage of precision weapons, including cruise missiles. The missiles it had used cost tens of billions of dollars, and U.S. officials acknowledge that replenishing the stockpile will take years. The military needs much cheaper munitions capable of striking most targets.
So how cheap are Russia’s new missiles?
The “availability” and “low cost” of Russia’s new missiles are relative. Chinese manufacturers sell jet engines with more than 200 kilograms-force of thrust (about 440 pounds of force) for nearly 10 times the price of the piston engines used in the previous generation of drones. The terms offered to Russian bulk buyers are unknown, but engines of this kind previously sold on Chinese online marketplaces for tens of thousands of dollars apiece. By comparison, piston engines for “Geran-2” type drones cost up to $10,000.
Experts estimate that a finished “Geran-5” costs more than $100,000, over twice the price of a “Geran-2.” Even so, it remains several times cheaper than a conventional cruise missile, such as Russia’s “Kalibr” or Kh-101, the British-French Storm Shadow/SCALP, or the U.S. Tomahawk. Those missiles have powerful, high-performance engines, travel at almost twice the speed, incorporate features that make them harder to detect, use sophisticated navigation systems, and carry warheads several times heavier.
Because the new missiles are fairly expensive, military planners and manufacturers have an incentive to make each one more effective — improving its accuracy, reliability, and resistance to electronic warfare and air defenses. The aim is to make the new missiles more likely to hit their targets than the previous generation of drones. The latest models therefore have features that make them less visible to radar, as well as more advanced navigation systems. “Geran-2” type drones relied for guidance solely on inertial systems corrected by satellite signals. Some “Geran-4” and “Geran-5” drones now have systems that guide them by comparing images of the terrain with a database. All this adds to their cost.
How does Ukraine plan to shoot down the new weapons?
Russia’s new weapons exploit a gap in Ukrainian air defenses: They are too fast for specialized electric-powered interceptors, yet still too cheap and numerous to counter with nearly all conventional air-defense systems, whose missiles cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars each.
- Conventional short- and medium-range air defenses: With help from Western partners, Ukraine has acquired many such systems and adapted Soviet launchers to fire foreign missiles under the FrankenSAM program; Kyiv ran out of their original Soviet missiles long ago. But interceptor missiles for conventional air defenses cost at least $70,000 each, even for older systems such as Hawk. More modern missiles, including the AIM-120 and Sea Sparrow, cost over $100,000 each. The missile models Ukraine uses in its FrankenSAM systems are no longer produced and come from U.S. and other countries’ stockpiles. The Ukrainian military has more modern systems as well, but their missiles cost even more. The high price of conventional air-defense missiles is precisely why Ukraine had to develop specialized defenses against the “Gerans.”
- Aircraft: Jet fighters are a reliable way to counter cruise missiles and can therefore be used against the new drones. Air-to-air missiles are more effective against airborne targets than aircraft cannon, but they are also expensive. Kyiv has received inexpensive laser-guided APKWS II missiles from the United States and France for use against drones; they cost up to $20,000 each. The United States uses them against Iranian and Yemeni “Shahed” drones, but they can also bring down faster targets. Ukraine’s main problem is that it has too few aircraft and launchers capable of firing them: Only F-16 fighters and ground-based Vampire systems can use these missiles. The country has received several dozen F-16s and fewer than 20 Vampire systems — nowhere near enough to cover its entire territory. Helicopters and light aircraft make up the bulk of Ukraine’s airborne defenses against drones. They were used successfully against “Geran-2” drones but are too slow to counter jet-powered models.
- Specialized defenses against drones: Ukraine has received electric-powered interceptor drones from Western partners, including private companies, and developed others itself, bringing the total to more than 10 models. They have proved highly effective against “Geran-2” drones and other Russian drones powered by piston engines or electric motors. Around Kyiv and Odesa, where mobile groups equipped with these interceptors formed the layered defenses described above, “Geran-2” attacks have almost ceased. But the interceptors were designed for targets traveling under 200 kilometers per hour (about 125 miles per hour), leaving them almost powerless against jet-powered aircraft. Such a system can bring down a fast target only with considerable luck — for example, in a head-on interception. The detection sensors may pose a problem, too: Acoustic devices were tuned to the distinctive sound of a “Geran-2” engine, while optical sensors were designed for targets with low angular speeds of a few dozen degrees per second. Ukraine’s main defense against Russia’s earlier drones has thus suddenly become ineffective.
Ukraine had prepared for the possibility that its drone defenses would become less effective. Preparations began when its intelligence services discovered Russia’s program to develop new drones for its military. As early as January 2026, Ukrainian military intelligence described the drones’ characteristics and production plans fairly accurately. By September, Ukraine’s armed forces and Security Service had several models of jet-powered interceptor drones. In the past week alone, Ukraine has released videos showing these interceptors successfully bringing down “Geran-4” and “Geran-5” drones. The new interceptors outperform electric-powered models in speed and range and can intercept targets at higher altitudes. Jet engines have an inherent advantage because hydrocarbon fuel has a higher energy density than batteries.
The big questions for Ukraine are how much more the new interceptors will cost and what it would cost to re-equip the hundreds of anti-drone air-defense systems that will use them — including their radars, other sensors, and launchers. The small turbojet engines alone are likely to cost several times as much as electric motors. They are much cheaper than the engines in Russia’s new “Gerans,” however, because they produce less thrust: Ukrainian interceptors do not need to travel hundreds of kilometers or carry warheads weighing tens of kilograms (dozens of pounds).
Bringing down each target also requires several interceptors. According to figures released by Ukraine’s armed forces six months ago, an average of four interceptors were used for every target brought down. Higher interceptor production costs alone — excluding the expense of re-equipping and upgrading air-defense systems — could therefore add hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars a year to Ukraine’s spending.
How is this arms race affecting both countries’ budgets?
Ukraine is already facing severe financial difficulties as it expands production and use of both air-defense munitions and its own strike weapons. A sharp increase in purchases of various drones left a $27 billion gap in the 2026 military budget, President Volodymyr Zelensky said. The military needs to spend $175 billion in 2027, up from $155 billion in 2026, but only $100 billion has been budgeted so far. The government plans to make up the difference with Western help and savings at home. Military spending would thus amount to almost 78% of the country’s GDP.
Russia faces similar problems. Actual military spending rose 30% in the first half of 2026, even though the budget law had called for cuts. Overall, military spending reached 9.4% of GDP, equivalent to roughly $250 billion a year. That increase was the main reason the budget deficit grew. To balance the 2027 budget, the authorities now plan another tax increase and cuts to nonmilitary spending, along with renewed cuts to military spending that would bring it down to $200 billion. So far, the technological arms race between Ukraine and Russia is draining both countries’ finances without changing the balance of power.
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