One in three members of Russia’s new State Duma has ties to the war in Ukraine. Some are accused of war crimes. Here’s who they are — and what they’ve done.

Russia has held its first State Duma elections since the start of the full-scale war. According to preliminary results, United Russia has won a record number of seats — more than three-quarters of the chamber. The party has already said that 49 “participants in the special military operation” will become lawmakers on its ticket, effectively answering Putin’s call for military personnel to become Russia’s “new elite.” But they make up only part of what might be called the Duma’s “war faction.” Many incoming lawmakers who have never fought on the front are nonetheless involved in the war, whether by financing it or providing infrastructure to support it. Meduza examined the backgrounds of everyone projected to enter parliament based on the preliminary results. By our count, the “war faction” consists of 148 lawmakers — a third of the State Duma. And that includes only those with clear ties to the war that can be traced through open sources.

How many war veterans are entering the new Duma?

The final number remains unclear: some winners could still decline their mandates or take other posts.

Even United Russia appears not to have settled on a final list for its “war faction.” Immediately after the results were announced, the party said it would send 86 war participants to the State Duma, and the claim spread through news agencies. The story was later deleted at United Russia’s own request, and Vladimir Yakushev, secretary of the party’s general council, gave a new, far lower number: 49.

That figure appears closer to the truth. During the primaries, United Russia had already marked candidates who fought in the war with a special icon, which earned them a 25% bonus to their primary vote totals. Exactly 49 such candidates appear on the party’s lists, making them eligible for a mandate, or won single-member districts. United Russia holds 355 of the parliament’s 450 seats in total.

Their backgrounds vary: some commanded combat units, some served as military medics, and others worked as instructors. Badma Bashankaev, for example, trained service members in tactical medicine. Vadim Logunov worked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ “Grom” unit in the occupied part of Ukraine’s Kherson region, guarding officials who issued Russian documents to Ukrainians.

At the same time, the “war participant” label isn’t always backed by concrete evidence of service. Meduza reported, based on the primary results, that a considerable number of winners with “war participant” status were already sitting deputies and officials. For some, the status stemmed from humanitarian trips to the front. For others, no public information at all could be found about their military experience.

For example, open sources describe Oleg Ivaninsky’s trips to occupied Luhansk region, but there is no data on his participation in combat.

In total, Meduza could not find specific evidence of military service for four candidates, now potential deputies, whom United Russia had presented as “war participants”: besides Ivaninsky, they are Nikolai Alekseyenko, Dmytro Vorona, and Shamsail Saraliev.

Alekseyenko, for instance, offers only detailed reports of work unrelated to combat. On August 1, 2022, he wrote on his website that as “reconstruction coordinator” for Izyum district, he was inspecting sites in Izyum, his hometown, which Russia had temporarily seized. That same day, he said he met trucks in Kupyansk carrying roughly 50 tons of food, medicine, and construction materials. The next day, he said he delivered medicine to a hospital in Izyum.

Alekseyenko later helped supply Russian troops through a charitable fund he founded called “Izyum.” In spring 2024, he received a Defense Ministry medal, “For Contribution to Strengthening the Defense of the Russian Federation.”

Dmytro Vorona, another potential State Duma deputy, previously served as Ukraine’s deputy minister of internal affairs and justice and later headed the State Registration Service. After the 2014 Euromaidan, he left government service, began working as a defense attorney, and moved to occupied Crimea. There, he first became an adviser to Sergei Aksyonov, the Russian-installed head of the peninsula, and then headed the Crimea Development Corporation.

After the full-scale invasion began, Vorona was appointed an adviser to Yevgeny Balitsky, head of the occupation administration in the Zaporizhzhia region, and became a senator representing the seized territory. For this, a court in Ukraine sentenced him in absentia to 12 years in prison.

Unlike Ivaninsky and Vorona, who have never claimed to have fought directly, some potential deputies have made exactly that claim publicly, though their accounts raise serious doubts. They include Dmitry Sablin and Vitaly Milonov, both re-elected to the State Duma.

Sablin’s website said he signed a contract and joined a reconnaissance unit in October 2022. That same fall, “military correspondent” Semyon Pegov described Sablin as someone who had been “constantly in the field” since the full-scale invasion began. Flight data published by The Insider, an independent Russian investigative outlet, show that the deputy flew from Moscow via Sochi to Antalya with his wife on October 7, 2022, and returned to Moscow on October 12.

The BARS “Kaskad” unit, which Sablin leads, is a prime example of what are known as deputy battalions, also called “laundering” battalions: formations where officials and politicians who want to show loyalty to their superiors or atone for some wrongdoing typically “serve.”

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Milonov described his service in more detail than Sablin did. He told Fontanka, a St. Petersburg-based news outlet, on October 12, 2022, that he was serving in the artillery of the 3rd Brigade of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (“DNR”) near Horlivka. That same day, he was photographed at a draft office in St. Petersburg, but he explained his “return” as a matter of re-registering paperwork after Russia annexed the “DNR”: he had previously served in the “DNR’s” “people’s militia” and was now applying as a volunteer.

Milonov said he was a junior sergeant and senior gunner on an MT-12 anti-tank gun. In March 2023, he told Komsomolskaya Pravda, a pro-Kremlin Russian tabloid, that he had spent five months at war. He explained his return home as the end of his contract and promised to go back to the front, though he never did.

In August 2026, Milonov said in an interview with blogger Amiran Sardarov that he had killed people in the war. Asked whether it was hard to live with that afterward, he replied: “No. It’s your duty as a serviceman.”

Four more candidates connected to the war from other parties have preliminarily made it into the new Duma. Three are from the nationalist LDPR party: Alexei Vereshchagin, commander of the “Alexander Nevsky” brigade, and Dmitry Zhirkov, whom the party presents as a war participant, though open sources contain no information about his direct presence in the combat zone. Even so, in April 2023, Zhirkov received a Defense Ministry medal, “For Strengthening Military Cooperation,” awarded for supporting war participants.

Sergei Antoshin, commander of “BARS-Bryansk”, may also enter parliament on the LDPR ticket, though this remains uncertain. He led a volunteer brigade in the Russian border region, but Meduza found no evidence that he served specifically in Ukraine.

Oleg Chernyshev, commander of the 1429th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, was elected to the Duma from A Just Russia. The party took the regiment under its patronage when the unit was formed in fall 2022.

Another future deputy with military experience made it into the Duma as an independent candidate: Magomed Valikhov, a military doctor with the Airborne Forces from Dagestan.

Meduza found no war participants among the KPRF or New People candidates projected to enter parliament.

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What do we know about those who actually fought?

One of the possible deputies from United Russia is Nursultan Mussagaliyev (it was unclear whether he would make it into the State Duma, but the party itself has already reported his election).

United Russia named him among participants in the “Time of Heroes” program who won seats in the State Duma election. Before his political career, Mussagaliyev served in the 104th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 76th Division. In Russia, he received the title of Hero. In Ukraine, he is suspected of war crimes near Kyiv.

In October 2023, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported that during the occupation of Bucha district, Mussagaliyev ordered his subordinates to detain a 29-year-old man passing through a Russian checkpoint. According to the Ukrainian investigation, the man was taken to a forest near Dmytrivka, tortured, and then shot on the officer’s orders. Among the evidence, the SBU cited testimony from a Russian prisoner of war who had served in the same unit.

Another United Russia member, Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commanded the Tsentr group of forces at the start of the invasion. In June 2026, Ukraine’s prosecutor general, Ruslan Kravchenko, said Lapin had been sentenced in absentia to life in prison.

According to the prosecutor, the court found Lapin guilty of violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity and waging a war of aggression. The case involves organizing the invasion and commanding the offensive on the Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kyiv regions in February and March 2022.

Adam Delimkhanov led Chechen forces during the assault on Mariupol, a role documented by Human Rights Watch, Truth Hounds, and SITU Research in a joint report that describes his role. The report’s authors included Delimkhanov among ten senior Russian officers who may be directly implicated in war crimes in the city (Mariupol was effectively destroyed by the Russian army).

Also in the Duma is Alexander Borodai, the first “head of government” of the self-proclaimed “DNR.” A former consultant to Konstantin Malofeev, an oligarch with a fondness for Russian Orthodoxy, Borodai worked as an adviser to Sergei Aksyonov, head of the peninsula’s occupation administration, during the annexation of Crimea, and later took a leadership position in Donetsk. Borodai has described himself as a friend and comrade of Igor Strelkov (Girkin), one of the main instigators of the conflict in the Donbas.

After the full-scale invasion began, Borodai became the founder and first commander of the “St. George” brigade. According to the unit’s website, it was formed in April 2023 by merging detachments of the Donbas Volunteers Union. Borodai’s brigade has fought in places including the Kinburn Spit, the left bank of the Dnipro, and the Soledar and Chasiv Yar directions. In May 2024, a Ukrainian court sentenced Borodai in absentia to 15 years in prison for violating the country’s territorial integrity.

Vladislav Golovin, known by the call sign “Struna,” commanded a platoon in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and took part in the battle for Mariupol. In June 2022, he was severely wounded and lost a leg, and later headed Yunarmiya, the Defense Ministry’s youth military-patriotic movement. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate accuses Golovin of organizing the “re-education” and military training of Ukrainian children, including in occupied territories.

Two more future deputies served in the 5th Separate Tank Brigade. Enver Nabiyev served as chief of staff and deputy commander of a tank battalion. He took part in the advance on Kyiv through Chornobyl and Borodianka in February 2022, and in fighting near Berezivka. Baldan Tsydypov commanded a motor rifle platoon in the same brigade and was severely wounded in the Kyiv direction on March 30, 2022.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs links service members of this brigade to an attack on civilians on the Kyiv–Zhytomyr highway. According to the investigation, between March 4 and 25, 2022, they fired on 10 civilian vehicles, killing 13 people and wounding six. Nabiyev and Tsydypov, however, are not specifically named among the suspects. Russian sources confirm their service in the brigade during that same period, but Meduza could not establish whether they took part in the shootings.

United Russia’s list also includes Alexander Filippovykh, deputy commander of the 1430th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment “Zaporizhzhia Spartans” (at the time this article was published, it was still unclear whether he would make the final list). According to Astra, an independent Telegram channel, he helped cover up the murder of soldier Alexei Serov.

According to Stanislav Rayevsky, another Russian soldier who witnessed the murder, battalion commander Sergei Serditov shot Serov in May 2023 after Serov complained about a shortage of shovels for digging trenches. Rayevsky said Filippovykh threatened witnesses to the murder with prosecution if they spoke about the crime. Rayevsky recorded his account on video and asked that it be published after his death. He was killed near Bakhmut that same summer.

Badma Bashankaev, a surgeon and United Russia representative from Kalmykia, started the group “Friends of Donbas Medicine,” whose doctors traveled to operate at the Donetsk Clinical Territorial Medical Association. It was there, in February 2024, that Ukrainian prisoner of war Andriy Pereverzev underwent surgery. Afterward, he discovered he had been branded with the inscription “Glory to Russia” and the letter Z on his body.

Journalists with the investigative project Schemes established that two surgeons from the group, Yuri Kuznetsov and Andrei Kryachko, were at the hospital on the day of the operation. According to them, they had traveled to Donetsk at Bashankaev’s invitation. The investigation did not establish who made the inscription, and there is no evidence that Bashankaev personally performed the operation, made the inscription, or ordered it made.

Eduard Kazymov, elected to the Duma from Moscow’s Tushino district, fought in the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade starting in March 2022, initially commanding a sniper platoon and later an air assault company. By the time of the election, he had become deputy director general of the “Urban Air Mobility Management Center.” According to EU Council documents, the company manufactures FPV drones for the Russian army.

Sergei Dobrovolsky, deputy chairman of the Young Guard of United Russia, joined the “Pyatnashka” brigade after the full-scale war began. The unit has been fighting in Donbas since 2014. Dobrovolsky himself was severely wounded in summer 2022.

Kirill Tikhonovich, another potential deputy, previously served in the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group. During the 2022 invasion, he commanded one of the “Redut” battalions, according to the investigative outlet Dossier Center. That name refers to a network of mercenary units that journalists have established is controlled by Russian military intelligence, the GRU.

There is no information in open sources about whether Tikhonovich took part in Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 2023 mutiny, the so-called “march of justice” on Moscow.

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How are other incoming lawmakers involved in the war?

Beyond these 54 people — 49 from United Russia, four candidates from other parties, and one independent — Meduza found 94 incoming lawmakers with clear, though less direct, ties to the war.

Five help train units, develop and test new equipment, or build military infrastructure. Four work on treating the wounded and organizing projects to help service members. Four more are involved in military propaganda.

The largest group — 81 people — raises money, supplies the army, or delivers humanitarian aid. The scale of this work sometimes far exceeds the occasional trip delivering parcels to the front line.

Galina Golovchenko, elected from United Russia, founded the Kuban fund “Generation” before the war. It now buys equipment and gear for Russian troops, makes camouflage netting, and helps the families of service members and displaced people. The fund estimates the total value of aid provided “as part of the war” at 450 million rubles.

Sergei Kazankov, a member of the Communist Party, helps supply Russian troops through businesses of the family agricultural holding “Zvenigovsky,” which he previously ran. According to a report on his work as a deputy, aid to troops and residents of occupied territories has exceeded 78.5 million rubles in total.

United Russia member Vladimir Gutenev and the Union of Machine Builders took part in handing over more than 16 million rubles worth of equipment in October 2024, including 35 quadcopters, 15 drone detectors, and eight electronic warfare stations.

The recipients included the Cossack detachment “Yermak,” part of BARS-15, a special forces brigade of the Central Military District. According to its commander, the unit entered the war in May 2022 in the Kharkiv region, then took part in fighting near Lyman, Kupyansk, Kreminna, and Svatove. In May 2024, the All-Russian Cossack Society reported that “Yermak” fighters were among the first to storm Avdiivka, Ocheretyne, and the settlement of Keramik.

Viktor Khalyn, a former member of the Rostov region’s legislative assembly and a potential State Duma deputy, bought reinforced tires for an armored military vehicle at service members’ request. A North Caucasus logistics company he heads has also supplied construction materials to a military unit.

Aid isn’t limited to buying and delivering ready-made equipment. Deputies also help train troops and build infrastructure for the war. Andrei Gimbatov and Vitaly Likhachev, for example, launched a combat training center called “Immortal Stalingrad” with their team, where drone operators are trained, according to Gimbatov’s own account. By the time this article was published, about 3,000 people had gone through the center.

United Russia member Ilya Volfson helps send Tatarstan engineers’ inventions to the front, including net launchers for intercepting drones and special attachments for firearms. He said troops test the equipment and report on its effectiveness.

Valery Leonov, also elected from United Russia, worked as Russia’s deputy minister of construction and housing before the election. Since 2022, he has overseen the construction of fortifications in the Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk regions, as well as in occupied Crimea. Leonov has also worked on reconstruction in occupied Mariupol and Volnovakha.

United Russia member Nikolai Doluda, who headed the All-Russian Cossack Society, worked on forming Cossack detachments to take part in the war. In early 2023, he called recruiting volunteers the main task of Cossack societies and reprimanded atamans who had not yet formed their own units. Doluda also demanded that combat training centers be set up and that Cossacks heading to the front be given equipment.

One separate area of work is treating the wounded and “helping veterans.” Gulnur Kulsarina heads the Bashkortostan branch of the state fund “Defenders of the Fatherland,” which handles, among other things, rehabilitation, prosthetics, and support for the families of service members.

Anna Kuznetsova, a former children’s rights commissioner and former deputy speaker of the State Duma from United Russia (she will apparently once again become deputy speaker in the new Duma), heads the party’s humanitarian cooperation headquarters. Together with the Defense Ministry and the fund “We Don’t Abandon Our Own,” the headquarters organized aid for wounded Russian troops. Party volunteers have also delivered equipment and rehabilitation supplies to hospitals, she said.

Another way future State Duma deputies are involved in the war is military propaganda. The leading figure in this group is Yevgeny Poddubny, a “military correspondent” and deputy director general of VGTRK, a Russian state broadcasting company, whom United Russia placed in the top five of its federal list.

In May 2022, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on him, saying that by spreading Kremlin propaganda he was supporting the Russian invasion. In fall 2024, Poddubny received the title Hero of Russia. He now gives talks on how to properly repel Ukrainian drone attacks, though, judging by results so far, it isn’t helping.

In total, four propagandists made it into the new State Duma. Besides Poddubny, they are Marina Kim, who traveled to the combat zone and filmed documentary films about Russian service members, and “military correspondent” Irina Kuksenkova, who has also worked on supporting and rehabilitating “war veterans.” Also elected was United Russia member Vyacheslav Nikonov, one of the hosts of the talk show Bolshaya Igra “The Big Game” on Channel One, a Russian state-controlled television channel, where the invasion of Ukraine is presented as Russia’s war against the “collective West.”

Even before the vote, Vladimir Putin had suggested that Russians see their participation in the election as a “contribution to victory.” After the election, he presented the official results — high turnout and United Russia’s record numbers — as proof that citizens supposedly support both the current government and the war.

At a meeting with the government on September 23, Putin thanked voters and said that unspecified attempts to disrupt the vote had supposedly failed, possibly a reference to the largest attack by Ukrainian drones on Moscow on the main day of voting.

Addressing troops specifically, he assured them that Russians believe in their victory, adding that the vote was “a vote for you”: “People believe in you, people believe in our victory. They believe in your courage, your heroism, your devotion to the Motherland. And I have no doubt that all the goals we set for ourselves as part of the special military operation will be achieved.”