Anonymous social media accounts are calling for the secession of an Estonian county on Russia’s border. Tallinn says it’s Moscow’s doing.
In conversations about a hypothetical Russian invasion of NATO territory, analysts frequently discuss the city of Narva, Estonia, as a possible target. Narva sits directly on the Estonian-Russian border, and 85 percent of its population is ethnic Russian. This has raised fears among some observers that Moscow could stage an attack under the same pretext it used in Ukraine, claiming a need to “protect” Russian speakers from persecution. In March 2025, an Estonian anti-propaganda watchdog flagged a cluster of social media accounts promoting a so-called “Narva People’s Republic,” deliberately echoing the language Moscow used to legitimize its backing of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The accounts have since drawn responses from Estonia’s prime minister, its intelligence services, and international media. But who is behind them — and what they actually want — remains murky. Here’s what we know.
On March 11, the Estonian anti-propaganda platform Propastop reported that social media accounts were circulating the idea of creating a “Narva People’s Republic” (“NNR”). The accounts operate on Telegram, TikTok, and the Russian platform VK, calling for autonomy for Estonia’s Ida-Viru County, which includes Narva. The anonymous administrators argue that autonomy is necessary to preserve Russian identity in the region.
The accounts also post “NNR” symbols, including a proposed flag and crest, alongside militaristic memes. One, titled “A Narva militia’s daily schedule,” lays out a tongue-in-cheek plan: storm Narva at 9:00 a.m., seize other towns in Ida-Viru County by 3:00 p.m., and cap the day with a concert by pro-war Russian blogger and rapper Akim Apachev at 8:00 p.m.
“The spread of such ideas in Estonia’s information space effectively normalizes rhetoric about the secession of part of the country and separatism,” Propastop concluded.
Wider attention
Propastop’s findings quickly drew attention from journalists and politicians. Estonia’s most-read outlet, Delfi, covered the story. Prime Minister Kristen Michal described it as a Russian information operation, while Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stressed that Narva “has been and will remain an Estonian city.”
Estonia’s Internal Security Service characterized the “NNR” project as a “simple and low-cost” information attack aimed at undermining the unity of Estonian society, warning that participation “may entail criminal consequences.”
The story also spread beyond Estonia. Numerous Russian outlets covered it, as did the German tabloid Bild, which regularly reports on the war in Ukraine. A source in Estonian intelligence told Bild that the ultimate goal of the “NNR” campaign remains unclear, but that it could be intended to lay the groundwork for a potential Russian invasion of Estonia — similar to Ukraine, where Russia backed the creation of the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” in 2014 before launching its full-scale invasion in 2022.
German military expert Carlo Masala told Bild that while NATO troops are stationed in Estonia, they are deployed about 180 kilometers (110 miles) west of Narva, and suggested that moving part of the contingent directly to the city could serve as a deterrent.
‘We’re dealing with a blunder’
Not everyone agreed that the campaign warranted the attention it received. Indrek Kiisler, head of the radio news editorial team at Estonian public broadcaster ERR, argued that journalists and politicians had devoted far too much attention to the online campaign, elevating a fringe topic into one that was taken seriously.
Of course, an information war is underway in the world, and Russia is surely plotting special operations against Estonia and the rest of the Western world every day — there’s no doubt about that. All the more reason to exercise basic professionalism and distinguish garbage from genuinely dangerous threats. This time, we’re dealing with a blunder, the noise from which — thanks to the media and the prime minister — has reached tens of thousands of people.
Propastop disagreed, pushing back against Kiisler as well as the media outlets and government officials it criticized for amplifying fringe separatist content:
In today’s information society, “blind spots” and self-censorship don’t work, because any idea will sooner or later become public knowledge. Silence would leave Estonia’s residents encountering such narratives without context — or only after they’ve already developed into a full-fledged information attack.
The cash grab
In any case, following Propastop’s post and the subsequent media coverage, the “NNR” Telegram channel did gain subscribers. Propastop noted it had around 60–70 followers at the time of its original report; by the time this article was written, the count had already exceeded 800.
Amid the surge of attention, the channel’s administrators clarified their goals — “We do not advocate for Narva or Ida-Viru County to secede from Estonia. We support autonomy — or at least equal rights for ‘Russian non-citizens’ with Estonians” — and began soliciting donations, adding: “Unfortunately, we are not a Kremlin project.”
Despite the channel’s growing popularity, the Estonian newspaper Postimees concluded that it is “nothing more than a poorly executed information operation.” Its journalists reached this conclusion after posing as “NNR” supporters and communicating with the channel’s administrators, who encouraged them to recruit others and distribute printed leaflets. “This cardboard ‘separatism’ is a self-funded project,” Postimees concluded.
Who exactly is behind the “NNR” accounts remains unclear. Postimees noted that the “NNR” group on VK was previously called “Blindazh 78” — the same name as a Telegram channel featuring posts about Russia’s war against Ukraine and nostalgia for the Soviet Union, with apparent ties to St. Petersburg. That channel is anonymous, though several early posts are attributed to someone named Ilya Boykov. Postimees did not specify who he is or whether he is connected to the “NNR” accounts.
The newspaper also noted that this is far from the first such project to target so-called “oppressed Russian speakers” in the Baltic states. In 2024, a Telegram channel called the “Latgale People’s Republic” appeared, advocating for the eastern Latvian region of Latgale to join Russia. The outlet Vot Tak found it was administered by users in Russia and Belarus. The channel has since been renamed, its subscribers removed, and its posts deleted.
Illegal referendums
The idea of “autonomy” for Narva isn’t a new one. In 1993, the city’s authorities attempted to hold a referendum on autonomous status within Estonia. The effort was led by Narva City Council chairman Vladimir Chuikin, who, as a Russian citizen, was no longer eligible to run in Estonian elections.
The push was driven not only by restrictions on the political rights of Russian-speaking residents, but also by the economic hardships of the early post-Soviet years.
The referendum took place in July 1993. According to local authorities, 54 percent of eligible voters participated, with 97 percent supporting autonomy. A similar vote was held in Sillamäe, another town in Ida-Viru County, where turnout reached 60 percent and support for autonomy stood at 98.6 percent. Estonia’s Supreme Court declared both referendums illegal.
Indrek Tarand, who served as the Estonian government’s special representative in Narva at the time, later said that the effort failed only because there were no Russian troops on the ground — and because Russia itself was consumed by internal political struggles.
Today, Narva’s residents appear unmoved by the prospect of a “people’s republic.” In a street poll by Delfi, the responses were largely dismissive. “It’s unrealistic now — that we could live normally as a separate state,” one respondent said. “We’d end up like Transnistria — neither here nor there,” said another.
