Georgia’s democratic reckoning As protests continue and the ruling party crushes dissent, could ex-president Salome Zourabichvili offer a political alternative?
Georgia’s democratic reckoning As protests continue and the ruling party crushes dissent, could ex-president Salome Zourabichvili offer a political alternative?
On May 26, Georgia celebrated its Independence Day — an occasion that coincided with the 180th consecutive day of anti-government demonstrations. The protests began last fall, after the ruling Georgian Dream party declared victory in a disputed parliamentary election and announced that it was halting E.U. accession talks until 2028. Georgians rallied in cities across the country, demanding European integration, a repeat vote, and the release of protesters arrested during clashes with law enforcement. Opposition lawmakers, meanwhile, refused to take up their seats in parliament — but this didn’t stop Georgian Dream from installing a new president to replace the defiant Salome Zourabichvili.
At 73 years old, Paris-born Zourabichvili has had a long political career, rising through France’s diplomatic service before becoming Georgia’s foreign minister and later the first woman president. Although elected with Georgian Dream’s support in 2018, Zourabichvili has since become one of the ruling party’s most outspoken critics. As Georgian Dream tightened its grip on power and sabotaged relations with the West, Zourabichvili took a strong pro-E.U. stance, allying herself with protesters, vetoing divisive legislation, and weathering impeachment proceedings not once but twice. Since vacating the presidential palace at the end of December, she has remained at the forefront of the embattled anti-government movement, working her international connections and attempting to coordinate Georgia’s notoriously divided opposition.
In posts on social media, Zourabichvili often talks about the need for a “true political alternative,” arguing that “Georgia must be ready — with democratic forces prepared to ensure stability and lead when change comes.” With the demonstrations that have persisted for months and Georgian Dream’s crackdown on dissent continuing unabated, could Zourabichvili herself be the political alternative many in Georgia are seeking? Researcher Guga Chomakhidze reports for The Beet.
This story first appeared in The Beet, a monthly email dispatch from Meduza covering Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Sign up here to get the next issue delivered directly to your inbox.
More than a century ago, with Georgia still under the shadow of Imperial Russia, one of the nation’s most visionary minds, Niko Nikoladze, wrote with determination: “Enlightenment and prosperity were not found in their [Europeans’] cradles, but achieved through effort.”
With these words, he urged his compatriots to look westward, embrace the ideals of liberty and self-determination, and transform Georgia into a modern, prosperous, and industrial state. His call, reinforced by many of his most prominent contemporaries, culminated in the founding of the First Georgian Republic in 1918, a bold democratic experiment that stood out amid the crumbling empires of the old world.
The republic established the first multi-ethnic, multi-religious, female-inclusive parliament on the European continent and passed some of the most liberal and forward-looking laws of its era. The republic also proved short-lived. In 1921, the Red Army invaded, extinguishing the young republic and scattering its leaders across foreign lands.
That March, in the Black Sea port city of Batumi, the ship Anatolia lifted its anchors, carrying some of the last defenders of Georgia’s fleeting independence into exile. Among them were Ivane Zourabichvili, one of Georgia’s founding fathers, and his wife Nino, daughter of the visionary Niko Nikoladze. Their departure marked not the end of a struggle, but the beginning of a long intergenerational resistance.
The diplomat
A century later, Nikoladze’s great-granddaughter, Salome Zourabichvili, stands at the center of Georgia’s ongoing democratic struggle. With the country now in its seventh month of sustained, nationwide protests against the increasingly pro-Russian ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), Zourabichvili has emerged as an unlikely figurehead of the country’s opposition movement.
Born in Paris in 1952 to Georgian political exiles, Zourabichvili grew up steeped in the anti-Soviet intellectual traditions of the diaspora. Her family, having fled the Soviet takeover of Georgia, never stopped imagining a return to a democratic homeland.
Zourabichvili went on to become a career diplomat, rising through the French Foreign Service and holding senior posts at the United Nations, NATO, and the French embassy in Washington, D.C. She came to Georgia in 2004 as the French ambassador. Riding the wave of the Rose Revolution, then-President Mikheil Saakashvili appointed her foreign minister.
Zourabichvili quickly became a popular but polarizing figure. Though lauded for her role in negotiating the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia, she was dismissed within a year amid political infighting. It would be the first of many times that she found herself on the outside looking in.
Nevertheless, Zourabichvili remained involved in opposition politics. Ahead of the 2013 presidential vote, she publicly endorsed Saakashvili’s main rival, deeming billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream party the only political force capable of defeating Saakashvili’s United National Movement. Though she was barred from running in that election on account of her dual citizenship, Zourabichvili would renounce her French passport in 2018 and go on to win the presidency on a Georgian Dream ticket.
Many viewed Zourabichvili’s Georgian Dream-backed presidential run as a capitulation. Her campaign had been marred by allegations of vote-buying, intimidation, and abuse of state resources — leaving her with a trust rating that hovered around 15 percent. Zourabichvili’s approval rating was similarly low, with a November 2019 International Republican Institute poll indicating that only 23 percent of respondents viewed her favorably.
Critics often described Zourabichvili as aloof and politically inconsistent, perceiving her as a ceremonial figure rather than an autonomous political actor. During the early years of her presidency, she frequently aligned herself with GD’s positions while maintaining a conspicuously cautious posture on key political disputes. Controversial statements — such as blaming Georgia for initiating the 2008 war with Russia, opposing the idea of U.S. military bases, and calling for direct dialogue with Moscow — further alienated segments of the pro-Western public. As a result, before her formal split with GD, many saw Zourabichvili not as a counterbalance to power, but as a contradictory figure who was neither fully aligned with the ruling party nor convincingly detached from it.
Zourabichvili’s slow transformation from political outsider to opposition figurehead gained momentum after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As Georgian Dream’s pro-European stance gave way to increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the West, she broke ranks, emerging as one of the most vocal critics of the ruling party’s drift toward Moscow.
“There are no angels in politics — especially not in Georgia,” says David Darchiashvili, a former Georgian lawmaker and the director of the Center for Russian Studies think tank in Tbilisi. “But when it matters, she [Zourabichvili] does the right thing.”
Breaking ranks
Ever since Georgian Dream came to power in 2012, critics have questioned the party’s true allegiances. At the center of this skepticism stands its founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who built his fortune in Russia’s banking and telecom sectors during the chaotic 1990s. Once a supporter of the now-imprisoned former President Saakashvili, Ivanishvili assembled a six-party coalition to unseat him, promising a new chapter for Georgia.
Over a decade later, that promise has curdled. Now in his 13th year as Georgia’s behind-the-scenes power broker, Ivanishvili has extended his influence across the political spectrum and consolidated economic control. He has slowly redirected the country’s foreign policy away from its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, leaning instead toward Beijing and, increasingly, Moscow.
“Every move GD makes resembles the Kremlin. The laws, the sabotage, the rhetoric,” says Beka Kobakhidze, a historian at Ilia State University.
For many years, Georgian Dream billed itself as pro-Western. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the party’s diplomatic balancing act became less tenable. It struggled to maintain both non-provocation toward Russia and integration with Europe. Faced with a moment of reckoning, Georgian Dream hedged, choosing caution toward Moscow over clarity with its Western allies and upholding democratic principles. The majority of the GD political elite followed the party’s decision. However, there was one high-profile leader who refused to fall in line.
Zourabichvili’s public break with Georgian Dream came in March 2023, in the form of a scathing state-of-the-nation address. “Where do you stand today? Why have you strayed from the people’s will?” she asked lawmakers, just weeks after major pro-E.U. protests rocked Tbilisi. Condemning GD’s abandonment of its early promise of European integration — a promise, she reminded them, that once included backing her presidential run as a gesture of goodwill — she accused the ruling party of suffocating dissent, undermining judicial reform, and sabotaging Georgia’s path to the E.U.
Zourabichvili would publicly condemn the government’s refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia, and she obstructed its push to adopt legislation mirroring Russian laws targeting civil society and media freedoms. Accusing GD of aligning with Moscow’s interests, she dubbed the party “Russian Dream,” emphasizing the stark choice facing Georgia between European integration and subservience to Russian-style authoritarianism. Her outspoken stance galvanized public support, particularly among pro-European citizens disillusioned with the government, positioning Zourabichvili as a central figure in the opposition to Georgian Dream’s policies.
“When it mattered most, she stood on the right side,” says former Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergi Kapanadze, who now heads the Georgia’s Reforms Associates think tank in Tbilisi. “It was a turning point. When GD began mimicking Kremlin policies, she refused to go along.”
In the eyes of many, Zourabichvili began to emerge as a bulwark against the rising tide of tyranny — a final safeguard as Georgian democracy edged closer to authoritarian rule.
The last president
The protests in Georgia resumed late last autumn, on the heels of a controversial parliamentary election that saw Georgian Dream claim victory despite widespread allegations of voter intimidation, vote-buying, abuse of state resources, and a mismanaged electoral process. But it was the government’s subsequent decision to postpone E.U. accession talks until 2028 that triggered mass demonstrations across the country.
Viewing this official shift in Tbilisi’s long-held foreign policy orientation as a betrayal of the constitution, the protesters challenged the legitimacy of the October 2024 vote. Zourabichvili sided with the protesters, urging her compatriots to join her on the streets of Tbilisi and filing an unsuccessful lawsuit with the Constitutional Court seeking to overturn the election results.
In December, Georgian Dream lawmakers elected Mikheil Kavelashvili, a former professional soccer player turned far-right politician, to replace Zourabichvili as president — provoking outcry from opposition parties, which had boycotted the vote. As her term came to a close, Zourabichvili refused to step down, with the opposition maintaining that she was Georgia’s last legitimate leader. Nevertheless, she vacated the presidential residence on the day of Kavelashvili’s inauguration, telling supporters gathered outside the Orbeliani Palace, “I bring legitimacy with me.”
Six months on, opposition forces are still demanding new parliamentary elections as well as the release of “prisoners of conscience” — more than 50 protesters detained during the ongoing anti-government demonstrations. The list of detainees includes some of Georgia’s most respected and active public figures, such as journalist Mzia Amaglobeli, actor Andro Chichinadze, and student activist Zviad Tsetskhladze.
Opposition parties, civil society organizations, and grassroots activists have voiced a unified public call for justice, accountability, and democratic reform, one that’s echoed by international observers advocating for transparent governance and respect for human rights. Against this backdrop, Zourabichvili invokes the very same ideals her ancestors championed and carried abroad a century ago. When addressing the Georgian people, she echoes Nikoladze’s words and ideals: “Our path to independence, our path to unity, is through Europe, with Europe — not with Russia.”
But while her sharp criticism and diplomatic efforts have positioned Zourabichvili as a moral voice, she’s still hovering at the edge of decisive political action. Despite her symbolic importance, Zourabichvili remains detached from the protests’ organizational core, appearing at times eager to support, yet hesitant to lead.
“She is doing her 100 percent to help the cause — I know this as a fact,” says a source close to Zourabichvili, speaking on condition of anonymity. “But she is also frustrated. She doesn’t understand why the movement is losing momentum. The people are no longer protesting as actively as they used to. I think a part of her also blames the electorate for the lost momentum.”
“She has a very difficult personality,” says another anonymous source who has worked closely with Zourabichvili. “She doesn’t work well with others. And, unfortunately, every leader in the opposition has an ego problem. They are all divas and egomaniacs; I’m not surprised they can’t unite.”
It’s a familiar story. With four main parties and a handful of minor groupings, the opposition in Georgia is notoriously fractured. Conflicting agendas undermine strategic alliances and personal rivalries run deep. And while they all call for European integration and an end to GD’s rule, opposition forces have repeatedly failed to form a united front — even in the face of opportunities like the 2024 parliamentary vote and the ongoing political crisis.
“The opposition parties are failing to present a viable alternative,” says Natalie Sabanadze, Georgia’s former E.U. ambassador and a senior fellow at Chatham House. “Just criticizing GD and calling them a ‘Russian regime’ is not enough. They must present a strong alternative in terms of party composition, leadership, Russia policy, [and] reform packages. The current way is not working; they need to do better.”
A multi-dimensional crisis
The opposition’s lack of initiative stands in contrast to the scale of the crisis. Since December, Georgian police have cracked down on demonstrators with unprecedented brutality, in addition to imposing massive fines and opening criminal cases. With opposition parties boycotting the parliament, Georgian Dream lawmakers pushed through a second “foreign agent” bill, upping the pressure on independent media and civil society organizations. Pro-government and state TV channels have ramped up anti-Western propaganda. Georgia's E.U. accession, meanwhile, has been forced to a standstill.
“The crisis is multi-dimensional,” Sabanadze explains. “There is a domestic legitimacy crisis, and there is also international isolation. GD has pivoted away from the West and rebranded Europe as a threat. It has left Georgia isolated, without allies.”
“Zourabichvili was able to fill the [opposition’s leadership] vacuum temporarily with her very clearly defined European trajectory, which many Georgians still do continue to support wholeheartedly,” says author and Eurasia Group analyst Tinatin Japaridze. “But resisting a system that is backed by the likes of Russia at the highest possible levels is not easy without the strong support of another power.”
With Europe and the United States preoccupied with other issues, Georgia has faded into the background on the international stage, Japaridze says, leaving Zourabichvili adrift despite her extensive network of contacts abroad. “Their actions are reactionary, not strategic,” Kapanadze argues. “Sanctions don’t work. What now? We need long-term policy from both Brussels and Washington.”
Meanwhile, Georgian Dream shows no signs of slowing its authoritarian drift. It controls the judiciary, the electoral commission, and nearly all the media. The V-Dem Institute has reclassified Georgia as an “electoral autocracy,” while Reporters Without Borders warns that “official interference” is undermining press freedom, creating a hostile environment for independent journalists. Kobakhidze, the historian, calls the current system “authoritarian in structure, heading toward dictatorship.”
In recent weeks, the authorities have jailed opposition leaders Irakli Okruashvili, Zurab Japaridze, and Nika Melia, citing their failure to appear before a Georgian Dream parliamentary commission and pay ensuing fines. The arrest of Nika Gvaramia, who leads the opposition party Ahali together with Melia, is reportedly imminent.
Critics warn that such inquiries are being weaponized to manufacture a veneer of legitimacy for arrests: opposition leaders, who are still boycotting the parliament, are summoned for questioning and then receive heavy fines for failing to comply. Government officials and pro-government media, in turn, portray even the act of paying fines as tacit acceptance of Georgian Dream’s authority — an interpretation many in the opposition reject.
Georgian Dream officials have accompanied this crackdown with increasingly alarming rhetoric, vowing to ban what they call “radical opposition” parties for alleged “unconstitutional behavior” and “crimes against the state.”
All the while, the anti-government protests have continued. Despite unprecedented popular mobilization, the fragmented opposition has failed to translate this outcry into concrete political change. This includes Zourabichvili herself. “Everyone agrees that it’s time to unite,” says Kobakhidze. “But no one knows how.”
That said, Zourabichvili could very well be the missing piece. With no party affiliations, no stated electoral ambitions, and a powerful personal story, she could bridge the chasm between warring factions. “Despite her flaws, she’s the only figure with symbolic weight and international credibility,” says Kapanadze. “This isn’t about perfection — it’s about survival.”
‘The 100-year struggle continues’
Zourabichvili’s lineage, stance, and actions all point to a deeper question facing Georgia. Can one woman, born in exile and carrying the legacy of a lost republic, galvanize a splintered opposition and steer the country back onto a democratic path?
“Since the main promoter of democratic values in the region — the U.S. — has stepped back, the [pro-democracy] movement must be homegrown,” Sabanadze maintains. “There is no alternative to this.”
Zourabichvili, who declined to be interviewed for this story, appears hesitant to take on a more formal leadership role, positioning herself instead as a coordinator of opposition forces. During a protest in Tbilisi on April 1, the 34th anniversary of the referendum on restoring Georgia’s independence, she announced the creation of the Resistance Platform, with the aim of uniting pro-E.U. parties and civil society groups — an initiative some opposition figures responded to with derision.
“Zourabichvili seems more effective abroad than she is internally,” notes Darchiashvili. “Considering the problems and differences within this resistance movement,” he adds, “unification will require a lot of effort and consistent energetic engagement from her to lead this process.”
In many ways, Zourabichvili is reprising a familiar role. Throughout her presidency, she sought to unify Georgia’s opposition, encouraging dialogue and coordination across party lines. That effort, though largely symbolic at the time, laid the groundwork for what many hoped would become a broader coalition against Georgian Dream. But during the 2024 vote, this political force failed to materialize.
“There is a sense of disappointment and disillusionment not only among opposition voters but also among undecided voters, who, I think, would have been ready to vote for an opposition candidate if they genuinely felt that they could deliver on the promises they made ahead of the election,” says Japaridze.
Now, with Zourabichvili’s formal powers expired and the Georgian political landscape dramatically altered, many believe the moment has come for her to transition from a figurehead to an active opposition leader, especially as she has the highest approval rating (49 percent) of any political figure. The stakes, they argue, have never been higher. “What many underestimate, both in Georgia and abroad, is the urgency,” Kapanadze warns. “With Georgian Dream’s authoritarian turn, we may soon have no internal resources left to push for democratic or pro-Western causes.”
Yet Zourabichvili’s apparent hesitation is not without cause. Limited resources, internal divisions, and unrelenting pressure from an increasingly repressive regime continue to beleaguer Georgia’s opposition. And global trends — marked by the resurgence of right-wing conservatism — have further complicated the terrain for liberal democratic actors. “It’s really not just Georgia that is going through this democratic backsliding, but the concept of democracy [itself],” Japaridze underscores.
In this context, fully entering the political arena may well feel like stepping into a losing battle. “The available resources are incomparably asymmetric,” says Kobakhidze. “It’s very hard to resist Georgian Dream in a context where it holds a monopoly over both state and economic resources.”
Despite lending her voice to protesters and publicly condemning authoritarian overreach, Zourabichvili’s domestic and international engagement remains limited in scale and sporadic in nature. Her political rhythm is uneven — at times forceful, at times absent — and her overall impact remains uncertain, leaving some to wonder whether she has done all she can.
“There has to be a fresh face that comes into Georgian politics, someone whose name the Georgian people haven’t been hearing for years, because there is political fatigue,” says Japaridze. “I am skeptical that much more can be done without another leader emerging.”
Indeed, the absence of a clear, unifying opposition leader has created a strategic vacuum. With no one to coordinate efforts between parties, engage grassroots protest movements on the ground, and represent the democratic cause to international partners, the resistance remains fractured. Meanwhile, Georgian Dream continues its methodical consolidation of power, undeterred by domestic discontent or international concern.
In Tbilisi, there is a palpable sense of urgency. The window to reverse Georgia’s authoritarian slide seems to be closing rapidly. But with protesters still taking to the streets, coming out in force on Georgia’s Independence Day on May 26, the fight isn’t over yet. As Zourabichvili once put it in an interview, reflecting on her great-grandfather Niko Nikoladze’s legacy, “the 100-year struggle continues.”
Hello, I’m Eilish Hart, the editor of The Beet. Thanks for taking the time to read our work! Our newsletter delivers underreported stories like this one to subscribers once a month. Like all of Meduza’s reporting, it’s free to read but relies on support from readers like you. Please consider donating to our crowdfunding campaign.
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Story by Guga Chomakhidze for The Beet
Edited by Eilish Hart