‘Little pieces in a big game’ Moldova’s former reintegration minister, Alexandru Flenchea, explains what losing Russian gas means for breakaway Transnistria
As the temperature in Moldova dips below freezing, the breakaway Transnistria region’s 360,000 residents are using plug-in electric heaters and wood stoves to keep warm. In the two weeks since Russian gas stopped flowing to the Moscow-backed region via Ukraine, locals have faced gas, electricity, and hot water cuts, which have all but paralyzed local industry. According to the self-proclaimed authorities in Tiraspol, Transnistria has less than a month’s worth of gas left. And after 30 years of supplying gas free of charge, Russia’s Gazprom has so far refrained from using alternative pipeline routes to shore up energy supplies.
Hoping to counter Moscow’s influence, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Moldovan President Maia Sandu have announced plans to work together to find a solution to Transnistria’s energy problem. And some analysts even argue that the crisis could offer an opportunity for Moldova to reintegrate the breakaway region. To learn more about the causes and consequences of the Russian gas cutoff, The Beet editor Eilish Hart spoke to Alexandru Flenchea, Moldova’s former deputy prime minister for reintegration and the director of the Initiative 4 Peace.
— How are the authorities in Tiraspol explaining the gas shortages and blackouts to the population? Are they putting forward any solutions?
— The way they explain it is kind of obvious: It’s Moldova’s fault, and it’s Ukraine’s fault. However I’d like to nuance this a bit. A couple of hours ago, I was talking to somebody from Tiraspol and I asked, “What do people think and whom do people blame?” And this person said, they obviously blame Moldova and Ukraine, because this is what the propaganda is telling them, but they’re also blaming the local government in Transnistria.
This person also said the earliest they heard about the imminent crisis, that there would be no gas, was two or three weeks before the end of December [2024]. Well, it was at least mid-2023 when the Ukrainians said there would be no extension of the gas transit contract. Most people in Transnistria and most people in Moldova proper didn’t take it seriously and thought somebody would sort this out, because “they” aren’t going to leave people freezing mid-winter. Well, guess what happened?
It’s not that Moldova is not entirely to blame, it’s just that Transnistrians are blaming Moldova for the wrong reasons. I’m not going to blame Ukraine, even though obviously what triggered this situation is Ukraine’s explicit refusal to extend the contract. They’re waging a war; the future of their country as an independent, sovereign nation is at stake. If this is what their leadership decided was needed to help them resist in this war, that’s their sovereign right to decide. After all, it’s a bilateral contract — both sides have to agree. However, I do blame the Moldovan authorities for being totally unprepared to face this crisis.
As early as 2023, it was crystal clear that unless the government in Chisinau took preventive measures, there was going to be an energy crisis. For some reason, most people in Moldova thought it wasn’t going to happen, because “Russians don’t abandon their own” and Moscow will sort this out. To which I said, “Really? Aren’t the Transnistrians our people?” It is the [central] government’s obligation to take care of the whole country, all of the people who make up this nation, including our fellow citizens in Transnistria. So, yes, I do blame Moldova for being totally unprepared, for [assuming] Moscow would find workarounds to supply gas to Transnistria. That was a big miscalculation.
— What message are officials in Chisinau sending to the population now?
— Moldovan officials say it’s Russia’s fault — Russia’s energy blackmail. And it is Russia’s energy blackmail, definitely so. Russia’s utilizing this situation and, in fact, using and abusing Transnistria and the [more than] 300,000 people who live there to put pressure on Moldova, and it’s also using [the rest of] Moldova. There’s an officially declared state of emergency, there’s a certain shortage in electricity supplies, and Moldovans are [being] encouraged to save electricity. Moldova’s electricity needs are being covered with day-ahead and intraday purchases on the Romanian market: It’s super expensive, and it’s also unreliable. You cannot sustain a country’s energy system with day-ahead and intraday purchases, it doesn’t work this way. So, yes, it’s Russia’s blackmail, but it was so predictable.
— According to Moldovan officials and Moldovagaz, the authorities in Tiraspol rejected offers to help facilitate the purchase of fuel on the European market back in December, before the gas shut off even happened. How do you understand the rationale behind Tiraspol refusing to seek out alternative supplies?
— The Transnistrian leadership may be Russian stooges, but they’re not stupid. So, the only rational explanation for this [refusal] is that purchases of market gas are not what they need. Firstly, the Transnistrian leadership is not entirely independent in making decisions. And secondly, they don’t need gas or any other fuel that they have to pay for.
Transnistria exists as a secessionist entity because of two converging interests. One is local interests: the local oligarchs who control the region, its economy, and its politics. Their interest is to make money, and Transnistria’s entire economic model is based on and fully reliant on supplies of free gas [from Russia]. This is where the money comes from. They burn free gas to generate electricity that they sell to Moldova proper, and that’s their biggest revenue channel. Transnistria’s industry and entire economy also relies on super cheap energy. They do charge local businesses for gas and electricity, but it’s super cheap, which makes Transnistria’s manufactured goods competitive. So, you remove the free gas, and then Transnistria’s entire economy and self-proclaimed independence collapses.
The second interest is Moscow’s interest. Moscow is interested in sustaining Transnistria economically to maintain it as a separatist entity because it hosts Russia’s military, without the consent and against the explicitly expressed will of the people of Moldova. And Russia is happy to pay for that military presence with free gas supplies. Remove that free gas component and Moscow loses leverage. So, obviously [no solution from Chisinau] is going to work and nothing is going to be accepted.
The only thing that both Moscow and the local oligarchs need is the resumption of free Russian gas supplies. Anything else would implicitly mean irreversible changes to the status quo, that is, Transnistria’s so-called independence. Transnistria would then inevitably become part of Moldova — or whoever sustains it economically, to be entirely honest.
— With that in mind, there is an alternative supply route through Turkey that Gazprom could use to get gas to Transnistria, so why not use it to keep that leverage in place? So far, we haven’t seen Moscow show any willingness to do that.
— You said it, “so far” — [just] wait for it. For Russia, Transnistria is not an end in itself. Russia wants all of Moldova, but even Moldova itself is obviously not Russia’s major interest. So, they use Transnistria to blackmail Moldova because, as I said, Transnistria has traditionally been its main supplier of electricity. So, Moldova is also under pressure now: It has to take care of the 300,000 people who are freezing in Transnistria but also the rest of the country. We shall see whether or not existing interconnections with Romania and whatever the Romanian electricity market has to offer will be sufficient.
Moscow is using Moldova to put pressure on Ukraine — just as it uses Hungary and Slovakia — to restore gas transit, because this is what’s at stake. Moscow’s real stake is the eventual full-scale resumption of Ukrainian transit of their gas because that’s a lot of money. So much money that it’s no longer business — it’s big politics.
So, as you see, Transnistria and all of Moldova are just little pieces in this big game. And, excuse me [for saying so], but unfortunately, the 300,000 people who live in Transnistria are just being leveraged. Russia knows exactly how long Transnistria can survive without supplies of free gas. They have some coal and gas reserves, they ration both, so they can survive. It wouldn’t be unprecedented, Transnistrians have faced this in the past a couple of times. The question is, can Moldova survive without cheap Transnistrian electricity longer than Transnistria [can survive] without gas? This is what the Russians are testing right now.
If Moldova can survive longer, Russia will lend their hand to help Transnistria and save it from collapse. And thus, once again, win the sympathy of the people in Transnistria, reinforce its moral and political power in this part of the world, and basically teach everyone a lesson. If Moldova cannot outlive Transnistria energy-wise, the same thing will happen. Moscow will hesitate but, again, lend their hand — [not to the] “bloody Maia Sandu regime” but to the friendly people of Moldova, to save them from the “merciless pro-Western government” that [supposedly] doesn’t care about them. [Russia] will find a workaround, supply the gas, save Transnistria and Moldova, but that comes at a cost. Either a financial or political one. Or, most likely, both.
— On January 8, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Moldovan President Maia Sandu announced plans to collaborate on a solution, which they said could include alternative fuel sources such as coal. What do you make of this approach?
— Why didn’t she call him one month ago? That would have already been late. I believe the day after Zelensky officially announced there would be no extension of the gas contract, she should have called him and talked about it. Talk, agree on plans in the interest of both countries, and enforce those plans before the crisis emerges.
They both said all the right things and kudos to them both. But again, the Transnistrians — in fact, meaning the Russians who effectively but illegally control the power plant in Transnistria — they said no to Ukrainian gas back in November of last year. What guarantee is there that they’ll say yes to Ukrainian coal, which they’ll have to pay for? That runs against Russia’s interests. Russia is bombing and readily destroying Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, so why would they allow Ukraine to supply fuel to a power plant that is supposed to cover the Odesa region’s electricity needs? It runs against their interests and, again, would also implicitly mean that Russia loses leverage over Transnistria.
Whoever controls the energy sector in Transnistria controls it politically. Why would Russia let Transnistria go into either Moldova’s hands or Ukraine’s hands? So, I’m skeptical. It could only happen if Transnistrians are completely desperate and have the option of either literally freezing or accepting that aid. But again, Russia is not going to allow that to happen; they’ll intervene at the right moment.
— Some analysts argue that an energy crisis like this — or, more specifically, an end to cheap Russian gas and the influence that comes with it — could present an opportunity for reintegrating Transnistria into Moldova. Do you agree with that assessment?
— It potentially could be an opportunity to reintegrate Transnistria, if Moldova was prepared. Right now, Moldova itself is struggling with the energy crisis. Remember, we have an officially declared state of emergency in the energy sector. So [Moldova] has no resources, it’s totally unprepared, and has no energy, political, or hard security plans. So, yes, it could have been [an opportunity for reintegration], but that opportunity has been missed. As one foreign diplomat [stationed] here in Moldova about 20 years ago said, “Moldovans will never miss the opportunity to miss an opportunity.” And this is exactly what happened.
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Interview by Eilish Hart