Endgame What battlefield developments and the balance of power reveal about the future of the Russia–Ukraine war
The Russian army has been advancing in Ukraine’s east throughout 2024 — though at a significant cost. Nearly three years after the start of the full-scale invasion, the grinding war of attrition is depleting resources on both sides. Attention is shifting from Russia’s battlefield gains to the prospect of peace talks, but how realistic a deal might be remains far from certain. Meduza’s analysts break down what the Russian army has achieved over the past year, why neither side has secured a decisive victory, and how dwindling manpower and equipment could bring Moscow and Kyiv to the negotiating table.
As the war’s third year draws to an end, so does another phase of the conflict. Over the past year, the Russian army leveraged its numerical and technical advantages, bolstered by extensive recruitment efforts in 2023 (though the Kremlin stopped short of declaring another round of mobilization). By late 2024, however, attention had shifted from the once-unimaginable advances of Russia’s forces to the prospect of peace negotiations. And while many view these talks as almost inevitable, the details of any potential agreement remain unclear.
This shift in discourse has been influenced, in part, by Donald Trump’s pledge to end the war in “a single day” after his inauguration as U.S. president on January 20 — even if this promise still seems naive. Yet, there are tangible reasons for Moscow to consider a compromise. Despite its gains, Russia’s military efforts remain confined to a war-of-attrition strategy. The Russian army hasn’t succeeded in decisively defeating Ukraine’s Armed Forces (the AFU), and no clear path to such a victory appears within reach. Moreover, this prolonged conflict has exhausted not only the AFU but also the Russian military.
Should negotiations fail, Russia will retain the capacity to press forward with its offensive, but its resources will start to dwindle in 2025. The Kremlin may still hope that the AFU will eventually collapse under the weight of its own challenges. However, a more pragmatic strategy for Moscow would be to “monetize” recent gains by securing a treaty advantageous to Russia.
In the best-case scenario for the Kremlin, it could use its position of strength to impose terms on Kyiv that would trigger a deep political crisis in Ukraine. This, in turn, could make Ukrainian politics dependent on Russia, which appears to be Vladimir Putin’s primary goal — should a decisive military victory remain out of reach.
What did the Russian army achieve in 2024?
In the third year of the war, the Russian military command developed several tactical approaches that have allowed its armed forces to capitalize on numerical superiority and break through Ukraine’s defenses.
The Russian army adopted small assault group tactics employed by Wagner Group in 2023. These tactics require minimal preparation for soldiers, who are directed by commanders via radio. The commanders monitor troop movements and enemy actions through live video feeds from numerous drones. Assault groups, often operating at night or in poor weather to avoid detection, approach enemy fortifications on foot and attempt to capture them. Artillery and kamikaze drones, guided by the same drone feeds, target enemy positions. When successful, the assault groups consolidate their gains and advance from position to position, gradually pushing deeper into enemy defenses.
At the same time, the Russian military refined its use of armored group assaults, a tactic also used by Ukraine’s Armed Forces. Small groups of armored vehicles, typically fewer than ten, advance under fire with tank support, crossing the “gray zone” — which can span several kilometers — to deliver infantry directly onto enemy positions. After deploying the troops, the surviving vehicles withdraw, leaving the infantry to hold the captured positions.
For larger settlements and heavily fortified positions, the Russian army relies on extensive infantry and armored forces supported by aviation. Aircraft operating from tens of kilometers away deploy powerful guided bombs equipped with planning and correction modules. These modules, attached to Soviet-era bombs produced in the hundreds of thousands, have made even heavily fortified urban and industrial positions vulnerable to attack.
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This combination of tactics enabled the Russian military to capture Avdiivka in February 2024 and then advance on Pokrovsk. Along the flanks of this offensive, they seized Vuhledar, nearly encircled Velyka Novosilka, took control of most of Toretsk, and captured part of Chasiv Yar. Just hours before the New Year, Ukrainian forces were pushed out of the industrial zone in the strategic city of Kurakhove.
However, these effective tactics have significant limitations and drawbacks.
The extended offensive throughout 2024 led to a sharp increase in Russian losses of both personnel and equipment. Open-source databases tracking losses through photos and videos report the highest numbers of destroyed or damaged equipment (particularly infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers) in 2024. While there could be alternative explanations — such as more frequent documentation by Ukrainian forces — there’s no logical basis for this. The simplest explanation is that Russian equipment losses have genuinely increased.
Databases compiling obituaries for fallen soldiers paint a similar picture. Since the fall of 2023, the rate of reported deaths has doubled, reflecting actual losses rather than changes in data collection methods.
Russia’s powerful offensive has also been limited to a single strategic direction. More than half of all Russian forces in Ukraine are deployed along the axis stretching from Velyka Novosilka (a village on the border between the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions) to Chasiv Yar (a town near Bakhmut). This includes troops from Russia’s Central and Eastern Military Districts (six combined-arms armies, one army corps, two independent divisions, as well as airborne and naval infantry brigades) and two armies from the Southern Military District.
Such a concentration of forces is only possible due to a robust logistics network, including railroads and storage facilities in Donetsk and Horlivka, as well as Russian control over all roads leading west. In peacetime, the route from Donetsk to the current front line would take just an hour by car. Elsewhere, the absence of similar logistical support has made the pace of Russian advances much slower. Meanwhile, losses in Kupyansk, Siversk, Vovchansk, and the Kursk region are also high.
Despite localized successes, the Russian military hasn’t figured out how to penetrate the full depth of Ukrainian defenses to transition from a war of attrition to a decisive victory. Ukraine’s recent offensive in Russia’s Kursk region demonstrated that deep breakthroughs are still possible, but only where defenses are particularly weak. As soon as Russian reserves were redirected to the border, the Ukrainian advance stalled, leaving their forces confined to a small foothold around the town of Sudzha in Russia’s Kursk region.
Why is a decisive victory still out of reach for Russia?
Over the year that Russian forces advanced from Avdiivka toward Pokrovsk and Kurakhove, they repeatedly surrounded Ukrainian battalions and even entire brigades. Near-encirclements occurred in Karlivka, Nevelske (between Donetsk and Hirnyk), Selydove, Vuhledar, along the Sukhi Yaly River southwest of Kurakhove, and in Kurakhove itself. However, these “cauldrons” never fully closed. Ukrainian troops consistently managed to break out of encirclement, albeit with heavy losses, and these battered brigades soon returned to the frontlines.
Similarly, as Ukrainian forces retreated westward from Avdiivka, dangerous gaps repeatedly appeared in their defenses. Yet, Russian forces were unable to exploit these openings to deliver a decisive blow. Instead, they could only push AFU brigades back and capture territory, only to face the same brigades — though weakened by earlier battles — at new defensive lines.
The slow and shallow advances of Russian forces stem from the tactics both sides have adopted in recent years. Troops have to be excessively echeloned in depth, divided into layers where assault groups comprise only a small portion of the attacking (or defending) unit. Concentrating large numbers of troops and equipment near the frontlines isn’t feasible, as they become easy targets for precision weapons, particularly drones and guided artillery shells.
As a result, small assault groups, often advancing on foot or using vehicles vulnerable to drones, can at best reach the enemy’s forward positions. Typical advances range from one to five or seven kilometers. Even when successful, these groups must consolidate their gains while under sustained attacks from enemy drones and artillery.
Launching the next attack requires time to assemble new assault groups and equipment at the captured positions, move artillery and drone operators to the new front, and establish supply lines — all while under constant surveillance and attack by drones and artillery. This makes it impossible to deploy follow-up forces quickly or without significant losses to exploit a breakthrough.
These delays — often lasting several days between assaults — allow the other side to bring in reserves and even launch counterattacks. When assault groups do manage to push into the opposing side’s rear positions, their small numbers prevent them from fully encircling or holding these areas in a “cauldron.”
Under these conditions, the Russian army remains unable to decisively defeat the Ukrainian army or advance toward major Ukrainian cities like Kyiv, Odesa, or Dnipro. Therefore, the Kremlin continues to pursue a war of attrition, hoping that by the time this strategy becomes unsustainable, the “realities on the ground” — as Vladimir Putin describes territorial control — will align with its goals. Officially, Russia’s demands include control over the entire territory of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.
In the last two months, the pace of Russia’s territorial gains in Donbas has accelerated to 500–600 square kilometers (190–230 square miles) per month, a speed not seen from Russian forces since 2022. At this rate, the Russian army could theoretically fully occupy the Donetsk region by the end of 2025. However, there are doubts about whether the Russian military can sustain its full offensive capabilities for another year.
Who is winning the war of attrition?
The short answer is that both armies are likely depleting their resources. The Russian military is losing potential at a faster rate, but it started with a larger reserve.
By mid-2024, the Russian army’s recruitment of new “volunteers” was barely enough to cover — if it even managed to cover — its losses. And the production of new armored vehicles has never kept pace with combat losses. Over the past two years, the Russian army has relied primarily on Soviet-era stockpiles, but these reserves (at least the equipment not requiring major repairs) are nearing exhaustion.
There’s still no precise data on the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ mobilization rates and irrecoverable losses. However, based on developments at the front, recruitment appears insufficient to offset losses from those killed, severely wounded, missing in action, or deserters.
Let’s dive into the details.
Ukraine’s resources
After the new mobilization law took effect in May 2024, Ukrainian officials and politicians claimed that call-up rates had risen significantly, with the Ukrainian Armed Forces now conscripting around 30,000 people per month — the same number the Russian army was bringing in during 2023. Yet, the situation at the front remained unchanged. The Russian army, which was recruiting half as many soldiers at the time, still maintained a significant numerical advantage.
It’s possible that the Ukrainian command directed a large portion of the newly mobilized personnel toward forming new brigades that are still undergoing training and integration in the rear. These brigades are indeed being created, although they require far fewer recruits than the reported 30,000 per month. The problem is that, unlike many experienced brigades struggling on the frontlines due to a lack of reinforcements, these new units often remain combat-ineffective for an extended period and even experience significant rates of desertion.
There aren’t any precise figures on AFU losses. One can only cautiously compare the names-based lists of Ukrainian losses, compiled from publicly available obituaries, with similar lists for the Russian army. However, these lists are incomplete — and perhaps to varying degrees. Known AFU casualties are about one-third lower than those of the Russian army. However, the AFU appears to have significantly more missing soldiers — nearly as many as those confirmed killed. In the Russian military, missing personnel can legally be declared dead relatively quickly, even without the recovery of a body, allowing families to claim inheritances and compensation.
Despite the poor readiness of its new units, the Ukrainian command may attempt another localized offensive in 2025, similar to the one in the Kursk region, should negotiations fail. However, such operations face growing equipment shortages. The last major deliveries of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) from the West came in the first half of 2023, ahead of Ukraine’s unsuccessful offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region. Expanding these supplies would require action from the incoming U.S. administration, as E.U. countries have limited stocks of armored vehicles and artillery left. Kyiv appears to be betting that Donald Trump will decide to increase aid should future negotiations collapse (or fail to materialize) due to Kremlin actions. However, it’s more likely that Trump could conclude Kyiv is the obstacle to progress, in which case Ukraine risks losing U.S. military support altogether.
For now, there are no clear prospects for improving the resource situation. This is likely what’s forcing Kyiv to explore the possibility of freezing the conflict.
Russia’s resources
Even going by official figures, the total number of contract soldiers Russia’s Defense Ministry recruited in 2024 dropped significantly compared to 2023. According to Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, 450,000 people signed contracts in 2024. In 2023, that number (again, according to Medvedev) was 540,000.
In reality, the number of recruits in 2023 — and likely in 2024 — was much lower, an important factor when comparing recruitment rates to losses. In the third quarter of 2024, Russia’s recruitment rates fell (based on data from federal bonuses paid upon signing contracts) to just 500–600 people per day. Meanwhile, the Russian army was estimated to be losing 200–250 soldiers daily to combat deaths as of July. Factoring in severely wounded soldiers, irrecoverable losses may have reached 600–750 personnel per day.
Data for the fourth quarter isn’t yet available, but the noticeable decline in recruitment occurred even after the federal bonus for signing a contract was more than doubled (from 190,000 to 400,000 rubles, or $1,772 to $3,739) and regional sign-on bonuses were increased in many areas. Even if recruitment rates improved by the end of the year and irrecoverable losses remained steady, the Russian army would still be unable to build substantial reserves like it did in late 2022 and 2023, when 300,000 mobilized personnel and nearly 350,000 contract soldiers were added to the ranks.
Of course, the Kremlin still has another option for replenishing manpower that it would prefer to avoid: launching a new wave of mass mobilization. However, if Putin decides to take that risk, there’s still the issue of how these new conscripts would be armed. According to a source within Moscow’s leadership who spoke to Meduza, a lack of weapons and equipment is already limiting the expansion of contract recruitment in the capital.
Russia isn’t producing enough tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to offset losses. As previously noted, these remain critical “expendables” for the Russian army’s offensive tactics. The country produces only about 250 new T-90M tanks annually, while confirmed tank losses documented through videos and photos in 2024 exceeded 1,100. While some tanks may have been repaired, other losses were never captured on video at all. In any case, production capacity is insufficient for a war of this intensity. Moreover, many of the “new” T-90M tanks likely weren’t built from scratch but are instead upgraded T-90A models that had been in storage.
So far, the Russian military has relied on vast stockpiles of Soviet-era tanks. Satellite images of open storage facilities show that thousands of these vehicles have been removed, sent to repair facilities, and then deployed to the front. Slightly less than half of these reserves remain, and what’s left consists of tanks in poor or very poor condition. Some may still be restorable, but doing so will become increasingly difficult and expensive. There could still be hundreds of tanks stored in closed facilities not visible to satellites; however, it’s likely these were prioritized for deployment due to their relatively better condition. Even if some remain, the supply of relatively modern tanks (various models of T-72s and T-80s) will barely last for another year of combat as intense as 2024.
A similar issue exists with IFVs. Officially, following production expansions, Russia now produces 50–60 new IFVs per month, or 600–720 annually. Yet confirmed losses of IFVs in 2024 exceeded 1,500 vehicles. Stockpiles of IFVs in relatively good condition are also nearly depleted, leaving only vehicles that are practically unfit for restoration.
In the case of artillery, barrels are being removed en masse from stored guns to replace those worn out by extensive use on the frontlines.
These resource shortages are likely pushing the Kremlin to consider negotiations.
What could negotiations look like?
At the moment, negotiations seem unlikely to succeed, despite exhaustion on both sides and the West’s diminishing willingness to support Ukraine. While a compromise on territorial issues might be possible, reaching agreements on other points that will shape post-war politics in Moscow and Kyiv is likely to be far more challenging.
Kyiv might be willing to freeze the conflict along the current front lines under an agreement that “temporarily” cedes de facto control of the occupied territories to Russia. The Kremlin, however, insists on formal recognition of its control over occupied Ukrainian territories — not only to secure its hold on them but also to cement Ukraine’s defeat by sparking a domestic political crisis in Kyiv. Such a crisis could ultimately grant Moscow leverage over Ukrainian politics, much like the influence it gained over Tbilisi following Georgia’s defeat in the 2008 war. Here, Putin could benefit from the West’s failure to grasp what a Kremlin victory might truly entail. Even if the West sees the agreement as falling short of a Russian victory because it doesn’t grant Putin direct control over Ukraine, it could still destabilize the country going forward, enabling Moscow to assert dominance even without a battlefield triumph.
The most pressing issue, however, will be security guarantees. Kyiv needs assurances that Russia won’t restart the war in the near future, which would require either NATO membership or similarly robust guarantees from Western countries. For the Kremlin, the priority is ensuring any peace or ceasefire agreement is permanent and binding, preventing Ukraine or the West from “seeking revenge,” even in the long term. Putin will likely resist merely freezing the conflict, having learned from Bashar al-Assad’s experience in Syria. Two years ago, Assad’s regime “won” but was forced to freeze the conflict under Turkish pressure. Then, the regime grew weaker in the absence of external support and ultimately collapsed in a week. This is why Putin sees cementing his victory as essential.
If negotiations fail, both armies will continue fighting with ever-dwindling resources. And what now seem like unconventional tactics — i.e. improvised solutions using whatever is at hand — could become the norm by the end of 2025.
This article aims to evaluate the military situation in Ukraine based on available data. Meduza has consistently condemned the war and holds Russia responsible for its military aggression in Ukraine.
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