The Real Russia. Today. Thursday, January 12, 2023

The invasion of Ukraine

• 🪖 Wounded Russian soldiers are allegedly being redeployed to the front before making a full recovery, without doctors’ permission (in addition to boosting manpower, the military can evade promised disability payments this way too)
• 🕊️ Ukraine schedules peace summit at UN headquarters to take place on the anniversary of Russia’s invasion (Moscow has already rejected Zelensky’s 10-step peace plan)
• 🚛 The Wagner Group has reportedly been using ordinary freight trucks to transport the bodies of its dead combatants back to Russia

🪖 Russia claims to have captured the mining city of Soledar. Meduza explains what’s actually known and what it means for the war’s next phase. (6-min read)

On January 11, the Wagner Group occupied a significant portion of Soledar, a small city in central Donbas. The city is likely to be captured in its entirety in the near future. It’s not yet clear how the battle will end for the Ukrainian military — whether all battalions were able to make an organized retreat, or whether some were surrounded. It’s also unclear what it means for the Russian military, and if it can now capture a swath of territory stretching from Horlivka through Bakhmut and all the way to Siversk. Meduza explains what we know, what we don’t, and what it means for the course of the war.

🪟 (Opinion) The Putin regime has a window right now to escalate again in Ukraine — Political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov (Telegram):

Pastukhov says the invasion of Ukraine has disappointed two very different camps: (1) supporters who hoped this imperialistic campaign would develop into another great patriotic war, and (2) opponents who hoped it would spark a “civil war” inside Russia (in other words, a popular uprising against the Putin regime).

Though Russia’s “thin stream of volunteerism” dried up after just a few months (and today’s volunteer movements look more like strafbataillon penal military units), Russia’s state system didn’t collapse when Putin initiated a mobilization; the public continues to tolerate the war, despite its disruptions to ordinary life and the quality of life.

In fact, in recent months, “the consolidation of Russian society around the war has grown.” The consensus view is that the war is a mistake, but Russians nevertheless blame Ukraine (“traitors”) and the U.S. (Kyiv’s puppet masters), not their own president. The conflict should be ended soon by “finishing off Ukraine” as quickly as possible. In this respect, says Pastukhov, Russian society is like a burglar who bungled a robbery and then started murdering random bystanders just to leave no witnesses.

For now, at least, this means the Kremlin can still get carte blanche from the public to carry on the war for as long as this moment lasts. If Putin’s team appreciates how temporary Russia’s current “super-resistance” to anti-war protests might be, it will do everything it can to use this window of time to “end the war on its own terms,” escalating and risking even more in 2023.

☦️ (Opinion) Dissecting the ‘technology’ behind Moscow’s Christmas ceasefire initiative — Political analyst Alexander Baunov (Carnegie Politika):

For much of this article, Baunov interprets the significance of Patriarch Kirill describing the invasion of Ukraine as “internecine fighting,” which insults not only Ukrainians but also the Russians who believe they’re waging a holy war against evil. Baunov argues that the phrase and the speech ahead of Orthodox Christmas generally were part of Moscow’s attempt to “test a new military-political technology,” wherein Russia conceals its plans for new escalations by proposing doomed peace initiatives.

The Christmas ceasefire served numerous purposes, says Baunov, explaining that Russia is “feeling around” for a potential rift between the Ukrainian army and Ukraine’s civilian population. In part, the ceasefire’s purpose was to get Ukraine’s army and government to reject it, all so Moscow could present this rejection to the Ukrainian people as proof that their real “occupier” resides in Kyiv. Bombing power plants, says Baunov, is an attempt to engineer a situation where ordinary Ukrainians want “peace and concessions,” but the army insists on continued suffering.

These insinuations serve the Kremlin’s view that an “occupying” nationalist army oppresses and impoverishes the good Ukrainian population. This narrative has failed, Baunov points out, but it’s all Putin has left to maintain his claim on a legacy as a “unifier of Russian lands.” (If Russia’s enemy is the people of Ukraine, Putin is instead a “conqueror,” after all.) In this sense, Kirill’s ceasefire advocacy was really addressed to Putin and designed to pander to his worldview. Rather than call on Russia’s secular authorities to observe Christian humanism, the Patriarch merely tried to highlight Putin’s supposed peacefulness and humanity.

For the foreign audience, says Baunov, presenting even imitations of “normalcy” (in this case, the Church acting as a peace broker) also feeds the world’s desire to find relief in signs that Russia isn’t a completely rogue state.

We got The Beet — Don’t miss Meduza’s weekly newsletter (separate from the one you’re reading here)!

Wartime/peacetime Russia

• 🪖 Putin voiced his support for the Defense Ministry’s proposal to raise the maximum conscription age in Russia from 27 to 30 (the State Duma’s Defense Committee wants to do this gradually, temporarily allowing the military to conscript under both the old minimum age of 18 and the new maximum age of 30)
• ☮️ A Duma deputy has threatened criminal charges against Aquarium front man and war opponent Boris Grebenshchikov (for “discrediting” the Russian military and “aiding terrorism and extremism”)
• 😤 Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov faces angry complaints from locals who say a town in the region has been abandoned outside new fortifications (he says circumstance prevent building the defensive line flush with the Ukrainian border)
• 🗳️ Insider sources told the newspaper Kommersant that the Kremlin has begun preparations for Russia’s 2024 presidential race with Putin as a candidate (the work is still “preliminary,” though, as Putin has yet to declare)
• 🗳️ The Kremlin and Russia’s national political parties are reportedly planning to use “special operation” veterans as candidates in future elections (United Russia alone has more than 400 members now volunteering in the Donbas)
• 🗳️ State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulyov says the Wagner Group’s prisoner-recruits could make great future politicians (though current federal law doesn’t allow even amnestied ex-convicts to run for office until 10 years after their criminal records are expunged)

👑 How Tatarstan lost the last major vestige of its sovereignty: its presidency (9-min read)

In October 2021, the Russian State Duma passed legislation requiring all regional leaders to go by the official title “glava“ (“head”), with some minor exceptions. A year later, Tatarstan, the last of Russia’s republics to call its leader “president,” had still yet to bring its legislation into compliance with this federal law. In December 2022, after months of negotiations with Kremlin representatives, the region’s parliament finally voted to amend its constitution and jettison the last major symbol of its once-meaningful “special status.” Why was Moscow so intent on ensuring that Putin is Russia’s only president? Meduza’s Andrey Pertsev explores this question and whether the change might have unintended consequences.

Russia and the rest of this ole planet

• ⚖️ Former president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev has been stripped of his title of honorary senator (his “leader of the nation” status has been axed too)
• 💰 State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin has informally proposed confiscating the property of the “lowlife” Russians who emigrated after the February 24 invasion of Ukraine (he wants to seize their homes as “compensation” for the damage they’ve inflicted on Russia by criticizing the war)
• 🦾 Arnold Schwarzenegger makes an appearance in a new music video from the Ukrainian rap group Kalush Orchestra (he shows up at the very end of the clip)
• 🧑‍💻 Sources at Vkontakte clarified rumors about a ban on remote work: it only applies to staff working directly with Russian users’ personal data (this appears to be a concession to State Duma lawmakers who demand increased data-localization)

Journalism saves lives. Help Meduza continue its mission. In times of war, people's lives often depend on access to reliable information. Meduza is a trusted news source for millions of readers in Russia, Ukraine, and beyond. By helping Meduza, you’re helping these people stay informed during these tough times. Please, support our work.