Russia is putting pressure on women to boost the birth rate — but demographers say the main problem is too many people dying
According to U.N. projections, Russia’s population of around 146 million could shrink by 20 million people by the end of the century, with worst-case estimates predicting a dramatic decline of nearly 60 million people. In response to this looming crisis, the Kremlin has rolled out various initiatives to tackle the “demographic problem,” from promoting “family values” in schools to restricting access to abortion. The independent outlet Holod spoke with demographic experts to understand why these government efforts aren’t boosting birth rates, what could realistically slow the population decline, and whether immigration could be part of the solution. Meduza shares an English-language summary of their findings.
A 2024 U.N. report on demographic trends around the world puts Russia’s current fertility rate at 1.45 children per woman — well below the 2.1 needed to maintain population levels. According to the report, the country’s population has already peaked and is projected to decline, with estimates suggesting it could drop to 125–130 million by 2100.
Russian demographer Alexey Raksha has an even more pessimistic view. While U.N. experts predict that Russia’s birth rate could start rising as early as next year, Raksha is doubtful. “There’s no basis for that right now,” he said. “Given the current situation, the U.N.’s forecast for Russia in 2100 is overly optimistic. If nothing changes, the population could fall below 100 million.”
Fellow demographer Dmitry Zakotyansky argues that it’s difficult to even make predictions beyond 2050 due to the rapid pace of societal change. Scientists are working on breakthroughs like cancer vaccines, new treatments for heart disease and diabetes, and advances in reproductive technologies such as IVF and egg freezing. Zakotyansky believes that if these developments extend women’s reproductive years by even 10 years, they could significantly boost birth rates. “This could help ease the problem of depopulation,” he said.
The main driver of Russia’s population decline is natural attrition, explains demographer Aby Shukyurov. More people are dying than being born. Unlike Raksha, he considers the U.N.’s forecast of 125 million by the end of the century realistic. However, while some experts are optimistic that the generation born during the 2007 baby boom could improve Russia’s demographic outlook, Shukyurov believes this won’t be enough to halt the overall decline in the birth rate.
The bitter truth is that events in Russia affect your life, too. Help Meduza continue to bring news from Russia to readers around the world by setting up a monthly donation.
Death over life
Russia’s current birth rate can be attributed to the fact that a smaller generation, born in the late 1990s, is now reaching the average age to have children, says demographer Dmitry Zakotyansky. Even so, he points out that Russia’s fertility rate remains relatively high compared to many other regions. In East Asia, it’s around 1.1–1.2, and in Southern Europe, it hasn’t exceeded 1.4 in recent decades.
“For instance, during the crisis in the 1990s in East Germany, the fertility rate dropped to 0.7. In Russia, it’s barely fallen over the past two years — by just 0.1 child per woman, which is negligible,” Zakotyansky explained. “What worries me more is that society doesn’t seem to notice what’s really happening. Right now, the birth rate might be fine, but the mortality rate isn’t.”
Aby Shukyurov concurs, noting that while Russia’s birth rate is comparable to Europe’s, its mortality rate remains high. Cardiovascular diseases continue to be the leading cause of death, unlike in developed countries where cancer took over as the primary cause back in the 1970s.
The war in Ukraine has also impacted Russia’s demographics. Using open-source data, Meduza and Mediazona estimated that by the end of June, 120,000 Russian soldiers had died since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Meanwhile, Western intelligence puts the number of wounded around 400,000, according to The Wall Street Journal — and severe injuries can significantly shorten life expectancy.
Economic inequality is another key factor contributing to Russia’s low life expectancy, says Zakotyansky. Around 30–40 percent of Russians live in poverty, many of whom continue to smoke, drink heavily, and are more likely to be involved in or affected by crime. However, he believes this gap has narrowed somewhat over the past two years due to increased military payments, which have risen the most in some of Russia’s poorest regions.
Both Shukyurov and Zakotyansky believe the country’s declining birth rate is part of a broader demographic trend driven by scientific advances, vaccinations, and improved sanitation, all of which have greatly increased life expectancy. “No country has managed to bring back the birth rates of 20–30 years ago,” said Zakotyansky. “Russia’s ‘Social Support for Citizens’ program aims to raise the birth rate to 1.8, just to slow the decline. But I don’t think the current pro-natalist policies are enough to achieve that.”
All stick, no stork
In an apparent attempt to boost birth rates, Russian lawmakers are considering a bill to ban “childfree propaganda,” and many private clinics across the country have “voluntarily” stopped performing abortions. However, experts interviewed by Holod agree that these measures are more symbolic and politically motivated than effective in raising birth rates.
Banning “childfree propaganda” won’t make a difference, says Aby Shukyurov, explaining that research shows childlessness in Russia is often due to personal circumstances, not ideology. Alexey Raksha echoed this, calling the ban purely ideological, with no real demographic impact.
Shukyurov also pointed to other measures, like reviving the Soviet-era “Mother Heroine” award for women with 10 or more children, “Conception Day" in the Ulyanovsk region, and requiring both a doctor’s and priest’s approval for an abortion in the Belgorod region, as equally ineffective. “On one hand, these measures seem almost laughable, but on the other, they’re clearly damaging because they make women’s lives harder,” he said.
There’s also talk of reintroducing a “childlessness tax,” similar to the one from Soviet times. “It’s just another way for the government to collect more money,” Shukyurov commented. “People who don’t plan to have children aren’t going to change their minds because the government charges them 2,000 rubles [$21].”
Abortion bans and restrictions are another common talking point for Russian officials. However, with the spread of contraception, abortions are already less common in Russia, says Dmitry Zakotyansky. And history, he adds, clearly shows that these measures won’t stop people from ending unwanted pregnancies. When abortions were banned during Stalin’s era, maternal mortality skyrocketed — pregnancy-related deaths rose by 76 percent in the first year, and maternal mortality doubled within five years. After abortion was legalized in 1955, those numbers returned to previous levels.
Now, Zakotyansky notes, generations of Russian women have grown up with the right to abortion, and taking that away won’t be easy. And even though these rights are slowly being chipped away, “it’s clear this won’t improve the birth rate,” he argued.
Since the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, anti-feminist rhetoric has become increasingly common in Russia. Lawmakers have called for a “legal ban” on feminism, claimed the “fight for equality is relegated to the archives” and said young women should “give birth, give birth, and then give birth again.” The Russian Orthodox Church has also weighed in, with programs on the religious Spas TV channel arguing that women who become pregnant from rape should give birth, while priests lament that the world is in a “difficult period in history” where women are “demanding equal rights with men.”
The Russian government has now officially incorporated patriarchal “family values” into its strategy to boost birth rates. However, Zakotyansky warns that this approach could backfire. He argues that modern women are more likely to forgo having children if they can’t balance family life with their careers, fearing it will hold them back professionally.
A policy at odds
Despite the Kremlin’s professed concern over population decline, it’s been tightening migration policies and escalating anti-migrant rhetoric. After the March 2024 terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, Russian authorities ramped up raids on migrant communities and passed laws creating a “special deportation regime,” sharply limiting migrants’ rights and reducing the length of time they can stay in the country without a visa. By April 2024, more than 30 regions, including occupied Crimea, had banned migrants from working in key sectors such as transportation, healthcare, and education.
The threat of being drafted is another deterrent. In the summer, Alexander Bastrykin, the head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, announced that more than 30,000 migrants who had obtained Russian citizenship but failed to register for military service had been added to the registry, with around 10,000 already sent to the front lines in Ukraine.
All this this has predictably led to a steady decline in the number of economic migrants, even as Russia grapples with a historic labor shortage across various industries. Dmitry Zakotyansky notes that until 2022, immigration helped offset Russia’s low birth rate, with up to 300,000 people arriving each year. But this figure could soon fall to just tens of thousands. (He estimates that Russia has lost one to two million labor migrants over the past two years.)
Emigration has also taken a toll. It’s estimated that hundreds of thousands of Russians left the country after the 2022 invasion — whether due to opposition to the war, concerns about its economic impact, or fear of being drafted. While some have returned, many have not.
In a country with high immigration rates (and minimal emigration), there’s no need to aim for a total fertility rate of two children per woman, Zakotyansky explains. For example, the U.S. population is growing due to immigration, even though birth rates there are falling simultaneously.
Shukyurov concurs that migration would be the best way to counteract Russia’s shrinking population. However, as he points out, the country is taking the opposite approach: “The government is doing everything to boost birth rates, but at the same time, it’s restricting migration.”
Still, with Russia’s current fertility rate of 1.4, even immigration can’t fully offset population decline, Zakotyansky says. The country would still need a rate of at least 1.7 to see growth.