Putin dismisses talk of another mobilization as ‘nonsense.’ But Russia has spent four years closing the loopholes that helped people avoid the last one.

Russian authorities continue to insist there are no plans for a new, large-scale wave of mobilization this fall. On September 1, Vladimir Putin called the rumors “complete nonsense.” There is also no urgent military need to expand the army by several hundred thousand mobilized troops. Still, the media’s constant churning of the topic is clearly frightening Russians. There is indirect evidence that many are looking into the option of leaving the country on short notice. So we decided to explain what people in Russia need to know, whether they trust the authorities’ assurances or believe another mobilization is inevitable. These are the laws Russia has passed since 2022 that would, in one way or another, be useful to the state if it once again decides to forcibly replenish the ranks of the Russian armed forces. What loopholes did they close? What should you remember about deferments? And who wasn’t at risk of mobilization before, but is now?

How the authorities closed the main loopholes for evading the mobilization draft

In 2022, Russians looking to dodge mobilization had two main options: leave the country, or stay and simply skip the summons to the local draft office. The worst that could happen was a 3,000-ruble fine for failing to appear, under the administrative statute “Failure by Citizens to Fulfill Military Registration Obligations.” There was no criminal liability for it. The Criminal Code’s provision on “draft evaders” applied only to conscripts performing mandatory military service. Since then, the authorities have worked systematically to close that “gap.”

• In October 2023, authorities raised the maximum fine for failing to appear at a local draft office in response to any summons tenfold, to 30,000 rubles.
• Still, evading a mobilization summons carries no criminal liability. But the authorities have built a system of punitive measures designed to compel people to appear at the local draft office.

In April 2023, the law on military duty gained a new article: “Temporary Measures Aimed at Ensuring Appearance in Response to a Summons From the Local Draft Office.” The article does not explicitly mention people the authorities plan to mobilize, or mobilization summonses themselves. But it is clear that these measures are meant to apply during mobilization as well.

This is evident, for example, from the technical specification for developing the military registration registry, published by the independent Russian investigative outlet iStories. One of the registry’s subsystems was designed to generate documents like this:

Another piece of “evidence” is a note on the back of a mobilization summons intended for a separate category of Russians:

So what exactly are these temporary measures threatening people who might be mobilized in the future?

Ban on foreign travel

A mobilization summons now automatically bars anyone liable for military service from leaving the country — even someone who never received the summons and has no idea it exists. That’s because an electronic summons counts as delivered “from the moment it is posted in the citizen’s personal account” in the summons registry, regardless of whether the person ever logged in to see it.

The ban stays in effect at least until the appearance date specified in the summons. If the person ignores the summons and fails to show up on time, no one will lift it. Article 15¹ of the law on procedures for leaving Russia states this explicitly:

In effect, local draft offices now have the arbitrary power to bar anyone liable for military service from leaving the country for up to a month.

Loss of rights for ‘evaders’ who stay in Russia

If a Russian issued a mobilization summons fails to appear at the local draft office on the appointed day, authorities impose a set of restrictions on him 20 days later:

• a ban on registering as an individual entrepreneur
• a ban on registering as a self-employed taxpayer
• suspension of cadastral registration and/or the registration of real estate rights
• restriction of the right to drive vehicles
• a ban on registering vehicles
• refusal to enter into a loan or credit agreement.

Regional authorities may also impose additional restrictions “on citizens receiving payments, benefits, support measures, and other preferences” at their own discretion.

The only way to restore those rights is to appear at the local draft office or prove a valid reason temporarily preventing you from doing so.

How the authorities added just one new mobilization deferment — and even that one was technical

In November 2022, lawmakers amended the law “On Mobilization Preparation and Mobilization in the Russian Federation” to formally expand the list of grounds for a mobilization deferment. Since then, volunteers — people “serving in volunteer units” who had already gone to war of their own free will — can also qualify for one.

In late 2022 and early 2023, opposition lawmakers in the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, introduced numerous bills seeking to expand the list of deferments to cover:

• citizens with three children under 16 (the law requires at least four)
• citizens with four children under 18, or raising a child under 18 without the child’s mother (the law sets the age lower — under 16)
• individual entrepreneurs, as well as heads of peasant and farming enterprises
• citizens with a single retired parent
• citizens with any child with a disability
• citizens with a disabled child under 18 or a Group I disabled person since childhood
• citizens who have not served in the military (under the law, any reservist can be mobilized; this currently includes people who did not complete mandatory service before turning 30)
• citizens holding a doctoral or candidate of sciences degree
• citizens found only partially fit for military service for health reasons (category B) — though only in the case of “partial” mobilization
• close relatives (including grandparents) of service members killed during mobilization
• reservist privates and sergeants over the age of 35 — also only in the case of “partial” mobilization.

All of these attempts failed — or were never even taken up by the State Duma.

Two more bills are now before the lower house, introduced in April 2026 and not yet even at the first-reading stage. They would create a mobilization deferment for:

• members of small Indigenous peoples
• biological brothers and sons of service members and volunteers who were killed.

How the authorities left the question of alternative civilian service during mobilization unresolved

Russia’s Constitution enshrines citizens’ right to alternative civilian service. But the corresponding federal law addresses that right during mobilization only in a referential provision:

In November 2022, the law on military duty gained a new Article 17¹, “Performance of Alternative Civilian Service During Mobilization.” It applied only to people who had already replaced mandatory service with alternative service.

Whether someone could refuse forced mobilization and replace it with alternative civilian service remained an open question. In November 2023, while reviewing a specific case, Russia’s Supreme Court ruled that a person who had previously performed alternative civilian service instead of mandatory service also has the right to alternative civilian service under mobilization.

No laws or regulations governing alternative civilian service during mobilization have ever been adopted.

In October 2022, State Duma lawmakers Sardana Avksentyeva and Maxim Gulin introduced a bill titled “On Citizens’ Right to Replace Mandatory Military Service With Alternative Civilian Service During Mobilization.” The State Duma sat on the bill for a long time before rejecting it in July 2024. In its official response, the Russian government stated only that “the bill requires substantial revision” because it fails to account for the new Article 17¹.

How the authorities expanded the categories of people who can be mobilized or forced to sign a military contract

Prisoners

In November 2022, lawmakers passed a law lifting the general ban on mobilizing people with an outstanding or unexpunged conviction for a serious crime — an intentional crime punishable by more than five years in prison, or a “negligent act” punishable by more than 10. In place of that blanket ban, the mobilization law now lists specific crimes: mostly “terrorism,” “extremism,” and sabotage offenses, as well as sexual crimes against a minor.

On June 24, 2023, the day Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny ended, Vladimir Putin signed a law establishing a formal contract system for prisoners. It replaced an unofficial arrangement for presidential pardons of convicts, whom the Russian mercenary group Wagner had actively recruited. Under the system, the state conditionally releases prisoners and sends them to war. Such a person can receive final “forgiveness” only after suffering a serious wound, reaching the maximum age for service, or when mobilization ends (and, starting in 2024, also for receiving a state award).

That same day, lawmakers also amended the Penal Code to spell out the procedure for releasing prisoners who were called up under mobilization or who had signed a contract during mobilization.

Prisoners who sign contracts face roughly the same restrictions as mobilized prisoners, though the list of “off-limits” crimes is periodically revised. Since August 2026, for instance, smugglers and members of armed gangs and criminal organizations, among others, have been allowed to sign contracts.

People charged with a crime

Since March 2024, a person facing criminal prosecution can sign a contract in exchange for having their case suspended. Like prisoners, they must wait for mobilization to end, or for a wound, an award, or reaching the maximum age of service.

Since the summer of 2023, that age limit during mobilization has been raised to 65 for all service members (except senior officers, whose limit was raised to 70).

Foreigners and stateless persons

Formally, foreigners and stateless persons are not part of the mobilization manpower pool, since they cannot be mobilized through the usual process. In practice, though, they are: they can be forced to sign a contract instead.

In November 2025, for example, Putin issued a decree “On the Temporary Procedure for Granting Russian Citizenship and Issuing Residency Permits in Russia.” Under the new rule, foreign men between 18 and 65 can no longer apply for a Russian residency permit or citizenship unless they have served in the Russian armed forces or been found medically unfit for service.

The decree makes an exception for all Belarusian citizens and certain “privileged” categories of applicants, such as former Soviet citizens or people with direct relatives born within Russia’s current territory.

Imprisoned foreigners and stateless persons

Since July 7, 2025, foreigners and stateless persons who have been convicted of a crime — or merely charged with one — have been explicitly permitted to sign military service contracts during mobilization on the same terms as Russian citizens.

How the authorities toughened criminal penalties for those who have already been mobilized

Immediately after announcing “partial” mobilization in 2022, the authorities rewrote numerous articles in Chapter 33 of the Criminal Code, “Crimes Against Military Service.” Those articles can be used to prosecute only service members, including mobilized ones.

Starting September 24, 2022, several articles gained new clauses imposing harsher punishment for the same crime when committed ”during mobilization or martial law, in wartime, or in the context of an armed conflict or hostilities”:

• Article 333. Resisting a superior officer or coercing a superior to violate their military service duties (up to 15 years in prison instead of eight)
• Article 334. Violent acts against a superior officer (up to 15 years instead of eight)
• Article 337. Unauthorized absence from a unit or place of service (up to 12 years instead of five)
• Article 338. Desertion (up to 20 years instead of 10)
• Article 339. Evading military service duties by feigning illness or other means (up to 12 years instead of seven)
• Article 340. Violating combat duty regulations (now carries a minimum five-year prison sentence)
• Article 341. Violating border service regulations (up to 10 years instead of five)
• Article 342. Violating guard duty regulations (up to 10 years instead of five)
• Article 344. Violating internal service and garrison patrol regulations (up to seven years instead of five).

In addition, since September 24, 2022, committing any crime “during mobilization” formally counts as an aggravating circumstance, meaning courts can impose a harsher sentence within the limits the law allows. But that aggravating circumstance cannot push a sentence above the maximum term or penalty set for the relevant article of the Criminal Code.