Russia’s Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is only miles from the front — so why isn’t it better protected against military strikes?
In early October, Russian media reported that drones were shot down just three miles from the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. Regardless of the intended target, the plant’s proximity to the front line is cause for concern. Unlike Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia NPP, the Kursk plant is still operational — and it wasn’t designed to withstand military strikes. The outlet Verstka spoke with a nuclear power expert and sources within Russia’s state-owned atomic energy corporation Rosatom to find out how well defended the Kursk NPP is against military threats and what the consequences could be if it were damaged. Meduza shares an English-language adaptation of the outlet’s findings.
On October 3, Russian media outlets reported that Ukrainian forces had launched several drones at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), located about 18 miles from the front line, near the city of Kurchatov. National Security and Defense Council representative Andriy Kovalenko denied any attempt by Ukrainian forces to strike the plant, calling such an operation “pointless.” Military blogger Roman Alekhin, an advisor to the acting governor of Russia’s Kursk region, echoed this sentiment, saying there was “no reason to fuel speculation that [Ukraine] was aiming for the nuclear plant, as [targeting it] wouldn’t make sense.”
Regardless of the intended target, the incident is seemingly the most dangerous potential attack the plant has faced since Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region began in July. Although Russian officials have stated the plant is “operating normally,” in reality, it lacks adequate protection against direct military strikes. Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), raised concerns about the plant’s vulnerability during a visit in August. Sources close to Rosatom, Russia’s government-owned atomic energy corporation also support this assessment, as do independent experts.
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Alexander Nikitin, a nuclear advisor at the environmental Bellona Foundation, explained that during the design process for every nuclear facility, engineers analyze both “design-basis” and “beyond design-basis” accidents. “Design-basis accidents are those that could realistically occur,” he said. “Beyond design-basis accidents are scenarios that are considered impossible but still analyzed. When nuclear plants were designed, even beyond design-basis scenarios didn’t account for military strikes.”
Nikitin described the current situation as “an unprecedented emergency.” Sources familiar with Rosatom’s operations partially corroborated this in comments to Verstka. “No civilian energy infrastructure, whether it’s a nuclear plant or any other power station, is designed to withstand missile strikes. The Kursk plant, in particular, was built 40 to 50 years ago, using materials and technology far below today’s standards,” one source explained.
While the reactors and spent nuclear fuel storage units are relatively secure — with some fuel is kept in “special reinforced concrete containers” built to survive falls from up to two meters — the spent fuel removed from the reactors is stored in cooling pools, where residual heat from radioactive decay dissipates. These pools, located separately from the reactor block, are “only slightly better protected than reinforced civilian buildings,” according to another Rosatom source. “Damage to such a facility could lead to an environmental disaster,” the source warned.
Nikitin compared the potential effects of such an incident to “severe contamination” akin to that from a “dirty bomb” — an explosive device that disperses radioactive material without triggering a nuclear chain reaction. “The reactors at the Kursk plant have relatively weak protection, and if they come under shelling, they won’t hold up,” he cautioned. Both Nikitin and Rosatom employees emphasized that predicting the exact consequences of such an incident is difficult because there are so many unknown variables involved.
‘No one even imagined such a scenario’
The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, which started operations in 1976, and the nearby city of Kurchatov share a similar original design with the Chernobyl plant and its satellite city, Pripyat. Following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, efforts were made to modernize its “sister” plants — the Kursk, Leningrad, and Smolensk stations. However, the vast majority of these changes focused on mitigating “internal” factors that could potentially trigger an accident.
According to Rosatom, these improvements include eliminating human influence on reactor safety systems and ensuring that these systems can function even in the event of a complete power outage at the plant. Alexander Nikitin expressed confidence in the plant’s staff, saying, “It’s a well-established team, and they’re doing everything possible to keep them at the station. Given the plant’s [long history], they’ve encountered and trained for just about every possible situation.”
The Kursk NPP originally operated four RBMK-1000 reactor units, identical to those at Chernobyl. Today, only one remains in operation; two have been decommissioned, and one is undergoing maintenance. A new plant, Kursk II, is being built next to the old one, with plans for four modern VVER-TOI reactor units. The first unit is expected to go online in 2025.
Newer nuclear power plants, including the Kursk II NPP, are designed to withstand the direct impact of an airplane crash, a standard introduced after the September 11 attacks in the United States. “These newer plants are built with a protective sarcophagus that can withstand the crash of a large airliner. But that’s not the case with the old Kursk plant. When it was designed, no one even imagined such a scenario,” Nikitin told Verstka.
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While international agreements deem attacks on civilian nuclear facilities unacceptable, these remain recommendations rather than enforceable rules, according to Nikitin. “These documents don’t explicitly prohibit it; they only call for refraining from such attacks,” he explained. “There are no agreements signed by all countries with nuclear power plants that suggest any binding responsibility for such actions.”
Nikitin also pointed out that there are “many caveats — some countries signed the agreements, while others initially signed but later withdrew.” “As [Russia’s war against Ukraine] has shown, politically binding documents don’t carry much weight,” he added. Nikitin also noted that there have been no “deliberate strikes on these plants” during the current conflict, only “incidents that could be considered accidental.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency, the main international body overseeing nuclear energy, operates in a “technical, not political” capacity, Nikitin explained. “No one has ever heard political statements from its head, Rafael Grossi,” he said. “The IAEA doesn’t have the authority, resources, or mandate to directly influence parties involved in such incidents.”
Sources close to Rosatom told Verstka that they rely on their own resources and the Russian Defense Ministry to protect nuclear power plants. “We’re systematically equipping facilities with detection and anti-drone systems, which have already proven their effectiveness on several occasions. The military is taking every possible measure to prevent attacks by Ukrainian forces,” said one source familiar with Rosatom’s operations.
Nikitin considers the risk of an accident at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant potentially more dangerous than one at the larger Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, which has long been in a combat zone. “Zaporizhzhia is completely ‘cold,’ with all its reactors shut down. But at Kursk, one reactor is still operational. And that’s alarming,” he said.
