The president from nowhere How a 36-year-old with no plans to run for office defeated Montenegro’s long-serving leader for the presidency
Story by Dmitry Goryachkin. Abridged translation by Sam Breazeale.
Jakov Milatović, the new president-elect of Montenegro, has lived his entire conscious life under the presidency or prime ministership of his predecessor in office, Milo Đukanović. He was just four years old when Milo, as he’s commonly known in the country, became the prime minister of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, which was then a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Milo went on to lead Montenegro within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, then within the common state of Serbia and Montenegro, and later within independent Montenegro after its secession from Serbia. But while Milo was governing, navigating independence, and weathering various corruption scandals, Milatović grew up, studied in the West, returned home, and — in a surprise to everyone involved — beat the veteran politician. Đukanović conceded and wished Milatovich success, but there’s little doubt that he plans to return. The independent outlet iStories recently took a look back at the events that led to Montenegro’s current political moment. In English, Meduza is publishing an abridged version of their story.
A man of many faces
Milo Đukanović’s political career began before he even finished high school, when he joined the League of Communists of Montenegro as a 17-year-old in 1979. After graduating from university, the aspiring leader aligned himself with Slobodan Milošević and Momir Bulatović, who would later become Montenegro’s first president. In 1991, the League of Communists was dissolved, and Bulatović and Đukanović founded the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), which would rule the country for the next 30 years. In late 1990, Bulatović was elected president, and Milo became prime minister in 1991. In practice, though, it was Milo who wielded power.
In 1997, Milo officially became the country’s top leader, beating Bulatović in that year’s presidential election. For two years after that, Bulatović served as prime minister, but in 2000, after the ousting of Milošević, Bulatović resigned. With brief exceptions, Milo Đukanović continued to rule Montenegro until 2023, and even when he wasn’t formally occupying key posts, his party, the DPS, maintained power.
During the Yugoslav Wars, Milo and Bulatović supported Milošević. In 1991, then-Prime Minister Đukanović sent Montenegrin militants to besiege the Croatian border city of Dubrovnik with the Yugoslav People’s Army in an effort to annex it to Montenegro. The attack resulted in the deaths of 92 civilians and damaged 563 historical buildings. Montenegro also supported Yugoslavia in the Bosnian War.
By that time, the U.N. sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia in 1991 had begun to take effect. To shore up the country’s economy, Đukanović’s government began illegally trafficking cigarettes into Italy at the state level; the traffickers transported in-demand goods back into Montenegro. The value of the illegal cigarette trade soon reached billions of dollars annually. Some of the money went to the state budget, while some settled in the pockets of state officials. Francesco Forgione, a former member of the Italian parliament who led the body’s Antimafia Commission from 2006 to 2008, has asserted that presidential immunity is the only reason Đukanović has managed to avoid criminal prosecution.
Milo broke off relations with Milošević before Bulatović did. After Yugoslavia’s defeat in Bosnia and the signing of the Dayton Accords in early 1996, Milo announced that Montenegro’s “unbreakable union with Serbia” would be replaced by a policy of Montenegrin independence and strong ties with the West.
The West saw Đukanović as a counterweight to Milošević. The 1997 elections were marked by scandals and accusations of fraud, but the U.S. immediately recognized Đukanović’s victory, and U.S. President Bill Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, congratulated him. Gelbard would later speak highly of Milo, praising his contributions to the creation of independent Montenegro and its democracy.
In 1999, when NATO carried out Operation Allied Force in a bid to make Belgrade abandon its war in Kosovo, Đukanović quickly reached an agreement with Bill Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac. As a result, Montenegro was largely spared from bombing. Serbia’s government deemed the agreement traitorous, an early step in the republics’ split and the development of an independent Montenegro.
In 2000, Montenegro stopped using the Yugoslav dinar as its currency and replaced it with the German mark, followed by the euro in 2002. That same year, Milo Đukanović apologized to Croatians for Montenegro’s participation in the siege of Dubrovnik.
Milošević’s ousting did not change Milo’s decision to end Montenegro’s union with Serbia. The split was finalized in 2006, when 55.5 percent of Montenegrins voted for independence. Most ethnic Serbs opposed the withdrawal, but their votes were outweighed by those of national minorities such as Albanians and Bosnians. There were rumors of 19,000 stuffed ballots, but Đukanović’s government refused to conduct a manual recount. On May 21, 2006, Montenegro became an independent state.
In 2007, the country ratified a new constitution, becoming a parliamentary republic in which the prime minister plays the leading role. The following year, Milo Đukanović became prime minister once more.
In lobbying for an independent Montenegro, Đukanović appealed both to Western countries and to Vladimir Putin (Russia and Montenegro had yet to go from partners to enemies) — and found support from both. Đukanović and Putin met multiple times, including when Đukanović made a private visit to Russia in 2004. Putin promised to support Montenegro in every way possible if it seceded from Serbia, and Russia was one of the first large countries to recognize the results of the independence referendum. Russian investments, including ones made by the aluminum company Rusal in an aluminum plant in Podgorica, helped Montenegro make it through the breakup relatively painlessly. Russians became the largest foreign purchasers of real estate in the country; today, a third of all yachts registered there have Russian owners.
But over time, Milo appeared to realize that betting on Putin, like betting on Milošević before him, had been a mistake. In 2012, while serving as the country’s prime minister, he announced that the country’s number one goal was to join NATO. Montenegro had begun preparing for NATO membership immediately after becoming independent, but now the process gained new momentum. At the same time, problems plagued Russia’s main investment in the Montenegrin market as Rusal was unable to clean up the finances of the plant in Podgorica. The two countries’ friendship ended definitively in 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea. While Russia had previously referred to Montenegro’s foreign policy as “balanced,” its leaders now started accusing Milo of failing to consider the will of his people and “caving” to NATO.
The falling out culminated in allegations of a coup attempt that was supposedly planned with the support of Russian and Serbian intelligence forces with the aim of assassinating Đukanović and preventing Montenegro’s entry into NATO. The purported thwarting of the attempt was announced in 2016 before that year’s parliamentary elections, and approximately 20 people were arrested in connection with the alleged plot.
To this day, it’s unclear to what extent the claims were true. In any case, Montenegro soon signed the NATO accession protocol, and in 2017, it officially became a member of the alliance.
Insulting the feelings of believers
In late December 2019, at DPS’s initiative, Montenegro’s parliament passed a law that hit Montenegrin society like a bomb. Titled “On freedom of religion,” the legislation gave a portion of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s property to the canonically non-recognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church, which was created in 1993. The Serbian Orthodox Church effectively lost the right to all of its buildings that were built before 1918 (when the Kingdom of Montenegro was abolished and became part of the Kingdom of Serbia).
In a country where almost half of the population identify as Serbs and belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church, rather than to the much smaller non-canonical Montenegrin one, the law was political suicide. It sparked a wave of rallies and roadblocks, and despite the pandemic restrictions, the protests continued until the parliamentary elections in August 2020.
It was in those elections that smaller parties that opposed Milo and the DPS were finally able to create a coalition and take power, putting Đukanović in the opposition for the first time. But that government didn’t last long. In April 2022, disputes between lawmakers, including Đukanović’s opponents, reached a fever pitch, and a no-confidence vote led to the coalition’s collapse. Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokapić, who presided over the government, is now remembered for little more than being the person who invited future president Jakov Milatović to join the government as economy minister.
The prime minister who replaced Krivokapić, Dritan Abazović, amended the law and signed what was termed the Basic Agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church. The dispute was settled, but the coalition that opposed Milo was again plagued by infighting, and in August, the deputies again passed a no-confidence motion.
Đukanović remained president throughout this period, but he paid dearly for the attack on the church: the country’s parliament responded to it by passing a new law greatly narrowing the powers of the president. Though he initially vetoed the change, Đukanović was ultimately forced to sign it into law, albeit with the reservation that “nobody will enforce this law, because it’s unconstitutional.” The law has been in limbo ever since: Montenegro finds itself unable to establish a Constitutional Court. In the leadup to the presidential elections, lawmakers managed to choose three judges, but they’ve been unable to confirm even a single one. The E.U. warned that until the court is functioning again, Montenegro will not be able to move closer to E.U. membership — one of the key items on Milo’s agenda.
A dark horse
For Jakov Milatović, E.U. accession isn’t just an agenda item; it’s the crux of his platform. Other than that, however, relatively little is known about him; just a few months ago, after all, he wasn’t planning on running for president at all.
Milatović is 36 years old. Like Milo, he studied economics in university before winning a scholarship that allowed him to continue his education in the U.S., Rome, and Oxford. He then went on to work in banks: first in Montenegro, then in Frankfurt, where he focused on Central and Eastern European countries as a risk analyst. From there, he took a job with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Bank, before his appointment as Montenegro’s economic minister in the first government formed without Đukanović and the DPS.
Milatović and then-Finance Minister Milojko Spajić became known for their program “Evropa sad!” (“Europe now!”), which also became the name of the party led by Milatović. The program managed to raise the country’s minimum wage from 270 euros ($295) to 450 euros ($273) per month. State employees celebrated the change, while businessmen deemed Milatović a populist, capable only of stoking inflation.
It was Spajić — a cosmopolitan philanderer popular with the media — who was slated to run for president on the new party’s ticket. On the day before registration opened to candidates, however, he was discovered to have dual citizenship with Serbia, and was forced to withdraw from the race. Milatović took his place.
At first, nobody took the young politician seriously. Observers predicted that in the second round of voting, Milo would face pro-Serbian politician Andrija Mandić, a longtime supporter of Vladimir Putin. Ultimately, however, Mandić’s vague policy platform failed to appeal to either European-oriented Serbs or nationalist-leaning ones. In the first round on March 19, Mandić garnered just 19 percent of votes, leaving Đukanović (35.4 percent) and Milatović (28.9 percent) to face off in a second round.
Milatović had offered little by way of specific proposals, but he did promise to continue to country’s path to European integration, improve its relationship with Serbia, and fight corruption — a sensitive topic for Milo.
Milatović’s advancement to the second round alone was a sensation, but his success didn’t end there. The young political unknown turned out to be the most dangerous possible opponent for Milo. After 30 years under Đukanović’s rule, his scandals, and his corruption, Montenegrins were eager for a change. The only candidate the veteran could have hoped to beat in a one-on-one race would have been somebody toxic and vulnerable to attack ads. Instead, however, he was facing somebody with very little notable political background. Milatović had faced no accusations of corruption, been involved in no scandals, and had no history of brash political statements that might alienate voters. The result is that even now, relatively little is known about his political views, his attitude towards the war in Ukraine, and his assessment of Russia’s actions there and the sanctions against it.
It also helped that Milatović was endorsed by all of the other candidates who failed to advance to the second round of voting, including Andrija Mandić. It’s unclear whether Milatović promised him anything in return.
In the final tally, on April 2, Milatović’s win was decisive: he garnered about 60 percent of the vote to Đukanović’s 40 percent.
The wait is on
Now that Milatović is in office, his voters are waiting to see what choices he’ll make. At the moment, most Montenegrins seem satisfied, but the hard part of the new president’s job has just begun.
Milatović’s push to bring Montenegro into the E.U. in the coming years has made him popular among Western diplomats and journalists, and pro-European Serbians have positive views of him as well. But the support for him doesn’t end there: on the eve of the elections, Milatović was endorsed by the leader of Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Šešelj, who was convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Court at The Hague in 2018.
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Even areas with high concentrations of ethnic Serbs that opposed Montenegro’s withdrawal from its union with Serbia in 2006 voted for Milatović in high numbers. Even today, many Serbs consider Montenegrin independence to be a personal project of Milo Đukanović and blame him for destroying the “Serbian World” for the sake of his own interests. They view the victory of Milatović, an ethnic Serb, as a chance to return Montenegro “to its native harbor.”
It’s symbolic that Podgorica residents celebrated Milatović’s victory with two flags: the Serbian one and the Montenegrin one. The first leaders to congratulate him on his win were those of Republika Srpska, one of the two entities comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country’s Bosnian leaders, meanwhile, expressed concern that relations between the two countries could take a downturn.
Montenegro’s Russians
As Milatović considers the difficult choices ahead of him, the Russians living in Montenegro are likely low on his list of priorities. Last year, 48,193 Russian citizens entered the country. They don’t have the right to vote, and there’s no party representing their interests. Nonetheless, Montenegro is currently one of the most convenient places in Europe to be a Russian immigrant. They’re allowed to remain in the country for 30 days with no visa, and resetting their stay is as easy as briefly exiting the country (a so-called “visa run”); as a result, they can effectively live there indefinitely.
But all of that may soon change. If it’s serious about joining the E.U., Montenegro’s government will have to prove that it’s not a gateway for Russians seeking to enter the Schengen Area. Brussels has already begun demanding that Podgorica impose a visa regime and bring an end to “visa runs,” and has threatened to end visa-free entry for Montenegrins into the Schengen Area if it refuses. Lawmakers have signaled that they might have no choice but to give in.
The next chapter
While Milo lost the election, it would be a mistake to think his political career is over. Not long before the presidential elections, on March 16, Đukanović signed a law dissolving the country’s parliament. The previous day marked the legislature’s deadline for swearing in the new government: the acting government has formally retired, and Abazović is technically only the “technical” prime minister. The current government has still not been confirmed, and the prime minister is the figure who performs the key tasks.
Montenegro’s next parliamentary elections have been scheduled for June. And observers have no doubt Milo Đukanović has a plan for returning to power.
Story by Dmitry Goryachkin
Abridged translation by Sam Breazeale