
High oil prices and tax hikes aren’t enough to offset war spending and keep Russia’s budget on track
This year’s St. Petersburg Economic Forum turned from a showcase of Russian achievements into a mirror reflecting the problems the full-scale war has created for the country. Officials showed no signs of panic — aside from the usual controlled outbursts. On the contrary, Putin assured investors that the economy was in fine shape and that the slowdown in growth was a deliberate, controlled process. Meanwhile, the budget has begun to feel the effects of the oil price spike and the VAT increase. But the gap in the treasury will still end up larger than the government planned by year’s end. And as the war continues, the economy’s structural problems will only deepen.
Budget update: the only good news is for the war machine
Russia’s federal budget deficit for January through May reached 6.01 trillion rubles — 2.6% of GDP and one and a half times the full-year target of 3.8 trillion rubles (1.6%). Even so, the pace at which the deficit expanded in May slowed sharply — the first positive trend the budget has shown since the start of the year.
- Revenue grew year-on-year, lifted by higher oil prices driven by the war with Iran and a VAT hike to 22%.
- Spending slowed in May for the first time since the start of the year, though overall expenditures for the first five months rose 17% year-on-year, reaching nearly half the annual plan — even though the federal budget calls for growth of just 4.2% in 2025.
The positive trend is unlikely to last: Russian authorities plan to increase spending this year. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov explained in an interview with the Russian business daily Kommersant that the increase reflects the need to concentrate additional resources on important priority areas.
In recent years, that has meant financing the war and its costs. Spending under the “National Defense” and “National Security” line items already accounts for nearly 40% of all expenditures approved in this year’s budget — 16.8 trillion out of 44.1 trillion rubles — just below the post-Soviet record of 41% set in the 2025 budget.
The spending increase will push the final 2026 deficit above the planned 1.6% of GDP. The government does not intend to cover the shortfall by expanding domestic borrowing — which Siluanov said will stay at 5.5 trillion rubles — or by drawing on the National Wealth Fund, which has shrunk by more than half from its level before the full-scale war. “Reserves are not infinite,” Siluanov acknowledged. The money will come from “budget carry-overs” and from “asset sales and so on,” the Finance Minister said.
“Spending in 2026 will be increased, but only modestly, and the draft budget for 2027–2029 will show a schedule of planned expenditures that does not fall in nominal terms but does fall in real terms over three years,” a leading economist at a Russian analytical center told Meduza. “The goal [facing the Finance Ministry] is probably to produce a [budget] plan that is workable both with the continuation of the war and with its end. With an [escalation of the war], I don’t think there are any scenarios.”
The Finance Ministry plans to lower the cutoff price in the budget rule starting in 2027, which will automatically reduce budget spending. Given the continuation of the war, civilian spending — unrelated to combat operations — will be cut first.
According to sources cited by the Russian business news outlet RBC, the government is discussing lowering the cutoff from the current $59 to $50 per barrel for Russian Urals crude — a move that would leave less oil revenue in the budget and channel more into National Wealth Fund reserves. Specific figures will not be available until the fall, when the draft budget package for 2027–2029 is submitted to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament.
Economic update: authorities sacrifice growth to hold down prices — which the war keeps pushing up
The Economic Development Ministry cut its GDP growth forecast for Russia threefold — to 0.4% from the 1.3% projected as recently as September 2025. Growth came in at 0.2% year-on-year for January through April, according to the ministry’s estimate.
Speaking at the St. Petersburg forum, Vladimir Putin called the slowdown “deliberate,” saying the authorities were prioritizing the fight against rising prices: “We don’t want inflation, hyperinflation, to be at 60–70%, like in some countries. We are fighting for the health of the Russian economy as a whole.”
He did not mention that inflation is being driven by massive military spending, which has forced Russia’s central bank to keep its benchmark rate in double digits — currently 14.5%, with the regulator’s next rate-setting meeting scheduled for June 19. Credit remains expensive, and civilian sectors are the first to suffer. If the authorities’ real priority were the “health” of the economy, the obvious first step would be to end the war.
Annual inflation as of June 1 stands at 5.4%. The Economic Development Ministry expects the figure to come in at 5.2% for the full year — the same number Putin cited in St. Petersburg. Russia’s Central Bank, for its part, kept its 2026 inflation forecast in the range of 4.5–5.5% at its April meeting.
The latest industrial data show that growth is being sustained almost exclusively in war-related sectors, while civilian industries contract.
- Output of construction materials and ferrous metals, according to estimates by CMASF, remains 10–20% below the average monthly level of 2024.
- Automobile production in April was 18% below the average monthly level of 2024 and 37% below the 2021 level, before the full-scale war. Meanwhile, imports of Chinese vehicles rose 41% year-on-year in the first quarter, from $2.62 billion to $3.69 billion, according to data from China’s Customs Administration — Russia has classified its foreign trade statistics since 2022.
The planned increase in military spending will only widen the gap between the war economy and the civilian economy. The defense industry — producing shells, drones, semiconductors, radar equipment, and the like — is growing rapidly on the back of state defense orders. It is draining resources, including labor, from sectors not directly connected to the war by offering above-market pay, which pushes up wage figures across the country without any corresponding increase in labor productivity. Subsidized loans for defense enterprises are covered preferentially from the budget. Russian Railways prioritizes their freight.
And the demands on resources will only grow. The war machine will keep burning money taken from productive sectors of the economy. Where this dangerous experiment ultimately leads remains impossible to predict.
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Yulia Starostina
What’s their name?
We are not publishing the source’s name for security reasons. Russian authorities could treat a comment to Meduza as cooperation with an “undesirable” organization, which carries first an administrative penalty and, upon a repeat offense, criminal liability.
We are fully confident in the expertise of the specialists who contributed to this article.
More precisely?
The federal budget deficit in May 2026 grew by “only” 0.1 trillion rubles, compared with increases of 1.3 and 1.1 trillion in April and March respectively, and 1.7 trillion in both February and January.
What’s the trend?
Federal budget revenues for January–May rose 0.3% compared with 2025, to 14.8 trillion rubles. In January–April, budget revenues had been down 4.5% year-on-year; in January–March, down 8.2%; in January–February, down 10.8%.
How much did that bring in?
In May, the Russian budget received its first significant windfall from the oil price spike caused by the war with Iran: oil and gas revenues totaled 679 billion rubles, 175 billion above plan.
In June, the Finance Ministry expects commodity revenues to again exceed the level built into the annual budget, forecasting an additional 220.2 billion rubles for the federal treasury.
How much did that bring in?
Growth in non-oil-and-gas revenues in 2026 following the VAT increase is accelerating: the year-on-year increase for January–May was 12.4%, compared with 10.2% the previous month. VAT receipts for the first five months of the year rose 21.9% against the same period last year.
According to Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, the growth in tax receipts from businesses and individuals shows that the risk of going too far with higher tax rates did not materialize.
How much is left in the ‘piggy bank’?
The fund’s liquid assets as of June 1, 2026, totaled 3.412 trillion rubles, or $48 billion.
As of March 1, 2022, the NWF held 9.738 trillion rubles, or $116.556 billion.
What does that mean?
The key parameter of the budget rule: when oil falls below this price threshold, the Finance Ministry draws on National Wealth Fund reserves to compensate for lost budget revenues; when oil is above it, the Ministry replenishes the fund.
This aligns with official forecasts
In the Economic Development Ministry’s scenario conditions, the forecast price of Urals crude for 2026 is set at $59, and at $50 for 2027–2029.
What is that?
The Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting. It was founded in 2000 by Andrey Belousov (currently Russia’s defense minister; until May 2024, first deputy prime minister). His brother Dmitry Belousov is the center’s chief macroeconomic analyst. The center’s materials are regularly sent to the government apparatus, the presidential administration, and various ministries and agencies.