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Redirecting rage, reducing risk Political scientist Kirill Shamiev on what the Kremlin stands to gain by blaming Ukraine for the Moscow terrorist attack

Source: Meduza

On March 18, Russia’s Central Election Commission announced that incumbent Vladimir Putin had secured almost 90 percent of the vote in the country’s presidential elections. Even though statistical analysis has clearly shown that the results were fabricated, Kremlin officials still believe such numbers give Putin carte blanche to make any decision — no matter how unpopular. However, a deadly terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall just days after the vote threatened to rattle the Kremlin’s image. Faced with questions about why Russian intelligence appeared to ignore warnings about an imminent ISIS attack, the authorities turned to a familiar scapegoat: Ukraine. Meduza spoke with political scientist Kirill Shamiev, a civil-military relations researcher and a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, about what plans the Kremlin has for Putin post-election and how these might have been altered by the attack.

Less than a week after the Kremlin secured an unprecedented 87.3 percent of the vote for Vladimir Putin in the most falsified presidential election in Russia’s modern history, a terrorist attack in Moscow claimed the lives of at least 144 people. The high numbers at the polls were meant to signal Putin’s control to Russian elites, says political scientist Kirill Shamiev, and the attack served as an “unpleasant reminder” that “strong power does not necessarily mean effective power.”

Now, according to Shamiev, Moscow is trying to deflect attention from any of its own counterintelligence failings and manipulate the narrative around the tragedy to its advantage. “The Kremlin is doing everything possible to extricate itself from the situation and construct a narrative that can redirect this anger, especially that of the Z-patriots, toward Ukrainians,” he explains. “[They’re trying] to exploit this failure in service of their main goal: obliterating Ukraine.” (According to Shamiev, the Russian authorities seem to be succeeding — at least in part; the level of hatred in pro-war online communities is greater than anything he’s seen before.)

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Asked why the Kremlin continues to push the Ukraine angle, even with no evidence, Shamiev also notes that any kind of backlash, no matter how small, can seem like a huge threat to Putin: “If I were a Kremlin dictator, I’d be concerned over even a slight risk to my position: it would seem enormous to me. Redirecting Russians’ rage toward Ukraine reduces this risk.”

Russia’s growing isolation could also explain why the authorities haven’t just accepted condolences from other nations or talked about the need to jointly confront terrorism. When Russia joined the fight against ISIS 10 years ago, this helped break through the international ostracism it encountered after annexing Crimea. Now, Shamiev explains, Russia is far more isolated, and Ukraine is its “priority number one.” “On the front line, enormous resources are being expended, including human ones,” he says. “If I were a Kremlin dictator, I wouldn’t miss seizing a moment of unity, like the one the Crocus attack brought, in pursuit of this priority.”

Keeping the focus on Ukraine is especially important for the Kremlin right now as the authorities will likely need to announce a new wave of mobilization, or at least a “gradual intensification of army recruitment.” In this context, continuing to promote the idea of Ukraine’s alleged involvement could help rally public support for mobilization.

But Shamiev isn’t sure yet how much the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack will affect the authorities’ calculations. Pro-war groups not only swiftly endorsed Moscow’s narrative blaming Ukraine but even voiced similar accusations prior to official statements. However, it’s still unclear what the rest of Russian society believes.

According to Shamiev, Putin’s eye-popping election results also indicate that the authorities may announce another round of mobilization soon. The Russian military is almost certainly planning major upcoming offensives, Shamiev says, and they’ll need more personnel to pull them off. The Kremlin may say: “You voted for us; you gave us almost 90 percent. And now, the state is making the tough decisions,” he explains. 

However, Shamiev doesn’t believe mobilization will illicit the same public backlash as it did in September 2022. The authorities learned from their mistakes, he thinks, and they won’t send draftees directly to the front. He also says that people have had time to get used to new realities: “The war has been going on for several years now. The expectation that ‘it will be over soon’ has already dissipated. I think society will prove even more prepared for new hardships than before.”

The ongoing war has also fundamentally changed Russia’s economy and enriched many people in the process, Shamiev says. He calls this mass redistribution of resources a “political-economic experiment” which he believes the Kremlin will continue through Putin’s next term.

After the start of the full-scale invasion, Western assets and businesses were nationalized or taken by pro-Kremlin “new elites,” Shamiev notes, and “enormous resources are being allocated to combatants and their families, as well as to economic sectors linked to the military-industrial complex.” Whether or not some of these individuals initially supported the war, they’re benefiting from it now. And all this is happening as the Kremlin increases its patriotic messaging. As Shamiev points out, those being enriched by the war also feel like they’re “patriots, doing the right thing.”

“I think that after the war, we will witness a new society, a new nation — with a slightly altered hierarchy and a new ideology,” Shamiev speculates. “Especially if this war ends with even relative success for the Kremlin. I think there will be a clear difference between Russia in 2021 and Russia in 2026.”