Russia may be forced to give up its base in northern Syria. What does that mean for Moscow?
Russia’s military presence in Syria may be facing another drawdown. Days after bringing Kurdish-held territory under government control, Damascus is reportedly preparing to ask Russian forces to withdraw from the Qamishli airfield there. To understand what role the Qamishli airfield has played in Russia’s Syria policy — and why that role may now be exhausted — we spoke with an expert from Meduza’s Razbor (“Explainers”) team.
For security reasons, this article refers to the analyst simply as “Meduza’s expert.”
According to Kommersant, the Syrian government could soon ask Russian forces to leave the airfield in Qamishli, one of three remaining Russian military sites in the country. Talks on the issue, a Syrian source told the outlet, could begin once control of the Hasakah governorate formally passes from Kurdish forces to Damascus. “I think the Russians will be asked to leave Qamishli entirely,” the source said. “There’s nothing for them to do there anymore.”
For more than a decade, large parts of Hasakah, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa governorates were controlled by Kurdish forces. In mid-January, after a government offensive, Damascus announced that the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces had agreed to hand those territories over to state control.
Anton Mardasov, an expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, also expects Russian forces to withdraw from Qamishli. With regional competition intensifying and the Syrian government increasing pressure on Kurdish groups, he said, “Moscow is unlikely to be able to play the role of a mediator,” making it “logical” that Russia’s military presence there would ultimately be ended altogether.
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Russian activity at the airfield has reportedly already been winding down. Russia began using the Qamishli airfield in 2019 and retained it after Syria’s change of power, even increasing its presence in summer 2025, according to Syrian media. But in January, Syria TV, citing satellite imagery, reported a partial withdrawal of Russian equipment from the site for reasons that were not explained.
Qamishli, a site formerly used by U.S. forces, served a specific, if limited, military purpose for Russia, according to Meduza’s expert. He notes that the airfield was used to monitor northeastern Syria and to help shield the Kurdish autonomous region from pro-Turkish forces. In earlier years, it also functioned as a coordination point: joint patrols with the U.S. military regularly departed from the airfield.
That role has now evaporated. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the expert says, the base effectively lost its military relevance. Most Russian troops were withdrawn, and neither Moscow nor Washington showed interest in protecting Kurdish self-rule or controlling local oil fields. The airfield, he adds, was not used as a logistics hub for operations elsewhere, as Russia’s bases at Khmeimim and Tartus are; its importance peaked during the campaign against ISIS.
Russia has maintained constructive relations with Syria’s new authorities and has preserved what it considers genuinely vital assets — the Tartus naval base and the air base at Khmeimim, he notes. Against that backdrop, it is unclear why Moscow would insist on holding onto a marginal site in the northeast.
