Trump’s Greenland gambit gives Russia a historic opportunity but could be a mixed blessing for Putin, experts tell Meduza
U.S. President Donald Trump’s preoccupation with Greenland has rapidly grown from an odd fixation to an unprecedented crisis for NATO. In early January, Trump told reporters that the United States “[needs] Greenland from the standpoint of national security.” The following day, his aide Stephen Miller refused to rule out the use of force to take the Danish territory, telling CNN: “Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland.” Denmark’s prime minister warned that a U.S. takeover of the island would effectively end the North Atlantic alliance. Since then, the crisis has only escalated, with Trump threatening new tariffs on European NATO members if they refuse to allow a U.S. takeover. On January 19, Norway’s government released a text exchange in which Trump linked his Greenland threats to not receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, writing: “I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace.” Meanwhile, the Kremlin has given little public comment on the rift, aside from noting that Trump would “certainly go down in history” if he annexed the island and comparing it to Crimea. To understand how Moscow is likely viewing the standoff, Meduza spoke to Russian military expert Keir Giles and a Russian political scientist who requested anonymity for security reasons.
According to Keir Giles, a Russian military expert at the London-based think tank Chatham House, the Kremlin is likely “jubilant” over Trump’s ongoing attempt to pressure Europe into giving the United States control of Greenland. “This disruption to NATO is the greatest gift that Trump has offered Putin so far,” Giles told Meduza. “It’s a confirmation that the preservation of NATO, or even the Euro-Atlantic consensus, is a very low priority for Trump and those around him.”
While Trump has framed his Greenland gambit as a response to supposed threats from Russia and China, Giles argued that any strategic downside for Moscow would be far outweighed by the damage such a move would inflict on NATO. “Just like the Europeans, Russia can see perfectly well that the U.S. wouldn’t actually gain anything from territorial control over Greenland that it does not already have the right to do, and therefore this may also allay any long-term concerns that Russia might have,” he explained.
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In fact, Giles said, expanded U.S. control over the GIUK Gap — the maritime corridor between Greenland, Iceland, and the U.K. — could even benefit Moscow. “If one end of the gap is in the hands of a power which, at least for the time being, is friendly with Russia, as opposed to seeking to oppose Russian ambitions, then this, too, could be a majority secondary geopolitical benefit,” he said. “It’s the icing on top of the cake of NATO being torpedoed.”
Between a rock and a hard place
Trump’s threats leave Europe with few attractive options, according to a Russian political scientist who specializes in civil-military relations and Russia’s foreign policy. “This is an opportunity for Russia because it destabilizes NATO and makes European countries look even weaker than they used to look before,” he told Meduza. “Basically, European NATO member states are now stuck between Trump’s America and Vladimir Putin’s Russia — one military aggressor on the eastern border and another aggressor on the western side.”
Because the U.S. plays such a central role in European security, he said, Europe’s remaining paths forward appear limited to either trying to change Trump’s mind or making a Greenland takeover politically too costly — whether through tariffs, economic sanctions, payments, or public-relations campaigns aimed at U.S. audiences.
At the same time, he added, Russian elites are unlikely to be celebrating just yet. “Russia is still on the offensive in Ukraine — it’s the most important foreign policy priority for Russia now, and so this conflict has not affected the battlefield in any way,” he said. “If Trump decides to pull out his support for Ukraine then yes, it would be a tangible practical improvement for Russia. But so far, the sanctions are in place and the battlefield is stable.”
For now, the Greenland crisis looks more like a latent opportunity than an immediate gain for Moscow. As events unfold, however, Russia could try to exploit the situation by sending the Trump administration a clear message: that Europe is the real obstacle to U.S. foreign policy ambitions, and that Russia is a more reliable political and economic partner. Moscow, he said, would like to convince Washington that it is “capable of making deals with disregard to any moral considerations, and that both countries and both regimes can benefit from cooperation.”
At the same time, the Kremlin is likely to keep up its “aggressive posture” toward Europe, increasing pressure on European leaders. “Without American support [for Europe], Russia’s threats would be considered way more seriously than before,” he explained. “And for Moscow, the hope is that a lot of politicians would just say, ‘Okay, we did what we could, but let’s just agree with Vladimir Putin and sign a deal that he will find satisfactory.’”
Like Russia on steroids
In the political scientist’s view, a sustained U.S. pressure campaign against Europe — especially one that ends with Washington taking control of Greenland — would not be an unmitigated win for Russia. “The downside is that the United States is now acting on the international stage like Russia did, but on steroids,” he said. For Washington to abandon the norms of international liberalism would be far more consequential than Moscow doing so, because “the military and economic capabilities of the United States are 10, 20, 30 times more powerful than what Russia has.”
That imbalance, he noted, means that if the U.S. eventually decides cooperation with Russia is no longer useful, it could move decisively to undermine Moscow’s relationships with its neighbors, including Belarus and countries in Central Asia. “But this hasn’t happened yet, and I’m not sure it’s going to happen, considering the official American position on China,” he said. “I don’t think they want to fight China and Russia together.”
Even absent such a rupture, Trump-era volatility already complicates Russia’s strategic calculations. “Before, it was pretty clear [what the U.S. and Europe would do] because these policies were set formally and discussed. Now there is no political process at all, or there’s some kind of hidden kleptocratic process behind the scenes. So it makes it more difficult for Russia to understand what’s going to happen.”
Domestically, however, the crisis in U.S.–Europe relations may still bolster Putin’s standing. “The European Union is now catching up in terms of sovereign digital tools, sovereign defense solutions, but it’s too late,” the political scientist said. “Meanwhile, the Kremlin, under Putin, has been talking about [strategic autonomy] since 2012, at least. I’m pretty sure a lot of [Russian] elites looking at this now are like, ‘Yeah, Putin was always right since day one.’”
Authoritarian and far-right leaders elsewhere are likely to draw similar conclusions. “For some of Russia’s partners in Europe and in the West, be it Viktor Orban in Hungary or populist politicians in other countries who are not yet in power, these developments also improve Putin’s position and worldview,” he said. “Basically all that the U.S. is doing now is proving him right. And these politicians can become more assertive, more certain about their political positions, and potentially try to transform it into electoral gains in Western democracies. I’m looking at the AfD in Germany, the far right in France, the upcoming elections in Hungary and other places. So the world is changing, and it’s changing not for the benefit of the liberal elites.”
Story by Sam Breazeale