‘The evidence leaves no room for doubt’ Military analyst Ruslan Leviev reviews the proof corroborating North Korea’s military intervention in Russia’s Kursk region
Last month, a new “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between Russia and North Korea entered force. Signed in June 2024 during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang, the agreement includes a mutual defense pact for immediate military assistance if either faces armed aggression. For the past several weeks already, Moscow has reportedly been getting this assistance in the Kursk region, where a supposedly 10,000-men-strong North Korean contingent has been helping to push back the Ukrainian incursion force that has occupied several hundred square kilometers of Russian territory since the summer.
North Korean troops have fought as a “disciplined, dedicated, and fearless force” and made battles “far more ferocious than before,” Ukrainian soldiers told The New York Times in a story published earlier this week. Intelligence agencies in Kyiv, Seoul, and Washington have said they have proof of this military intervention. Nevertheless, many observers online remain skeptical of the scale of Pyongyang’s involvement. To understand the evidence beyond news reports and Pentagon press briefings, Meduza spoke to military analyst Ruslan Leviev, founder of the Conflict Intelligence Team.
— What’s the main evidence proving that North Korean soldiers are present and fighting in Russia’s Kursk region? Let’s start with the two captured prisoners who featured in video footage recently shared by Volodymyr Zelensky. Can we be sure these men are from North Korea?
— Of course, they didn’t have any Korean documents on them (or none were found anyway). Evidently, all Korean soldiers are issued false documents as soon as they arrive in Russia. In other words, they’re issued genuine Russian military documents, either under a fake name or the name of a real person. But all the documents are, of course, without photographs.
As a result, there’s no hard evidence proving they are North Korean nationals. On the other hand, we have confirmation through these two living prisoners, who do not speak any language other than Korean. Obviously, the Korean language is difficult; it’s very hard to pretend to be Korean.
Moreover, there are conversations, including a video published by Volodymyr Zelensky, where the prisoners are being questioned. One of them doesn’t speak — he either has a broken jaw or some kind of jaw injury, and his head is bandaged. He only responds with gestures or in writing, but the questions are being asked in Korean. The other prisoner speaks freely; he is asked in Korean, and he answers in Korean. You can hear it — it’s all recorded in Korean, both video and audio.
Additionally, there are also handwritten notes, not from these prisoners but from killed North Korean soldiers, which were released by Ukraine’s Security Service. Korean experts have studied these notes and said they look very authentic. Moreover, certain words there are unique to the North Korean dialect, words not usually used in South Korea. There’s also confirmation from South Korean intelligence, which initially reported that North Korean soldiers were being sent to Russia. [Seoul] even shared photographs tracking military ships.
I’ve also been told that these two prisoners are servicemen of the North Korean army, reportedly from an intelligence unit.
Beyond documents and more formal evidence, there is a lot of other proof. There are many photos and videos of dead Korean soldiers recorded by Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines.
— Some skeptics say the proof of North Koreans in the Kursk region is actually just people deliberately or accidentally misidentifying soldiers from Russia’s Far East. How certain can we be that the evidence shows men from North Korea, not Yakutia or Buryatia?
— It’s reasonable to question these claims. However, as my colleagues and I point out, the two men are most likely not Buryats or Yakuts. As you can see, there are also Buryats and Yakuts fighting. Just recently, a Yakut corporal was awarded the title of Hero of Russia for killing a Ukrainian soldier in battle. He also has Asian features. (Of course, I’m not someone who differentiates between Yakuts and Koreans — I’m no phrenologist.)
What stands out when we look at all the photos and videos involving North Korean soldiers? All the Korean soldiers are very young. Those two prisoners — one is 25 years old, and the other is 20. In photos shared on pro-Russian Telegram channels that show Korean and Russian soldiers standing together, hugging or posing together, it’s striking how all the Russians appear to be 50-plus, while these Koreans are young guys. The visual contrast is striking.
Therefore, in some sense, it’s an educated guess. It appears that the photographs of dead soldiers with Asian features wearing Russian uniforms are indeed Koreans, as Ukrainian soldiers claim.
Additionally, there’s video evidence from the early days of battles involving North Korean soldiers in December of last year, published on pro-Russian channels. In what appears to be a scene with a Korean soldier speaking Korean, he’s in a dugout explaining something to Russian soldiers from Chechnya, using gestures to indicate that drones or something bad is over there. You can hear him speaking Korean in the video, and the Russian soldiers also respond with gestures, agreeing, “Yes, bad. Yes, drones.”
There are also older videos, not from the front lines but from training grounds in Russia, recorded by Russian soldiers, where you can hear them saying, “These guys have arrived from Korea.”
If you ask me, the combined evidence leaves no room for doubt. Everyone is now fully convinced that North Korean soldiers are participating in frontline combat. There’s not much to uncover here.
For example, a media outlet recently claimed that the two Korean prisoners are the first visual proof of Korean soldiers’ participation in battles in the Kursk region. This statement surprised me because, as I’ve said, there was already plenty of evidence before. In my opinion, the appearance of live Korean prisoners doesn’t add much new. It’s evidence that can be presented to the media, you can hold briefings about it, and so on, but essentially, it was already proven, in my view.
— Do you expect the Ukrainian military to capture many more North Korean soldiers?
— This is typical of how hostilities develop. It doesn’t seem like [the North Koreans] are being withdrawn from anywhere right now; on the contrary, judging by the situation, they’ll likely replenish their losses gradually. Meaning that new arrivals will come from North Korea. And from time to time, they’ll engage in battles, and occasionally, as is often the case, there will be prisoners. It might not happen often, but there will occasionally be new prisoners.
— Rumors have circulated on social media that one reason Ukraine hasn’t captured more North Korean soldiers is that they’re under orders to kill themselves rather than become prisoners of war. Is there any evidence for that speculation?
— I think Ukrainian soldiers exaggerate this a bit. For instance, alongside Ukrainian journalists, they’ve shared stories claiming that Korean soldiers are ordered to kill themselves if they’re at risk of capture, supposedly to prevent Ukraine from proving Korean involvement in the war. Earlier, there were strange videos showing drone footage of dead soldiers with their heads burning. Ukrainian Telegram channels claimed this was done to hide the fact that they were Korean. I think it’s nonsense — just stories soldiers tell each other.
The practice of promoting suicide in the face of capture predates the North Koreans arriving in Russia — it existed among Russian soldiers. It was even glorified on state television, like on Russia 24 and other networks, with weird gurus going on Vladimir Solovyovand saying things like, “If you’re surrounded, it’s better to kill yourself because that’s honor, that’s courage, that’s pride. Being taken prisoner is disgraceful. So it’s better to kill yourself.”
This has been consistently and frequently emphasized on various channels and in different media outlets. And no one, it seems, has tried to argue against it or say that it’s unacceptable. Nobody says, no, these people need to be rescued. Instead, propaganda supports this kind of behavior in these situations. So, when the Korean military showed up, it’s possible they were also instructed, in a manner similar to political commissars, to adopt the same approach.
However, I don’t think the cases of suicides I’ve seen, especially among Russian soldiers, are usually connected to being surrounded and not wanting to be captured. Rather, it’s because a soldier is wounded, realizes no one will come to save or evacuate him, and that no one, including the commander, cares. They might even hear over the radio, “It’s your problem. Deal with it however you can.”
On top of that, they understand that Ukrainian drones could drop grenades on them at any moment and finish them off. Many realize that it’s better to end their suffering quickly by blowing themselves up or shooting themselves than to die slowly and painfully. That’s why there are so many suicides among Russian soldiers.
— How have pro-invasion Telegram channels responded to reports of North Korean soldiers in the Kursk region? Do they try to conceal or debunk the evidence that’s circulated? Is Russia’s mainstream state media any different?
— A lot of Telegram channels and large pro-Russian Telegram bloggers don’t hide it. They acknowledge that Korean soldiers, Korean equipment, and Korean shells are there. More mainstream propaganda, like television networks, Solovyov, and [Alexander] Kots, tends to sidestep it. I haven’t seen any big, bold takes, like in 2014 when Russian propaganda heavily pushed the narrative that local militias were all local volunteers, not Russian soldiers. I don’t see that kind of activity from major state and national media outlets now. At a grassroots level, like on Telegram, nobody denies it. It’s no secret.
— Why isn’t there more satellite or drone footage showing large North Korean formations? Some who take an “I’ll believe it when I see it” approach seem to want a smoking gun — a grand image of the North Korean Army on Russian soil.
— Last October and November, Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian sources announced the first clashes with North Koreans, supposedly around November 2-3. I remember people asking me whether anything had been confirmed. I told them we had lots of drone footage from Ukrainian forces showing people in Russian military uniforms in combat, but from that altitude, you can’t see faces and can’t determine if they are Korean or Russian.
It was only in December, during their first confirmed engagement, that we identified them, thanks to a mistake the Russians stopped making long ago. Drone footage captured a large group of about 40–50 men moving across a field. Russians have learned that such large groups are immediately spotted by drones and targeted by artillery or cluster munitions, which is what happened. That’s how we realized these guys were North Koreans. But, of course, their faces were not visible in the videos.
— In November 2024, the Pentagon reported that there were 10,000 North Korean troops in Russia's Kursk region. Just a few days ago, South Korea’s spy agency told journalists that around 300 North Korean soldiers had been killed and 2,700 wounded while fighting in Russia. Are these numbers verifiable? Is there any proof of these exact figures, or should people just trust the claims of intelligence agencies in “friendly” countries like Ukraine, South Korea, and the United States?
— Well, everyone should decide for themselves whether to take these figures on faith. We’ve always been, and continue to be, very skeptical of data coming from warring sides — whether it’s the Ukrainian General Staff’s reports or the Russian General Staff’s.
As with all wars, both sides consistently overstate enemy losses and downplay their own. So, when Zelensky said that North Korea has already lost 4,000 soldiers killed and wounded, well, it might be true. I don’t know — maybe it is, maybe it isn’t. But given that Ukraine is making the claim, I expect they’re likely inflating the numbers. That’s why I approach it with skepticism.
On the other hand, when South Korea spoke up, it seemed, at first glance, to be a relatively neutral third party — not a warring party. It maintains a firm position of not supplying weapons to Ukraine. So, maybe Seoul’s numbers are more trustworthy. But their figures don’t match up either.
Last December, South Korea reported that North Korea had 100 soldiers killed and 1,000 wounded. Now, they’re saying North Korea has lost 300 killed and 2,700 wounded. In December, the ratio of killed to wounded was 1:10; now it’s 1:9. That’s an extraordinary, completely implausible statistic.
After hearing this, we specifically investigated similar cases and looked at statistics from Israel’s operations in Gaza. It’s a small area, which makes evacuating wounded soldiers relatively simple and quick. Israel has excellent medical care, including military medicine. According to the numbers provided by the IDF, their ratio of killed to wounded is roughly 1:6.
And that’s in a small area with an advanced, modern army. For the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ratio was roughly 1:6 or 1:7 — also with efficient evacuations, adherence to the golden hour rule, and access to excellent medical care. Yet, the South Koreans claim a 1:10 ratio for the North Koreans in the Kursk region. This suggests that nearly all of their wounded soldiers received immediate medical attention and evacuation within the first hour and then fully recovered. Evidently, none of those alleged cases of self-inflicted wounds occurred. It’s hard to believe.
If true, it would mean that North Korea has the world’s best military medical system, capable of saving soldiers at an unprecedented level — even though they’re operating in Russian territory. For comparison, the Russian ratio is 1:3, which is three times worse than North Korea’s supposed results. Naturally, we don’t believe these figures.
As for the claim of 300 killed, that seems entirely plausible, and the number could be even higher in reality. The Ukrainian military has recorded a lot of drone footage showing rows of [supposed] North Korean soldiers’ bodies laid out, prepared for evacuation, collected from the front lines, and gathered in one spot. There are a lot of these videos, each showing 20–30 bodies. And that’s only what made it on camera. So, just based on observations, I’d say the number of deaths is probably in the hundreds by now. As for the exact number of wounded, I can’t say.
Interview by Kevin Rothrock
Cover Image: Vladimir Zelenskiy / AFP / Scanpix / LETA