‘Playing the populist’ To keep Russia’s protest-prone Khabarovsk region under control, the Kremlin takes a lesson from a former governor who got too popular
Three years ago, the Kremlin was facing a serious dilemma: Sergey Furgal, the popular governor of Russia’s protest-prone Khabarovsk region, had just been arrested, and he needed to be replaced by someone more “reliable.” The person they landed on, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) member Mikhail Degtyarev, never became very popular with voters; in addition to lacking the populist appeal of his predecessor, he hailed from the faraway Volga region and filled his administration with “outsiders” like himself. In May 2024, Degtyarev was appointed Russia’s Sports Minister, and the Putin administration sent yet another “outsider” to take his place: Dmitry Demeshin, a member of the ruling United Russia party. This time, however, both the candidate and his Kremlin backers appear to have learned some lessons from the Furgal saga: though he’s still only acting governor, Demeshin regularly makes a show of scolding local officials, wears military-style clothing, and has tried to distance himself from United Russia. Ahead of the gubernatorial election in Khabarovsk, Meduza special correspondent Andrey Pertsev explains how the Russian authorities plan to ensure the region stays under control.
In Russia’s 2018 gubernatorial elections, the governorship of the Khabarovsk region went to Sergey Furgal, a State Duma deputy from the far-right LDPR. Initially, he was seen as a sham candidate whose run had been coordinated with the Kremlin to help United Russia candidate Vyacheslav Shport win the election. Instead, Furgal came out on top.
The new “accidental” governor quickly became a popular figure. He scolded local officials, tried (but failed) to sell the regional government’s yacht to save taxpayer money, and even traveled around the region to speak with his constituents. In 2019, the LDPR became the ruling party in the Khabarovsk region, with its members winning a majority of seats in both the regional parliament and the Khabarovsk City Duma.
This situation didn’t suit the Kremlin. In 2020, Sergey Furgal was arrested on dubious charges of organizing multiple murders in the early 2000s. His arrest sparked mass protests in the Khabarovsk region, with tens of thousands of people taking to the streets in the regional capital alone. The demonstrations lasted from July until October 2020. And while Furgal said that he didn’t support unauthorized protests, he thanked the people for their support.
Meanwhile, Mikhail Degtyarev, another State Duma deputy from the LDPR, was appointed to serve as acting governor in Furgal’s place. Degtyarev spoke out emphatically against the pro-Furgal protesters (“Scream as much as you want — I won’t be dictated to”) and made a range of other inflammatory comments, ultimately failing to win over the Khabarovsk region’s residents. Nonetheless, the Russian authorities instructed its political strategists to orchestrate an election win for Degtyarev — one with a narrow enough margin to appear “plausible” to voters.
The official results of the September 2021 Khabarovsk gubernatorial election gave Degtyarev 57 percent of the vote amid an official turnout of 44 percent. In the years that followed, the Kremlin-chosen leader was unable to repeat the success of his predecessor, largely because he filled the government with “outsiders.” In May 2024, when he left the governorship to become Russia’s sports minister, the Khabarovsk region welcomed his departure.
Like Furgal but with a Kremlin twist
Degtyarev wanted his associate and deputy Alexander Nikitin to be his successor, according to a source close to the Putin administration and another one close to the Khabarovsk regional government. The LDPR hoped for a smooth handoff, like those that had recently occurred between governors in the Kursk and Kemerovo regions; Nikitin was even named the acting governor ahead of the upcoming elections.
But the Kremlin ultimately decided on a different approach. According to Meduza’s source close to the Putin administration, the president’s political bloc believed Nikitin’s chances of winning in such a protest-minded region, where Degtyarev’s team had proven so unpopular, were too low. Instead of Nikitin, they decided on then-Deputy Prosecutor General Dmitry Demeshin, who was already overseeing the Far East and lived in Khabarovsk. While two sources close to the Putin administration said that Demeshin’s high level of media activity caused friction between him and Attorney General Igor Krasnov, the Kremlin believed his combination of “media savvy” and “toughness” made him perfect for the role of Khabarovsk governor.
Demeshin’s campaign chief is Grigory Kuranov, an experienced political strategist and a deputy of Yury Trutnev, the presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District. Sources close to the Putin administration and sources in United Russia’s leadership told Meduza that Demeshin’s image as a “no-nonsense security official” was their idea. A source close to the presidential administration explains:
He wears military-style clothing — sometimes in appropriate settings, sometimes not. He intentionally speaks rudely to officials, making demands of them and calling out their underperformance. It’s as if he’s forcing them to work — to finish construction projects faster, for example. But it’s all a performance, of course: everything is planned in advance.
At the same time, a former official from the Khabarovsk regional administration who previously worked with Governors Shport and Furgal said he believes the image Demeshin’s team is promoting is based on his imprisoned predecessor. “He’s a copy of an inimitable original [i.e. Furgal]. Demeshin is playing the populist, the defender of the people, though I’m not so sure how genuine it is. But people seem to like this behavior,” he says.
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A political strategist who has worked in the region and knows Demeshin personally told Meduza that Demeshin is “definitely a prosecutor through and through” and “part of the system” but that he also “has thoughts that he could change lives for the better.” “The human mask has grown onto the security official’s face,” the source added.
Meduza’s source close to the Putin administration noted that the authorities intended for Mikhail Degtyarev to become an “anti-Furgal” in the region:
Furgal said that the region is self-sufficient and simply gives too much to the center [Moscow] — and that this is unfair. Degtyarev, on the other hand, said that Khabarovsk needed to ask the center for help because the region depends on it. Furgal would never have worn a Putin T-shirt, but Degtyarev was happy to. Then there’s Demeshin, who’s almost Furgal, only a “correct” version [in the Kremlin’s view]: He doesn’t criticize Moscow, only negligent officials.
In the Khabarovsk region’s upcoming gubernatorial election, organizers have not been instructed to “inflate voter turnout,” according to a source close to the Putin administration and a source close to United Russia’s leadership. They expect a turnout of 40–50 percent to be sufficient and for Demeshin to win about 60–70 percent of the official vote.
The rest of the candidate lineup is also expected to help ensure Demeshin’s win. So far, nine people have expressed their desire to run in the elections. Sources close to the Putin administration told Meduza that the ballot will have four or five names, including Demeshin. His most notable potential opponent is Roza Chemeris, a State Duma deputy from the New People party. A political strategist who works in the region, however, told Meduza that Chemeris’s odds of winning are low:
There’s an unspoken rivalry between the Khabarovsk region and the Primorsky region about which region in the Far East is the main one and which city is the real capital — Khabarovsk or Vladivostok. This is a sensitive issue: after Furgal’s victory, the district capital was moved to Vladivostok. Chemeris is a prominent member of the Vladivostok elites. [For the Khabarovsk region,] she represents an enemy, external expansion. Against this backdrop, Demeshin becomes “one of us.”
However, a source close to the authorities in the Khabarovsk region disputed this characterization, calling Chemeris a “prominent politician who will bring interest to the elections.”
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Story by Andrey Pertsev. Abridged translation by Sam Breazeale.