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An effigy representing the Kyiv authorities hangs over a barricade in Slovyansk. May 11, 2014.
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‘Different possibilities exist’ Historian Hiroaki Kuromiya on the complex past and uncertain future of Ukraine’s war-torn Donbas

Source: Meduza
An effigy representing the Kyiv authorities hangs over a barricade in Slovyansk. May 11, 2014.
An effigy representing the Kyiv authorities hangs over a barricade in Slovyansk. May 11, 2014.
Zacharie Scheurer / NurPhoto / Corbis / Getty Images

Historian Hiroaki Kuromiya is one of the world’s leading specialists on the history of Ukraine’s Donbas. His 1998 book, Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s, is still considered a benchmark study of the region. Kuromiya first became interested in Donbas in the 1980s, and even then he pointed out that the region could become a flashpoint between Moscow and Kyiv. Now a professor emeritus, Kuromiya continues to do research and monitor the situation in Ukraine’s east. Ten years after the outbreak of the war in Donbas, journalist and researcher Konstantin Skorkin interviewed Kuromiya about the region’s history and what awaits it in the future. The following is an abridged summary of their conversation.

Hiroaki Kuromiya, historian

Hiroaki Kuromiya first realized that Donbas was a “perennial trouble spot for Moscow” in the 1980s, when he was researching his PhD dissertation on Joseph Stalin’s industrialization drive. Seeking to develop his own understanding of this complex region, he went on to research and write Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s-1990s, which remains a foundational historical text. 

But although he saw Donbas as a potential flashpoint even then, Kuromiya pushes back against the notion that the region’s history predetermined its fate. “I see no evidence suggesting the inevitability of Russia’s invasion of Donbas,” he said. 

If anything, Moscow was uncertain of the political reliability of the Donbas elite and hesitant about what they considered to be an “industrial wasteland.” Moscow’s calculation was that if Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Odesa were taken, the rest of Ukraine’s south-eastern territory, including Donbas, would automatically fall into Russia’s hands. This failed to happen.

According to Kuromiya, there were few “outright separatists” in Donbas before 2014. “It’s worth remembering that in 1991, a vast majority of the Donbas population voted for the independence of Ukraine, and by 2014, in spite of all kinds of complaints about the Kyiv government, they thought of Donbas as part and parcel of independent Ukraine,” the historian explained. 

DONBAS, IN PHOTOS

A brief history of the Donbas War, in photos American Brendan Hoffman captures eight years of life along the contact line in eastern Ukraine

DONBAS, IN PHOTOS

A brief history of the Donbas War, in photos American Brendan Hoffman captures eight years of life along the contact line in eastern Ukraine

That said, regional politicians — like Viktor Yanukovych, who served as the governor of the Donetsk region from 1997 to 2002 — had a history of using the “threat of autonomy and separatism” as leverage against the central government in Kyiv. When Yanukovych was elected president in 2010, Kuromiya said, Donbas effectively “took over” the country, “signaling in a sense that Donbas had finally been integrated into Ukraine.” 

“I am certain that before Russia’s invasion, the vast majority of the Donbas population thought of their future in independent Ukraine, not in an annexed region of Russia,” he added. 

Nevertheless, the Donbas region remained vulnerable to outside influence — and attack. As Kuromiya explained: 

Radical Russian nationalist schemers and intriguers found Donbas easy to penetrate. They were not numerous, but they had been working in Donbas since well before 2014. So when Russia annexed Crimea and spread the conflict to “New Russia,” Moscow could count on dependable elements already well established in Donbas. 

These networks, along with what Kuromiya described as a “lack of resoluteness among the Donbas political elite,” allowed Moscow to capture large swaths of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions. “The prejudice some Ukrainian politicians and intellectuals held for Donbas, considering it as a bastion of separatism, [also] facilitated Russia’s capture of Donbas,” he added. 

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The Revolution of Dignity, meanwhile, prevented the entire country from becoming a “vassal state.” In this context, “Russia’s capture of Donbas was more accidental than inevitable or predetermined,” Kuromiya said. And a decade later, with Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine now in its third year, the historian still believes that “different possibilities existed and exist for Donbas.”

I am firmly convinced that the Donbas people ultimately understand that their future lies in Ukraine and not in Russia. Kyiv’s task may be difficult, but it must convince the people of the Donbas that their allegiance belongs to Ukraine and Europe.

At the same time, Kuromiya urged Kyiv to try and preserve the unique culture of the Donbas region, to avoid the risk of mimicking some of Moscow’s policies in occupied areas of Ukraine. 

There is no doubt that if Russia retains the Donbas, it will […] destroy any vestige of its Ukrainian past. If Ukraine recovers the Donbas, […] it will have to tread carefully. Moscow will surely use the Russian language, Russophone culture, and anything related to Russia in Donbas to subvert Kyiv’s influence there. Nevertheless, Kyiv would do well not to follow Russia’s lead and attempt to obliterate Donbas’ past. 

“Diversity can be a source of conflict, but it is also a great source of creativity and prosperity,” he continued. “Forgetting the past is a sure way to invite disaster in the future.”

The way Kuromiya sees it, Russia’s continued occupation could lead to the “obliteration” of Donbas as such, since Moscow is unlikely to invest in rebuilding the war-torn region. “Donbas matters to Moscow only as a lever against independent Ukraine and the West,” he said. And although the West has shown “little actual interest” in the region’s fate, Kuromiya believes that if Ukraine can recover occupied territories, Western countries will make “considerable efforts” to support reconstruction. 

The population of Donbas will also have a decisive role to play in shaping post-war Ukraine, the historian said. 

The only way to preserve Donbas and its past and future will be for Donbas residents to choose unequivocally Ukraine over Russia, and for the [rest of the] Ukrainian population to treat the people in Donbas as fellow Ukrainian citizens, even if they [are] Russophone. Ukraine may have to go through a painful process of forgiveness and reconciliation after the war, but this will be a far better outcome than war and destruction.

“Without bringing peace and prosperity to the Donbas, Ukraine will remain vulnerable to Moscow’s subversion,” Kuromiya concluded. “Given peace and prosperity, the Donbas population will manage their own history and culture appropriately.”

READ MORE ABOUT THE WAR IN DONBAS

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READ MORE ABOUT THE WAR IN DONBAS

From ‘frozen’ conflict to full-scale invasion How has eight years of war changed Ukraine’s Donbas? Meduza asks human rights expert Varvara Pakhomenko.

Interview by Konstantin Skorkin