‘A significant diversion of resources’ Ukrainian drone attacks are hitting oil facilities further inside Russia than ever before. How will this affect the war?
At the start of January 2023, the Ukrainian army began regularly targeting Russian oil and gas refining facilities. Between January 18 and February 3, Ukraine’s Armed Forces carried out seven drone strikes against oil infrastructure, while at least two more drones were shot down in the Nizhny Novgorod region, which contains a refinery. While Ukraine has been attacking petroleum industry targets throughout the war, previous attacks targeted facilities in occupied or border regions. Now, Ukrainian drones have started hitting targets in the Leningrad, Volgograd, and Yaroslavl regions. The independent Russian outlet iStories dug into what these attacks could mean for the next phase of the full-scale war. Meduza has translated the analysis into English.
How vulnerable are oil refiners to drone attacks?
The Novatek chemical terminal in the Leningrad region’s Ust-Luga settlement ceased operations after a drone attack on January 21 — as did the oil refinery in Tuapse on January 25. On January 31, Russia’s Energy Ministry said that the terminal in Ust-Luga was up and running again. A refinery in Volgograd that was hit in an overnight drone attack on February 3 stopped part of its production to repair damage, sources at the plant told Russian newspaper Kommersant. Official reports say the refinery is operating normally.
Oil refineries’ vulnerability to small drones shouldn’t be exaggerated, according to Sergey Vakulenko from the Carnegie Center: “The standards at which Russian oil refineries are built and modernized stems from Cold War-era technical standards. At the time, they were designed to ensure the resilience of plants even during conditions of aerial bombardment by 1000 kilogram (1.1-ton) bombs. That means that drones weighing only a few kilograms can set a refinery on fire, but it can’t destroy it.” Even if a drone hits the most vulnerable part, the gas fractionation unit, it would cause a large explosion which could put a plant out of commission, but it wouldn’t wipe out the whole facility.
However, Russia’s refineries may have difficulties repairing the damaged Western equipment that they started using widely after 2008, Vakulenko notes. It’s now impossible for Russian companies to get all of the parts and expertise they need due to sanctions, and Chinese technology may prove incompatible.
Are air defenses able to defend oil refineries?
There are two ways to defend targets in the deep rear from drones: shielding the border from the enemy and shielding the targets themselves.
It’s difficult for Russia to defend its entire border with Ukraine due to its expanse, explains the Israeli military expert David Sharp. Drones are a difficult target for Russian air defenses. Made out of plastic and composite materials, drones are hard to detect by radar. They also fly relatively low to the ground.
Some of the Ukrainian drones flying into Russian territory are intercepted by air defense systems right in the border regions, especially in the Belgorod region, according to Sharp. “Ideally, air defenses are supposed to catch all drones near the border, but this requires many complexes, many long-range detection systems, including airborne ones, like the A-50 aircraft,” he says. It also requires coordinated effort from all air defense units: “There are many technical and organizational aspects involved; it can’t all be airtight.”
Another option is to put air defense complexes near every facility that could be a target for drone attacks, Sharp explains. This would likely require short- and medium-range systems such as Russia’s Pantsir. It would also likely require more than one complex per facility. After the strikes on the terminal in Ust-Luga and the refinery in Tuapse, Vakulenko wrote that another 18 Russian refineries could come under attack.
“For Russia, defending oil refineries is a significant diversion of resources — even when it succeeds. Many air defense systems need to be deployed either to defend the borders or to defend the facilities, or for both. You either take these systems from the front line, or you increase production, which is very costly,” says Sharp.
Russia doesn’t have enough air defense systems to protect all of its facilities scattered across its vast territory. If attacks continue, according to analysts at the Atlantic Council, Russia’s military command will have to decide where to use air defenses — on the front or in the rear.
Are attacks on oil refineries a new strategy for Ukraine’s Armed Forces?
Yes and no. On the one hand, applying a “long arm,” i.e. hitting targets deep in the enemy’s territory, has increasing been a priority and an important factor in the war’s development, according to Sharp. On the other hand, these efforts have occurred independently of the situation on the front, where reality dictates a defensive strategy.
Military expert Kirill Mikhailov agrees: “These attacks play an important role in both defense and in offense. During the Second World War, the U.S. and the U.K. spent several years looking for ways to inflict as much damage as possible on fascist Germany through bombings.” Strikes on residential buildings and factories didn’t bring about significant results, but closer to 1945, the U.S. “found Germany’s achilles heel.” “They turned out to be synthetic fuel plants. These were huge plants that couldn’t be hidden, and required a lot of time to repair. By the end of the war, the Allies had practically deprived Germany of fuel."
What damage have the drone attacks on Russian oil refineries caused to the economy so far?
This is a difficult question. Here’s what we know.
On January 25-30, Russia saw a nearly four-percent drop in oil processing (compared to January 2023), according to Bloomberg. During the last week of January, the disruptions at the plants in Ust-Luga and Tuapse, which were targeted by drones, may have begun to affect operations at the facilities. In December, around five percent of Russia’s oil processing took place at these plants. There was also a decrease in the amount of output at the oil refinery in Volgograd.
According to Russian newspaper Kommersant, oil refineries processed 1.4 percent less in January than they did in December, and four percent less than in January 2023. While this is partially attributable to annual maintenance and reductions related to Russia’s commitments as part of agreements made with Saudi Arabia to decrease its oil production, it’s also a result of the shutdowns following drone attacks.
On January 31, Russia’s Energy Ministry officially announced measures “to compensate for the declining volumes of automotive gasoline caused by unplanned repairs at the plants.” In order to secure enough gas for the domestic market, the authorities reduced shipments abroad. This caused gas exports to fall by 37 percent and diesel exports by 23 percent compared to January 2023. It’s not clear to what extent these repairs were related to the drone attacks.
Experts say that continued attacks on oil refineries could decrease export volumes (oil products currently account for a third of total oil exports, notes Vakulenko), create a fuel shortage in the country, and even affect the front lines — though it’s difficult to assess under what conditions this would occur and how serious the consequences would be.
Attacks on critical infrastructure, rather than an “endless bloodbath on the front lines,” is what could inflict truly serious damage on Russia, writes British writer and historian Owen Matthews: “Perhaps this is what will make the war too expensive and painful for Putin.”
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Reporting by iStories
Translation by Sasha Slobodov