‘The situation took a wrong turn’ How the Kremlin feels about the sudden popularity of Boris Nadezhdin, Russia’s anti-war presidential hopeful
Barring an act of God, there’s no question who the official winner of Russia’s upcoming presidential election will be. But the leadup to the vote has brought with it a different, smaller mystery: why has Boris Nadezhdin, a 60-year-old former lawmaker whose campaign centers around his opposition to Putin and the war, been allowed to make it this far? According to Meduza’s sources, it was somewhat of an accident — and now the Putin administration wants Nadezhdin to leave the race of his own accord. But insiders from the presidential hopeful’s campaign say he has no intention of doing so. Meduza special correspondent Andrey Pertsev explains.
[The Kremlin’s politic bloc] held brainstorming sessions: they discussed the possibility of having a liberal candidate participate in the presidential race as a way to show the West, to show outside audiences, that these kinds of ideas are unpopular [in Russia]. It was supposed to be someone who’s well-known [in the West] but unknown to most of Russian society. The candidate would get 2–3 percent, and that would be it. But when they started mentally going through all the possibilities, it turned out that everyone who fit the bill either has dual citizenship, has been declared a “foreign agent,” or has bank accounts and real estate abroad. So they pulled the plug on the idea because it was unfeasible.
This account came from someone who took part in one of these Kremlin “brainstorms.” He said the Putin administration held these sessions several months ago, while the idea to include a “liberal candidate” in the 2024 presidential race first arose in early 2023. Another source who also attended the “brainstorming sessions” confirmed this description: “They talked about a lot of things and went through a lot of ideas, including this [the nomination of a ‘liberal’ candidate].”
A source close to the leadership of Russia’s ruling United Russia party also told Meduza that the Putin administration discussed allowing a “liberal” candidate to run, but that the authorities ultimately nixed the idea. “We barely even look over at the West anymore; it’s no use trying to prove something to them. And there wasn’t any domestic reason to do it, other than to increase voter turnout. But they determined that it would be easy to ‘make up’ these extra few percentage points by using multi-day voting,” said the source.
In October 2023, the Russian newspaper Vedomosti reported that the Kremlin was planning to add some variety to the presidential ballot by allowing a “liberal” candidate to run, naming former Ekho Moskvy editor-in-chief Alexey Venediktov as one possibility. Venediktov himself told journalists that he had no plans to join the race.
Around the same time, politician Boris Nadezhdin, a former associate of murdered opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, announced his own plans to run. (Nadezhdin has occasionally represented Russia’s “liberal opposition” on Russian state television in recent years, something that genuine opposition figures are generally not allowed to do.) “Unfortunately, everyone I would probably have supported if they had run is either no longer able to, like Nemtsov, or is in prison, or has left the country. So I have to do it myself,” he told journalists.
Two sources close to the Putin administration told Meduza that neither the Kremlin’s political bloc nor the political strategists it works with have provided any assistance to Boris Nadezhdin. At the same time, they said, the Kremlin’s information bloc — whose leader, Alexey Gromov, has a competitive relationship with political bloc leader Sergey Kiriyenko — did show interest in Nadezhdin’s campaign and briefly believed that by supporting “their own liberal,” they could contribute to Putin’s victory.
“[The Kremlin’s information bloc] had their first conversation with Nadezhdin [in early fall]. They’re in contact with Boris because of his [regular] participation in [propaganda] TV shows. But to reiterate: [Nadezhdin’s campaign] is not [Gromov’s] project. The discussion didn’t go any further. Everything was at the level of, ‘If something goes wrong, I can probably [help],’” said one of Meduza’s sources close to the Putin administration.
Nadezhdin himself has publicly insisted that he never discussed his candidacy with the Kremlin.
‘Boris was careful’
Initially, Nadezhdin refrained from making any anti-war or anti-Putin statements. In his campaign manifesto, he said that Russia needs to have a “Western orientation” and be “like a European country.” He even expressed agreement with several statements made by Vladimir Putin, including the idea that “the world of the 20th century is collapsing” as China and India prepare to surpass the West in the global order, and that this will give Russia a chance to become Europe’s “largest economy.”
An acquaintance of Nadezhdin told Meduza that at the time of those comments, Nadezhdin still expected the Putin administration to support his candidacy. “Boris was careful; he tried not to say anything too subversive for fear of scaring off [the Kremlin,]” said the source. According to this person, Nadezhdin was also hoping to increase his name recognition on the national level ahead of a possible run for Moscow City Duma in September 2024 or Russia’s State Duma in 2026.
But according to two sources close to the Putin administration, Nadezhdin was unable to convince the Kremlin’s political bloc to help him with his nomination. They believe that this was what “radicalized” the candidate, leading him to post slogans against the “special military operation” and the president himself on his website. One source from the Kremlin’s political bloc and two political strategists who have worked for the Kremlin told Meduza that Nadezhdin “categorically cannot be called a spoiler candidate or a coordinated candidate.”
“Any ‘technical candidate’s’ campaign has to have a supervisor [from the Putin administration], and preferably a political strategist. Representatives from these campaigns must attend meetings [with the administration] and compare notes. There’s nothing like that in Nadezhdin’s case, even though there was some past communication. […] There’s no way [the Kremlin] would have authorized his statements against the special military operation and Putin. They’re not suicidal,” said one source close to the Kremlin.
Several sources from Nadezhdin’s campaign also emphasized that the candidate’s team currently has no contact with the Putin administration or its political strategists. “There are a wide variety of people working here, from various campaigns. Some of them gained experience working with [opposition politician Maxim] Katz; others worked with Navalny’s offices. Most of them worked as volunteers or semi-volunteers. All of them are working out of sincere support,” said one source.
In January 2024, a number of well-known opposition politicians, bloggers, and experts living outside of Russia expressed support for Nadezhdin, including Maxim Katz, political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann, and supporters of Alexey Navalny, including his wife Yulia. Katz uploaded dozens of tweets calling for Russians to submit their signatures in support of the candidate, while Schulmann interviewed him for her YouTube channel.
Politician Lyubov Sobol, who works for Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, said Nadezhdin’s sudden popularity is a result of the fact that he “gives people a chance to show that Russian society has a demand for political representation and new voices.”
By late January, thousands of Russians were lining up throughout the country and abroad to add their signatures in support of Nadezhdin’s candidacy. As of January 26, the campaign has collected approximately 200,000 signatures — twice as many as he needs to officially join the race.
Now, the campaign’s lawyers are tasked with verifying each of the signatures and submitting them to the country’s Central Election Commission by January 31. A source who monitored the signature collection process for Nadezhdin’s candidacy told Meduza that some of the signatures have “obvious flaws”: they’re “real signatures, but crossed out.”
‘Flung around like a hot potato’
The Kremlin’s political bloc, which oversees presidential elections, finds this situation troubling. One source close to the Putin administration told Meduza that the bloc hopes that Nadezhdin himself will decide not to turn the signatures in and either say that too many of them had errors or that the campaign failed to meet the required regional quotas. “In this case, they would be willing to offer him something [in return]. But the desire to make a trade is fading: [Nadezhdin’s] behavior is veering too far from the system,” he said.
But according to an acquaintance of Nadezhdin and a person who works in his campaign, Nadezhdin still has every intention of turning in the signatures and registering his candidacy. “He’s really in it now; it’s become a real battle for him,” one source said. Whether and how he’ll actually manage to get on the ballot, however, is unclear. “His radicalization and the support from opposition figures abroad have definitely not increased the odds of him being allowed to register,” a source close to the Putin administration told Meduza.
According to the source and one of their colleagues, the president’s staff has no intention of letting the Central Election Commission register any candidates who oppose the war. “There’s a portion of the electorate that wants the war to end. If [Putin’s opponent in the elections] decides to cater to this demand, they may get a decent percentage. And [the Putin administration] doesn’t need that,” said one source.
As Meduza has previously reported, in the 2024 elections, the Putin administration wants Vladimir Putin to receive about 80 percent of the official vote, with a turnout of at least 79 percent. According to Meduza’s sources, an “anti-war candidate” like Nadezhdin could make it difficult to achieve these results, even with the help of electronic ballots and multi-day voting.
At the same time, the Kremlin is not concerned about possible protests in response to Nadezhdin being blocked from running. “Everyone has already forgotten about [Ekaterina] Duntsova, and her case didn’t cause protests. This won’t [either],” a source from the political bloc told Meduza. Nonetheless, the Kremlin views voters’ enthusiasm for Nadezhdin’s candidacy as “fairly problematic”: “It’s become clear that people are eager for something new — that’s a very unpleasant effect.”
The Kremlin expects Nadezhdin’s voters to redirect their support to Vladislav Davankov, the nominee for the Kremlin-approved “liberal” party New People. “Obviously, his campaign won’t have anything explicitly anti-war or anti-president,” a source close to the party told Meduza.
According to a source from the Putin administration, Nadezhdin shouldn’t count on any support from the Kremlin’s information bloc or its leader, Alexey Gromov. “Hypothetically, someone who supports letting him register could convince the president that they need Nadezhdin for some reason. But that’s very unlikely,” said the source.
A political strategist who works with the Putin administration and with several Russian governors said he agreed. In his opinion, the Kremlin’s information bloc didn’t “choose the wrong candidate to promote,” but it did make the mistake of failing to state its intentions clearly. “The situation took a wrong turn,” he said. “There’s a problem, therefore someone must be to blame: the people who proposed having a ‘liberal on the ballot.’ […] The result will be them flinging Nadezhdin around like a hot potato, casting the blame on others.”
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Story by Andrey Pertsev.
English-language adaptation by Sam Breazeale.