Ukraine’s offensive in the south, Russia’s offensive in the north Meduza shares an updated combat map with the latest developments in Bakhmut, Velyka Novosilka, and Orikhiv

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Meduza has adopted a consistent antiwar position, holding Russia responsible for its military aggression and atrocities. As part of this commitment, we regularly update an interactive map that documents combat operations in Ukraine and the damage inflicted by Russia’s invasion forces. Our map is based exclusively on previously published open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect reports already available publicly and determine their geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process.

Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of 11:00 a.m. GMT (7:00 a.m. EDT) on July 27, 2023

Two months after Ukraine’s offensive began on June 4 (or mid-May if the first counterattacks near Bakhmut are included), the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) have achieved their first objective. It’s clear that it wasn’t intended to be one operation, but rather a series of strikes, spread across time and space. First, the attacking troops had to cross 7-10 kilometers (around 4-6 miles) separating their positions from the Russian army’s fortified line of defense — which can now be considered as achieved.

It’s likely that the Ukrainian command planned to achieve this objective much earlier, but Ukraine’s advancing forces sustained major losses in minefields, from Russian artillery fire, anti-tank systems, and helicopters. In the final days of July, the Ukrainian army began an assault on several towns and villages considered to be part of the Russian army’s main lines of defense. The New York Times even wrote that it’s possible the main thrust of Ukraine’s offensive may already be underway. The main direction is assumed to be Orikhiv, employing brigades of Western-made armored vehicles.

The actual shape of the AFU’s operation isn’t clear, since they continue to attack in separate directions. The settlements being fought over are dozens of kilometers apart from each other. The direction of the main attack is also not clear yet. After initial failures, the Ukrainian command was forced to use reserves who, like the troops in the first phases of the offensive, were equally distributed in different directions.

The Russian command also revealed part of its plans. For now, Russia is not transferring large reserves in areas where the AFU are attacking (not including the Bakhmut front, where Russian forces have had to quickly replace Wagner Group with new units made up of reserves). Instead, it is using its reserves for its own offensive in northeast Ukraine, on the border of the Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions. It’s clear that this would divert Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut and the south.

Bakhmut

• After weeks of fighting in the south of this section of the front, the AFU have been able to push back the Russian forces (which replaced Wagner Group) from the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal and the road between Kostyantynivka and Bakhmut. Despite the transfer of Russian reserves to the region, Ukrainian troops have been able to mostly capture the Russian army’s fortified area on the hills west of Klishchiivka and Andriivka in recent weeks. On July 25, Ukrainian troops launched an assault on these villages.
• The outcome of the fighting is not yet clear. The AFU units were seen on the southern outskirts of Klishchiivka. Judging by videos, Russian artillery has carried out strikes on the AFU units.
• For several weeks, the AFU have been carrying out strikes on the Russian artillery’s rear positions (there are dozens of videos showing damaged Russian artillery systems located several kilometers away from Bakhmut). They still haven’t been able to completely suppress the Russian fire support systems, however.
• If the AFU are able to liberate Klishchiivka and Andriivka, they can approach the southern outskirts of Bakhmut (as the Wagner Group mercenaries did when they captured these villages in the middle of winter). While this won’t collapse the Russian defense, it could strain it. The main supply lines to Russian units (along the Bakhmut-Popasna and Bakhmut-Soledar roads) are located to the northeast and have so far been relatively reliable.
• The AFU’s offensive to the north of Bakhmut, which could threaten the supply of Russian troops to the city, has been stalled for several weeks. The Ukrainian forces are only trying to attack trucks northeast of Bakhmut.
• It’s likely that Russian forces will be forced to leave Klishchiivka, given that it’s become difficult to defend after losing the heights west of the village. It probably won’t lead to a breakthrough, however. If Russian units leave, then they will take up new lines of defense to the east of Klishchiivka and Andriivka.

In the direction of Velyka Novosilka

• In recent weeks, combat on the border between the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions has become a crisis for Russian defenses.
• The AFU’s advancing units were halted in July after having advanced to the south of the regional center of Velyka Novosilka along the Mokri Yaly River and liberating a few villages along its banks. It became clear that it would be impossible to advance further south along the river without capturing the heights on the flanks. Then, Ukrainian forces employed reserves and began a large offensive on the western flank. They liberated the small village of Rivnopil and moved south. At the end of July, the AFU stormed the villages of Pryutne and Staromaiorske. On July 27, the AFU reported that they had liberated Staromaiorske.
• Success on the western flank (liberated Staromaiorske, Pryutne, and the surrounding areas) will allow the AFU to attack Russia’s fortified areas in Urozhaine on the other side of the Mokri Yaly River from three different directions. This may force Russian troops to retreat south, toward Staromlynivka, on the second line of defense.

In the direction of Orikhiv

• The AFU suffered a setback in June, when attempting to cut across the Orikhiv-Tokmak road using western armor. This is an important logistical center for Russian defenses on its rear positions in the Zaporizhzhia region. It took nearly two months, however, to pass through seven kilometers (4.3 miles) through “no man’s land” to reach the nearest village of Robotyne, which is fortified by the Russian army. Finally, by July 20, the AFU were able to bypass Robotyne from the east and approach it from the north. In order to do this, the Ukrainian command had to utilize large reserves (units of several brigades which didn’t participate in fighting in June appeared on the battlefield).

• The first attempt to enter the outskirts of the village on July 26 appears to have failed. The advancing troops, with a large amount of armored vehicles, sustained losses when they came under fire from anti-tank systems, artillery, and helicopters. In the near future, we can expect further attempts to storm Robotyne and attacks to the east of Verbove.

Russia’s offensive in the north

• The Russian army’s large offensive on the border of the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kharkiv regions (from Kreminna and Torske in the south to Kupiansk in the north) is likely to have led to major initial success. The situation is difficult to assess. No videos have been posted from the area between the Zherebets and Oskil rivers, where the main thrust of Russia’s offensive is supposedly taking place.

• Both sides, however, recognize that the Russian offensive is underway and that they have made relatively large advances. Russia’s Defense Ministry reported that Russian troops cut across the Zherebets River, gained a foothold on the western bank, and captured the village of Serhiivka (though the village has not existed for a long time, its name is still on maps). Ukrainian sources report that Russian troops have advanced and have captured a few more villages. It’s clear that advancing Russian troops have a large advantage in numbers here.
• It’s also clear that the Russian command is expecting this offensive to force the AFU to pull troops, at least from the direction of Bakhmut, and redirect them to the north in order to stop Russian advances.

The data points reflected in the combat map above are typically at least 48 hours old. Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to [email protected]. Thank you!