Ukraine’s offensive: slowing down or not yet started? Limited progress on the front lines raises questions about Ukraine’s intentions. Meduza’s updated interactive combat map.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Meduza has adopted a consistent antiwar position, holding Russia responsible for its military aggression and atrocities. As part of this commitment, we regularly update an interactive map that documents combat operations in Ukraine and the damage inflicted by Russia’s invasion forces. Our map is based exclusively on previously published open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect reports already available publicly and determine their geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process.

Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates as of 2:30 p.m. GMT (10:30 a.m. EDT) on June 17, 2023 

Ukraine’s offensive in the southern part of the country is developing very slowly. After initial successes in two out of three directions — south of Zaporizhzhia and near the regional center of Velyka Novosilka in Donetsk — the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have as yet been unable to reach the main line of Russian defenses. In the third direction, southwest of the city of Orikhiv, the AFU has not had any success at all.

Ukrainian troops are still adapting to the peculiarities of Russia’s defenses. Rather than breaking through the Russian front lines, as the AFU had originally planned for the offensives, they’ve switched to the same techniques in the south that they’re using in other areas — carrying out strikes on the Russian army’s rear with suicide drones and long-range artillery, and using small forces to assault Russian positions in forested areas. This type of fighting isn’t promising for decisive breakthroughs or the quick liberation of territory, but neither does it threaten major failures. Thanks to good reconnaissance and advantages with drones and long-range artillery accuracy, the AFU could achieve an acceptable loss ratio in terms of equipment.

At the same time, Ukrainian command has not yet sent the main forces assembled for the offensive into battle. Attacks continue by four out of the 20 brigades that Ukraine formed specifically for the summer campaign and outfitted with Western equipment. Four or five “old” brigades, including the territorial defense, are also participating in the offensive, alongside “old” and “new” artillery brigades and powerful groups of drone operators.

Two main questions arise from this set of conditions:

• How much do recent developments differ from Ukraine’s initial plan?
• Does AFU command plan to carry out its main strike, with brigades and hundreds of tanks and other armored equipment, in the coming days and weeks?

Naturally, the plan for Ukraine’s offensive is unknown. At the very least, however, the current reality appears to differ significantly from what many experts and retired military officials in the West expected. On June 3, a day before the beginning of Ukraine’s offensive, former CIA head David Petraeus predicted that the AFU would carry out its main strike right away, at that it would culminate within the offensive’s first 72–96 hours and end with Ukraine breaking through Russian defenses.

There are two ways to explain the discrepancy between predictions and the current reality of the war.

• The more popular explanation in the West holds that AFU command decided to start up the offensive slowly while preparing the main strike, which they will carry out later in one of the directions discussed above. If that scenario plays out, we should expect a massive attack with seven or eight brigades and hundreds of tanks somewhere on the front lines in the near future.
• The second explanation holds that the AFU was unable to achieve its early-stage offensive goal of breaking through Russian defenses with relatively small forces, and that they have therefore delayed the second phase of bringing reserve forces into battle. If true, this would mean that the AFU needs to regroup around a new plan and, possibly, undertake difficult reconnaissance work on targets in the rear, minefields, Russian air defenses, and depleting some of Russia’s drone resources. It’s likely, if this scenario plays out, that AFU command will decide that it’s necessary to use large forces immediately to break through Russian defenses. Presumably, these forces would have been originally intended for actions after a breakthrough.

In the meantime, fighting continues with increasing intensity in all of the same regions as a week ago.

Velyka Novosilka

• After the AFU liberated villages in the Mokri Yaly river valley, to the south of Velyka Novosilka (the “Vremivka wedge” in the Russian defense ministry’s terminology), as well as the surrounding hills, the offensive slowed. The AFU conducted several attacks on the next villages in the valley, primarily on Urozhaine on the eastern bank. Judging by Russian video footage (which you can see on our interactive map), the attacks were repulsed. Drone footage from the outskirts of Urozhaine shows broken and abandoned Ukrainian armored vehicles.
• AFU have concentrated some of the best suicide drone detachments and artillery units in the region. They have carried out strikes on the Russian rear, hitting dozens of targets, including artillery units. Artillery pressure is a clear necessity if Ukraine is to resume its offensive. Russia’s Armed Forces have been responding with their own suicide drone and artillery strikes.
• For the first time since the beginning of Ukraine’s offensive, Russia transferred reinforcements to the front, and they went precisely to the sector south of Velyka Novosilka. 
• Fighting is still taking place around 10 kilometers (~6 miles) from the main Russian line of defense. The AFU remains far from even accessing it, much less breaking through.

Orikhiv direction

• After two columns of Leopard tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles from AFU’s 47th Mechanized Brigade suffered losses while moving toward the front in early June (video is available on our interactive map), the Ukrainian offensive halted in the region. The AFU was able to evacuate some of its equipment, but Russia’s Armed Forces seized some of it. The two sides traded drone and artillery strikes on both rear and forward positions, but made no significant advances. 
• On June 17, allegedly, Russia’s Armed Forces detected another small column of tanks and fighting vehicles and hit it with a massive suicide drone strike (including a Leopard tank). The results of the strike are unknown.

Lobkove and Pyatykhatky

• South of the city of Zaporizhzhia and about 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) west of Orikhiv, a small group, comprised of one mountain brigade with support from artillery and drones, continues its offensive on the Russian defense near the villages of Luhove and Pyatykhatky. The goal is, evidently, to flank the Russian units defending the Dnipro banks near the city of Vasylivka. If Ukraine breaks through Russian defenses in the region, it’s possible that troops near Luhove and Pyatykhatky can coordinate with the group breaking through from Orikhive toward Tokmak and Melitopol. 
• After the AFU liberated Lobkove in the first days of their offensive, they launched several attacks on Luhove and Pyatykhatky. They were hampered, once again, by minefields, Russian drone attacks, and shelling from tanks in Pyatykhatky. On June 17, reports emerged from Russian sources that the AFU had been able to reach Pyatykhatky but had subsequently been driven out of the area. You can watch video footage from these battles on our interactive map.

The data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old. Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to [email protected]. Thank you!