Opinion: Moscow isn't limited to the Assad regime's position A career diplomat lays out Russia's tough options in Syria

The horrific terrorist attacks in Paris and apparent bombing of a Russian passenger flight in Egypt have galvanized the world's attention like few events in recent memory, offering a rare moment in Russian-Western relations for common cause in the Middle East. The focus, of course, is the Syrian Civil War, where the terrorist organization ISIL has been expanding for more than a year now. But can Moscow come to terms with leaders in the West and the Arab world? In an opinion piece for the newspaper Vedomosti, Russian career diplomat Aleksandr Aksenenok argues that the Kremlin's position on Syria doesn't need to depend on the position of the Assad regime. Meduza translates that text here.

Developments in the Middle East, especially in Syria, have reached a critical point. The conflict between Russia and the West is being used by their regional partners, and the cycle of violence has become nearly uncontrollable. The international community can no longer watch as the region's states destroy themselves, creating waves of refugees and a humanitarian disaster on such a scale that it disfigures humanity's very consciousness.

Amidst all this chaos, a terrorist internationale with a foothold in Syria and Iraq has launched an all-out war against modern civilization. The so-called Islamic State has claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in the Sinai, in Iraq, Lebanon, and Paris. If, two or three years ago, the Middle East was thought of as a zone of regional unrest, then today its new hotbeds of terrorism and religious hatred create security risks for the entire world.

In these circumstances, Russia's direct military involvement in the Syrian crisis and its calls for forming a broader anti-terrorist coalition should really give impetus to coordinating an international effort, in one form or another, and to establishing common ground with the United States on this basis. But it might have the opposite effect. It might bring about even more distrust and distance. The cost of errors at this stage is enormously high. And whether Russia and the US become allies in the fight against a shared threat from militant Islamism, or rivals pursuing their own ambitions, depends not only on the Americans' decisions, but also how Russia itself chooses to act.

Initially, Russia's campaign in Syria enjoyed some tactical success. The airstrikes managed to prevent the collapse of state structures in areas still controlled by the Syrian government. Without Russian intervention, the country's armed opposition (primarily militant Islamists from groups like ISIL, the al-Nusra Front, and many other terrorist groups) had a significantly good chance of overthrowing the state. In any case, the slow-moving process of regulating the conflict was moved forward from a standstill. Airstrikes against ISIL were intensified by the international coalition, led by the US, which in turn began to make adjustments in its anti-terrorist strategy. With Russia and the US both playing active roles with parallel aims, changes emerged at the front of multilateral diplomacy.

At the same time, Russia's actions in Syria invited critical assessments from the West, Turkey, and several Arab states in the Persian Gulf, leading to a great deal of speculation and puzzled questions. What are Russia's real targets in Syria? Is Moscow fighting terrorism or saving Assad? Doesn't Russia's intervention work in favor of the Middle East's "Shiite Axis," strengthening pro-ISIL attitudes among the Sunni majorities in Syria, further escalating the violence? Is this a serious effort to establish a functioning cooperation with the United States, or is it a game to increase the prestige of a "strong Russia" at the expense of a "weakening America"?

The intervention has also raised questions about how Moscow chooses the targets of its airstrikes, which has offered room for false interpretations of Russia's position, including the idea that Moscow shares Damascus' official view that the entire armed opposition is made up of terrorists. Several ambiguous statements by top officials and propagandistic outbursts in the media have indeed suggested that the only forces now fighting against the Syrian government are terrorists. It's as if Russia were not holding political consultations with the widest range of forces among the various groups of the armed opposition.

In fact, you've really got to hand it to Russia's Middle-East diplomacy, which has reacted promptly to signals of misunderstanding and to the information war being waged externally. Russia has tried to make certain adjustments to its political efforts alongside its military campaign.

The line between "war and politics" is also visible in how Russia formulates its priorities. What comes first and then comes after: defeating ISIL or progressing towards a political settlement in the Syrian crisis? This important issue has been one of the main points of disagreement. With the establishment of multilateral consultations, it's become clear that the key focus of international anti-terrorism efforts, whatever form they take, comes down to Syria. Even Iraq is secondary. Iraq's government is admittedly fragile, but at least it's recognized. And so, until the Syrians, with international assistance, agree on parameters for a transition period and there begins the real political process of removing the truly terrorist groups, it's hard to expect decisive successes in the fight against ISIL. Sending Syrian troops to eradicate terrorism is only possible with the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country's secular state operating in a reformed political system.

At the second meeting of the International Syria Support Group, the biggest disagreements remained on two issues: Who should be considered terrorists? And what role should Syrian President Bashar al-Assad play in the political process? Agreements on these issues depend largely on a transitional power-sharing arrangement and the development of a common strategy to fight ISIL and the al-Nusra Front. Nearly everyone recognizes these two organizations as terrorists, but there are hundreds of other powerful groups, some of which are sponsored by influential regional players, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. The conglomerate of Syria's Islamic terrorist groups, both large and small (a total of 400-1,000 groups, according to different estimates), amounts to a sizable fighting force.

Meanwhile there are still military commanders in the ranks of the armed opposition who are committed to preserving Syria as a single state with a secular system of government that ensures equal rights to citizens, regardless of ethnicity and religious affiliation. This could be the Free Syrian Army, units in the Southern Front, and Sunni tribes that often change allies depending on how the military situation develops. Searching for potential partners in this sphere (once all the groups with terrorist ties have been weeded out) represents a promising direction for cooperation. This would naturally include Russia's participation.

As for Assad's future, participants in the Vienna talks have at this stage, it seems, agreed not to make a consensus on this issue a prerequisite for further negotiations. But sooner or later, the moment will come when it's precisely this question that becomes the stumbling block. And Russia needs to be ready to take certain steps to meet its partners halfway. After years of bitter conflict with such enormous casualties and human suffering, it's difficult to imagine how the man who presided over everything that's taken place could become a center of national reconciliation.

On the way to this, there will still be many hidden hazards—and not all of them are outside Syria. The Syrian government and the country's ragtag opposition are themselves complex partners, and neither Russia nor the United States always wields influence over these groups.

For Russia, it's important that its position isn't associated with the inflexibility of the Assad regime in Damascus, which, judging by the statements of the Syrian President and his Foreign Minster, prefers to keep the political process bogged down in non-binding dialogue. While Russia's Syrian ally behaves this way, Moscow will have difficulty cooperating with external partners. Russia's strategy for ending its military operation also depends on this. The weakened Syrian Army, whatever the air support from Russia, is already incapable of defeating ISIL on its own. In order to achieve that victory, all of Syria's anti-terrorist forces need to unite, and actions need to be coordinated at the international level.

Aleksandr Aksenenok is currently Managing Director of Vnesheconombank and a member of the Expert Council of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs.