explainers

A key gateway Russia is at risk of losing its military bases in Syria. Here’s what that means for its Africa operations.

Source: Meduza

The overthrow of the Russian-backed Assad regime has dealt a major blow to Moscow’s international reputation as a security guarantor. But the impact goes beyond optics or influence in Syria — it threatens Russia’s operations in Africa, where Moscow has spent years building its foothold. Russia’s naval and air bases in Syria have been key hubs for supporting its campaigns across the African continent. Now, with opposition forces long targeted by Russia’s brutal military campaigns in control of the country, the future of these facilities is uncertain. To find out how important these Syrian bases are for Russia’s operations in Africa — and what options Moscow might have if it loses them — we looked at what analysts are saying and spoke to an expert from Meduza’s Razbor (“Explainers”) team.

For security reasons, this article refers to Meduza’s correspondent simply as “the expert.”

Russia’s window to Africa

Syria has long been central to Russia’s ambitions in Africa, with two key military bases — Tartus naval base and Khmeimim airfield — serving as strategic hubs. Located in the Latakia governorate, which is now under Syrian opposition control, these bases are more than local assets. They’ve become critical for facilitating military shipments, both covert and overt, to support Russia’s expanding operations across North and Central Africa.

Russia’s intervention in Syria and its backing of the Assad regime opened the door for Moscow to expand its influence and military presence in the region. Tartus, established as a Soviet naval base in 1971, got a major upgrade in 2017 when Russia struck a deal to expand the facility and use it rent-free for nearly half a century. Khmeimim, on the other hand, is a more recent addition, built after Moscow came to Bashar al-Assad’s aid in 2015. 

According to Meduza’s expert, before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Syria was unquestionably Russia’s main jumping-off point for operations in Africa. Although this role diminished slightly after Turkey closed the Bosphorus Strait to warships following Moscow’s February 2022 invasion, cutting off the “Syrian Express” — a key route for transporting military cargo via the Black Sea — these bases remain indispensable to Russia’s current modus operandi in Africa. 

Russia expert Mark Galeotti told Al Jazeera that Syria provides Moscow a vital staging ground, allowing it to sidestep Turkey’s restrictions. “[W]ithout the Russian base at [Tartus], the only way of projecting naval power into the Mediterranean is through the Baltic, which is hardly ideal,” he said. “Likewise, without the [Khmeimim Air Base], providing air support to operations in Africa would also depend upon Turkey’s goodwill, which is something unlikely to sit well with the Kremlin,” he added.

Russian transport planes currently rely on an air corridor through the Caspian Sea, Iran, and Iraq, refueling at Khmeimim before continuing on to Africa, Meduza’s expert explains. For now, there’s no alternative in place that can fill this crucial role for the Russian command.

Looking for the ‘least bad option’

With the fall of the Russian-backed Assad regime, Moscow is at risk of losing its bases in Syria — and it appears as though there aren’t many good alternatives in the region. One potential option is Libya, where Russia already has bases, but as researcher John Lechner points out, they’re “on loan” from Khalifa Haftar, the unpredictable commander of the Libyan National Army, who only controls part of the country. Meduza’s expert notes that a permanent base would require a formal agreement, something Haftar likely doesn’t have the legal authority to provide. Establishing a permanent Russian base would also increase pressure on Haftar from Western powers.

 “Haftar currently has no reason to quarrel with Moscow — after all, he’s not the internationally recognized authority,” military expert Kirill Mikhailov told Mediazona. “However, the issue also involves other regional players who influence Haftar, namely France, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates. As a result, both logistical and political questions remain unresolved.”

Meduza’s expert suggests that even the arrangements Haftar could offer might suffice for Moscow’s needs in the region, even if the setup is less convenient than the one in Syria. Frederik Van Lokeren, a former Belgian navy officer turned analyst, echoes this view, calling Libya’s port of Tobruk Russia’s “least bad option” for a naval base due to its existing infrastructure, strategic location, and Haftar’s reliance on Russian support. Still, Tobruk falls short of Tartus in terms of development, and Russia’s focus on Ukraine limits its ability to fully support Haftar if the Libyan strongman faces a crisis.

Even though we’re outlawed in Russia, we continue to deliver exclusive reporting and analysis from inside the country. 

Our journalists on the ground take risks to keep you informed about changes in Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Support Meduza’s work today.

Sudan is another possibility, but it’s hardly ideal. As Lechner points out, the country’s ongoing civil war and Russia’s internal divisions over which faction to back create significant challenges. While negotiations for a naval base in Port Sudan are ongoing, the chaos on the ground makes any practical progress unlikely in the near future.

Van Lokeren also flags logistical issues with Sudan. Port Sudan is located in the Red Sea, far from Russia’s Mediterranean operations. Deployments from there would need to pass through the Suez Canal, a strategic barrier that limits operational flexibility and signals Russian movements well in advance. The port itself also requires extensive upgrades — years of dredging and construction — before it could host a naval presence.

As for Algeria and Egypt, Van Lokeren dismisses both, pointing out that their prioritization of neutrality makes a Russian naval base politically untenable. While Russian ships occasionally dock in Algeria, establishing a base would require a clear shift to a pro-Russia stance — something Algerian authorities are unlikely to embrace. Egypt, meanwhile, has been leaning more toward the West, relying on Western military supplies, and is unlikely to risk jeopardizing those relationships.

There may be even fewer options for air bases than for naval ones. “Russia is surrounded by hostile states,” explains Meduza’s expert. “Iran once refused to lease an airbase to Russia — even during the active phase of the war in Syria.” Adding to the challenge, establishing an air base requires controlling actual territory, Mark Galeotti told Deutsche Welle’s Russian service. “Wherever they go— Libya, Mali, Sudan— they won’t have the same situation they had in Syria,” he said.

Finding a solution is crucial for Russia. Rybar, a Telegram channel run by a former Russian Defense Ministry employee, asserts that cargo planes leaving Russia can only make it to Libya without refueling if they’re flying empty. According to Meduza’s expert, however, this isn’t entirely accurate. Cargo planes such as the Il-76 and An-124 can reach Libya even when fully loaded if departing from southern Russia. But they’d need to pass through Turkish airspace, which, again, would require Turkey’s approval — and Moscow swallowing its pride.

A dual setback

Russia’s interests in Africa center on expanding its geopolitical influence, gaining access to valuable resources, and undermining Western power. In a February report for the U.K.’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Jack Watling, Oleksandr Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds explain that Russia provides “elites in target countries” with a “regime survival package” that includes military support, protection from international backlash, and propaganda tools to solidify their control. In return, Moscow gains greater influence over their decision-making “with the explicit intent to supplant Western partnerships.”

Beyond regional influence, Africa offers Russia access to critical natural resources like gold and diamonds. By providing military services to local regimes, Moscow secures lucrative opportunities that fund its operation in Africa and may even contribute to its war efforts in Ukraine, Filip Bryjka and Jędrzej Czerep noted in a May report for The Polish Institute of International Affairs.

However, Russia is now facing a dual setback, according to analyst Alexander Baunov — one to its image and another to its operational capabilities. “This is precisely why the fall of Assad’s regime is such a sensitive issue for Moscow,” Baunov told Meduza. “The export of security and military power in the interests of its allies has been one of the few commodities [Russia] offered that were in demand in the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, this export heavily relied on Russian bases in Syria, the fate of which is now uncertain — along with the logistics of Moscow’s future ventures in Africa.”

In light of this, it’s unsurprising that Moscow would want to do everything in its power to keep its Syrian bases. As Assad’s regime crumbled, the Kremlin quickly shifted its rhetoric about the Syrian opposition, rebranding the rebels from “terrorists” to “the opposition,” likely in a pragmatic effort to position itself for future dealings. Just a day after Assad’s fall, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that “Russia plans to discuss continued deployment of troops in Syria with the country’s new authorities after the situation stabilizes.” But given Moscow’s history of propping up Assad through brutal military campaigns, whether such an agreement is feasible remains unclear.