With the war’s future uncertain, the Putin administration doesn’t know how to prepare for Russia’s next State Duma elections
Russia’s next federal parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 2026 — less than two years away. This means it’s time for the Putin administration to start crafting a strategy to keep the ruling United Russia party in power. However, sources close to the Kremlin and the Russian government tell Meduza that the chaos of the war has left authorities at a loss as to what they should even be planning for. As one political strategist put it, if the war is still going on, the campaign will need to emphasize “ultrapatriotism,” while a post-war scenario would call for more “moderate forces.” Meduza lays out the challenges facing Russia’s ruling elites as they try to predict the unpredictable.
The Putin administration’s political team has yet to begin preparing for the 2026 State Duma elections — even though it typically decides on an overall strategy for the “race” about two years ahead of the vote.
In the fall of 2019, for example, the Kremlin decided to create several new parties tailored to various types of voters; these included the Direct Democracy Party, New People, For Truth, and Green Alternative. After these parties were registered in 2020, the Kremlin helped them secure seats in regional parliaments so that they wouldn’t have to gather signatures to participate in the Duma election. The following year, New People made it to the State Duma, where it won 15 seats.
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Preparing for the 2026 election, however, is a more daunting task — due to the war against Ukraine and the uncertainty it’s brought to Russia’s domestic politics. Meduza has previously reported that the regional elections held in September 2024 were supposed to serve as a kind of “review” of Russia’s current parties: the Putin administration wanted to assess the popularity of the establishment parties to determine whether it would need to present voters with new options like it did last time.
The results were reportedly not encouraging. “The popularity of A Just Russia hadn’t noticeably improved, and the other [establishment] parties aren’t doing great either. But this didn’t bring any more clarity. Everything depends on whether the special military operation will still be going on in 2026 or not,” a source close to the Putin administration told Meduza.
A political strategist who works for both the president’s political team and several Russian regional governments described the situation as follows:
Right now, nobody has any idea what’s going to happen with the war. If it’s still going on [closer to the 2026 elections], we’ll need a force that leans heavily on ultrapatriotism: a new party or a slightly revamped “A Just Russia.”
If the war’s over by then, we’ll need more moderate forces. And if it does end, then on what terms? That also matters a lot — but it’s more relevant for United Russia’s platform. What should be on their banner — rebuilding the new territories, or returning to the pre-war standard of living?
A source from United Russia’s leadership added that the party’s candidate lineup will depend on the situation at the front as well. “Will the people at the top be soldiers, or someone symbolizing a return to peacetime, like the prime minister?” the source says. He adds that he doesn’t want to give specific names because “these figures could theoretically still change.”
It’s difficult to tell which of these options is currently more appealing to Russia’s elites. According to two sources close to the Kremlin and another one close to the Russian government, officials’ attitudes toward the war are “uncertain.” One source close to the Putin administration elaborates:
On one hand, everyone’s tired and wants to see its end — nobody wants endless war, that’s for sure. The hawks might add that we should only accept an end to the war if it’s on Russia’s terms, but that’s still ultimately about peace. This kind of talk has been especially common since [Ukraine’s] invasion of the Kursk region.
On the other hand, it’s unclear how we’re supposed to proceed after the special military operation. What will the country’s goals be? Right now, it’s straightforward: we’re at war, and most decisions are made with that as the priority. After the special military operation, we’ll have to think about the future, our goals, and our strategies. And that’s genuinely unsettling.
A source close to the Russian government said that the country’s business executives are having similar discussions. According to this source, the war has made it nearly impossible for businesses to plan for the long term, since even initially “friendly” countries like China and Turkey are at least partially observing anti-Russian sanctions. “It’s likely that this won’t all be lifted [after the war ends], or will take time to be lifted. While we were focusing on short-term [planning], we redistributed [the assets of Western companies that left the Russian market], then reallocated them and took over their market shares. But now there’s nothing old left, nothing new emerging, and everything is starting to stagnate,” the source said.
‘The shock has worn off’
Right now, the willingness of Russia’s top leadership to enter peace negotiations might be “higher than in August,” when Ukraine’s cross-border operation in the Kursk region became a new source of uncertainty in Russian domestic politics, another source close to the Kremlin told Meduza.
Russian officials and Kremlin-loyal businessmen initially expected the incursion to cause a major escalation. “The Kremlin has concluded, ’Now we’re definitely going to destroy the Ukrainian state,’” a source from Russia’s leadership told the outlet Faridaily at the time, adding: “Right now, there are no rules — both sides are thinking about how to make things worse for the other.”
But as of late October, the sentiment among Russian elites has changed, according to Meduza’s source close to the Kremlin. “The shock has worn off. We’ll push back the Ukrainian forces sooner or later, and [the Russian army] is making progress in Donbas. The atmosphere has gotten more positive,” he said. A source close to the government added that in his view, if Putin decides to enter into negotiations, they “won’t begin from a position of weakness for Russia.” (The Russian authorities have repeatedly claimed they’re willing to negotiate but have taken no concrete steps towards peace.)
Both sources note that the Russian authorities’ official demands have not changed: they want full control over the annexed Ukrainian territories and for Kyiv to reject NATO membership. The government source says he believes that “compromises are possible” regarding the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, but adds that this is his “personal view” of the situation.
However, none of Meduza’s sources expect to see negotiations in the foreseeable future; one said they’re not likely to begin “in the coming days, weeks, or even months.” One factor that will influence Russia’s top leadership, according to the sources, is the result of the upcoming U.S. presidential election. A political strategist close to the Putin administration wryly noted that American elections “somehow always serve as a benchmark and reference point for the Kremlin” — and said approach seems irrational to him:
They have these hopes that Trump [if he becomes president] will be able to solve everything. But he might not be able to.
Reporting by Andrey Pertsev. Translation by Sam Breazeale.
Special Military Operation
The Kremlin’s euphemism for its full-scale war against Ukraine