Putin has approved Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, but any escalatory actions will depend on how the Kremlin interprets its own wording

Expanding the category of states and military alliances against which Russia exercises nuclear deterrence, and expanding the list of military threats “to be neutralized by nuclear deterrence measures.”

No. However, it goes without saying that Russia could add Ukraine to the list of states with respect to which it exercises nuclear deterrence. In the context of a full-scale war with such a state, this effectively means that Russia is climbing the nuclear escalation ladder.

Considering aggression against Russia from any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state as “their joint attack” on the Russian Federation.

Possibly, but with caveats. In the ongoing war with Russia, three nuclear states openly support Ukraine: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The only question is at what point the Russian authorities will decide to codify this “joint attack” as a sufficient threat to warrant the use of nuclear weapons — and how they’ll decide to deploy them (they may decide not to use them at all). Presumably, this “clarification” is aimed at preventing Western allies from deepening cooperation with Ukraine by lifting restrictions on Kyiv using Western-made long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to strike deeper into Russian territory.

Considering the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons upon receiving reliable information about “a massive launch of aerospace attack weapons and their crossing of our state border.” Putin referred to strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and “other” lethal aircraft, specifically.

Possibly, but with caveats. Ukraine is already attacking Russian territory with drones and cruise missiles that fit Putin’s definition of “aerospace attack weapons.” But as with the aforementioned “clarifications,” the course of events depends entirely on the Russian leadership’s interpretation of their own wording. For example, there are no clear answers to the questions of whether the scale of Ukrainian attacks constitutes a “massive launch” or whether long-range weapons strikes deeper inside Russian territory would cross a “red line.” (Usually, states deliberately include answers to such questions in their nuclear doctrines to effectively deter potential opponents.)

Reserving the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as a member of the Union State.

No. The Russian Federation’s right to defend its allies with nuclear force even in response to a non-nuclear threat (namely, ballistic missile strikes) is also spelled out in the current version of Moscow’s nuclear doctrine. The only real change is that now one ally is singled out. Given the risks of an escalation of the conflict between Aleksandr Lukashenko’s regime and Western countries (for example, the Baltic countries or neighboring Poland) this “clarification” can also be seen as an increase in the degree of escalation on the part of the Russian Federation.

Using nuclear weapons “if the enemy, using conventional weapons, creates a critical threat to the sovereignty” of Russia and Belarus.

No. But this new wording also looks like an escalatory step. The current version of Russia’s nuclear doctrine mentions neither Belarus nor a “critical threat to sovereignty” but rather a threat to “the very existence of the state.” The original wording can be more broadly interpreted, since not every “critical threat to sovereignty” constitutes a “threat to the very existence of the state.” But even when it comes to this point, the final interpretation of specific threats is entirely up to the Russian authorities.