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State-controlled ‘autonomy’ How the Kremlin uses ‘independent organizations’ to do its propaganda dirty work

Source: Meduza

“Patriotic” programs and events have been popping up all over Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. The entities behind these endeavors are often “autonomous nonprofit organizations”: organizations purportedly characterized by their socially beneficial, cultural, educational, scientific, or charitable nature. They also aren’t governmental — at least officially. At the end of 2023, journalists from Delfi Estonia gained access to leaked documents from Putin’s administration. When a team of journalists from Meduza, iStories, Expressen, Frontstory.pl, Paper Trail Media, Der Spiegel, ZDF, Der Standard, VSquare.org, and Tamedia studied the documents, they discovered evidence that the Kremlin directly funds and controls many of these so-called “autonomous” organizations. Meduza summarizes the findings in English.

This article is part of the Kremlin Leaks project. The first story in the series can be found here.

‘Autonomous’ in name only

Leaked documents from Putin’s administration list 15 “autonomous nonprofit organizations” (ANOs) that receive state funding. Despite their official status, there’s no hint of autonomy: all of the organizations were created by people close to the Russian authorities, and the Kremlin fully controls their work. Moreover, all of them are actively involved in creating and disseminating state propaganda.

ANOs have proven particularly convenient for the Kremlin since the start of its full-scale war against Ukraine as they’re not bound by government procurement laws. In 2023, these organizations received subsidies from the state budget totaling 59 billion rubles (about $639 million and exactly two times the annual budget of Ingushetia, one of the poorest regions in Russia).

Perhaps the most well-known of these ANOs is the Internet Development Institute, which finances the production of Russian films, TV series, and other cultural content (often with a pro-government bent). Another nonprofit organization, Dialog, is charged with spreading Internet propaganda and fabricating disinformation, specifically about the war in Ukraine.

Several other ANOs organize “patriotic” events. For instance, Russia is a Country of Opportunities, created at Putin’s initiative, conducts competitions and Olympiads for students — including in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. According to the leaked documents, from 2023 to 2025, Putin’s administration intends for about 20 percent of people ages 14–25 in the occupied territories to participate in events run by the organization.

This isn’t the only ANO the Kremlin uses as an on-the-ground tool for its propaganda efforts in Ukraine. For example, the Center for the Development of Cultural Initiatives holds the Tavrida cultural festival in Russian-annexed Crimea. In addition to live musical performances, programs like these inevitably include propaganda lectures and meetings with “veterans” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. ANOs take varied approaches to “integrating” residents of the “new regions”: the World Youth Festival brings volunteers from the occupied territories to Sochi, the Mashuk Knowledge Center “retrains” teachers from occupied Ukrainian regions, and the Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment keeps a close watch on students’ social media in order to “promptly inform about emerging threats and new, destructive phenomena.”

The documents also mention an organization that’s less widely known: the Integration production center, which was created in May 2022 and is controlled by the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives. The center is headed by Gleb Shagun, the former chief producer and general director of state news channel RBC-TV. A former colleague described him as “a careerist” and “a company man masquerading as a liberal.”

In 2018, Shagun was in charge of public communications for annexed Sevastopol’s Kremlin-backed government. A local journalist, who spoke to Meduza on condition of anonymity, characterized Shagun as a “batshit PR guy” for then-governor Dmitry Ovsyannikov. “He banned everything and everyone and engaged in smear campaigns against the governor’s enemies. Which is to say, against all local politicians,” he said. 

Unlike other Kremlin ANOs, Shagun’s “production center” doesn’t get money from the state budget. Rather, it relies on “donations” from state and private companies. (This is common practice for NGOs connected to the authorities.)

In late 2022, Integration received over 100 million rubles (about $1 million) from RusHydro, one of Russia’s largest energy companies. It got another 100 million from JSC Dalgiprotrans, a major transport and infrastructure design company in Russia’s Far East (and part of “king of state orders” Alexey Krapivin’s 1520 group). Mosgiprotrans, one of Russian Railways’ largest contractors, also contributed a similar amount. Integration’s total budget is unknown.

Getting their money’s worth

Integration doesn’t have a website, and there’s virtually no information on it in open sources. However, judging by the leaked Kremlin documents, it produces so-called “public opinion leaders” (teachers, pop stars, etc.) who then promote a state-sanctioned agenda. Integration liaises between the Russian authorities and these “public opinion leaders” and takes care of their funding.

One document lists several Integration projects, including the so-called “agitbrigade” (propaganda brigade) of Russian celebrities who visit the military to boost morale. The “agitbrigade” is the brainchild of Sergey Kiriyenko, the Kremlin’s domestic policy czar, as Vedomosti has already reported. Some notable “agitbrigade” members include actors Sergey Bezrukov, Mikhail Porechenkov, and Sergey Garmash, musicians Sergey Galanin and Denis Maidanov, comedian Yevgeny Petrosyan, and chess player Sergey Karjakin.

Integration also helped musicians Oleg Gazmanov, Alexander Rosenbaum, and Yulia Chicherina raise funds for military formations in the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People's Republic” and “Luhansk People's Republic,” promoted pro-Russian German director Wilhelm Domke-Schulz’s projects, and developed numerous pro-Kremlin Telegram channels — including that of Alexander Malkevich, who produces propaganda media in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.

The center also financed the “Russian Dream” movement, recently created by Alexander Prokhanov — a Stalinist, “patriotic” Russian writer, and editor-in-chief of Zavtra, a newspaper that openly embraces the state’s “imperial ideology.” Oleg Rozanov, a member of the pro-government ultra-conservative Izborsk Club, is chairman of the board.

Additionally, Integration is involved in the administration’s campaign for the upcoming Russian presidential elections. In particular, it’s tasked with creating “a database of Russian Science and Education Ministry employees who meet the relevant criteria.” (Which criteria the document is referring to is unclear.) The center is also supposed to “monitor the political sentiments and electoral preferences” of education professionals and students.

However, these aren’t Integration’s only functions. Several employees of state- or government-loyal media said Putin’s administration has been “requesting” that editors at their publications take comments from pro-government experts through the center. According to them, each media outlet is assigned a specific Integration employee to whom they can send the topic of an article and specific questions. In response, they receive a written comment from one of the “public opinion leaders” with whom Integration works.

One employee of a Kremlin-loyal media company believes this helps the ANO mint “new media experts.” “It's convenient in principle. There’s no need to bother with calls: you write a request, you get a quick answer,” he says. “However, often you don’t know whose comment you’ll get. Sometimes they send no-names; sometimes they send quite media-savvy and well-known individuals.”

Another interviewee adds that centralizing the work this way allows Putin’s administration to control already loyal media even further — and to prevent journalists and experts from getting too close, where an expert might share something off the record. “Of course, this wouldn’t be published, but the journalists themselves might start to think and reflect. And this is hardly in the authorities’ interests.”

iStories and Meduza sent inquiries to RusHydro, Mosgiprotrans, Dalgiprotrans, and the Presidential Fund for Cultural Initiatives but did not receive a response. Gleb Shagun, Denis Maidanov, Yevgeny Petrosyan, Sergey Karjakin, Oleg Gazmanov, Sergey Galanin, Sergey Bezrukov, Mikhail Porechenkov, and Yulia Chicherina also did not respond to requests for comment.