explainers

Redeploying troops Meduza updates its Ukraine combat map with the latest developments in Avdiivka, Orikhiv, and the Dnipro

Source: Meduza

Like our earlier reports on the combat situation in Ukraine, this article takes stock of the recent developments in the battlefield based on open-source information. Meduza has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine from the very start, and our detailed military analyses are part of our commitment to objective reporting on a war we firmly oppose.


Our map is based exclusively on open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. We collect available evidence and determine its geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Meduza doesn’t try to track the conflict in real time; the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old.

Key updates

What we knew as of 7 p.m. Moscow time (4 p.m. GMT, 12 p.m. EDT) on October 27, 2023

Russia’s war in Ukraine entered a new phase after Russian commanders decided that the Ukrainian offensive, which began more than four months earlier, is out of steam. Moscow responded by launching its own offensive. At first, it seemed like a separate operation by the Southern Military District’s 8th Combined Arms Army to the north and south of Avdiivka. Russia appeared to be trying to force the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) to redirect reserves from the Zaporizhzhia region in this direction. Advancing Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses, losing dozens (and maybe more than 100) pieces of heavy equipment.

However, during the operation’s second week, it became clear that Avdiivka (a vital suburb of Donetsk) was not just the location of a diversionary maneuver but rather the target of a larger Russian offensive involving troops from multiple armies and military districts.

The AFU command responded by redeploying reserves toward the Zaporizhzhia region from the direction of Orikhiv. Russia then deployed additional troops, withdrawn from the northern direction, previously engaged in local battles near the town of Svatove. The situation for Ukrainian forces near Avdiivka significantly worsened as a result, although they managed to slow down the Russian offensive. This front is likely to involve more and more troops from both sides in the near future:

  • Russian forces will continue their attempts to encircle Avdiivka or to push out the Ukrainian unit, which consists of approximately 15,000 soldiers.
  • The AFU will attempt to create new fortifications on this front’s flanks, similar to what happened in Bakhmut during the winter. The aim will be to force the Russian forces into a frontal assault on the city.

The AFU command doesn’t agree that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is over. While Russian forces were fighting their way through minefields and Ukrainian fortified positions near Avdiivka, the AFU launched new attacks in the direction of Orikhiv. By attacking the flanks, they’re attempting to expand their wedge near the village of Robotyne, aiming to encircle the Russian fortified area in the village of Novoprokopivka and then break through to their objective: the city of Tokmak.

At the same time, the AFU are once again attempting to cross the Dnipro River between Kherson and Nova Kakhovka. This time, they deployed a larger number of forces to the bridgeheads (which are supplied by boats) than they did during the summer. So far, however, the results are the same: the landing force remains pinned to the banks of the Dnipro River and is unable to advance deeper into Russian defenses.

Avdiivka

  • After two weeks of fighting, Russian forces captured the commanding heights on the northern flank of the Avdiivka front: the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant’s massive ash dump.
  • The dump is an artificial hill approximately 200 meters (around 650 feet) tall. A massive plant is located at the dump’s base, which serves as a supply route for all AFU units in the city and the surrounding areas. In 2015, a fortified area was established in and around Avdiivka, which prevents Russian forces from storming the city. The only solution for the Russian command is to encircle the city by striking from the north of the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant and from the ruins of the Donetsk airport to the south. Capturing the ash dump is essential for the success of the operation to encircle Avdiivka from the north.
  • Russian forces, reinforced with reserves, advanced toward the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk railway to the north of the plant. The front line now runs along this railway.
  • The next stage of the offensive will likely be an attack across the railway toward the villages of Stepove (Petrovske) and Berdychiv. South of Berdychiv, one of the roads (passing through the villages of Orlivka and Lastochkyne leads toward the Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, which supplies Avdiivka. This road is positioned low compared to the heights near the railway.
  • Forces from the AFU’s 47th Mechanized Brigade, German Leopard tanks, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles (which were previously used in the battle for Rabotyne in the Zaporizhzhia region have been redeployed) were redeployed in this direction. Part of the brigade likely remains in the vicinity of Rabotyne). Counterattacks using tanks have started near the railway. The outcome of the attacks is unclear. Despite having an advantage in its number of forces, the Russian army was likely unable to establish itself to the west of the road, while the 47th Brigade was unable to push them eastward.
  • South of Avdiivka, Russian forces advanced from the village of Vodiane and reached Ukrainian fortified positions in the village of Severne. Another road supplying Avdiivka is located near Severne. There are currently no further attempts by Russian forces to advance to the north in this area. The Russian army’s main attack is likely to the north of the chemical plant, while the secondary attack is taking place to the south.
  • Russian forces supported the offensive with other diversionary attacks along the entire front line near Donetsk. Russian forces then attempted an unsuccessful attack near the village of Novomykhailivka in the direction of Vuhledar.
  • The operation’s further development near Avdiivka depends on the balance of forces. Russian forces need to advance several more kilometers to Lastochkyne, where supply routes for Ukrainian units are located. However, every meter gained comes at a high cost. Due to these losses, the reserves put into battle may lose their offensive potential, as has happened several times during Russian and Ukrainian operations in the past year.
  • On the other hand, the situation remains extremely dangerous for the AFU. If the AFU command wants to hold Avdiivka, it must reinforce its flanks with a larger number of forces. To achieve this, it will likely have to weaken the units near Orikhiv or Bakhmut. This would mean refusing to continue the offensive, which began in the summer and saw the AFU suffer heavy losses.

In the direction of Orikhiv

  • In early autumn, AFU units advancing from Orikhiv toward Tokmak faced a problem that they have yet to resolve. After reserves were brought into the battle in August, they managed to penetrate about 10 kilometers (around six miles) into Russian defenses and liberate the key village of Rabotyne, where the Russian forces’ fortified area was located. However, the wedge turned out to be too narrow since it was only a few kilometers wide. This means the advancing group’s rear is shot at from the flanks, making supply and troop deployment difficult.
  • For several weeks now, the AFU have been trying to widen the corridor with attacks on the flanks — on Verbove to the east and Kopani to the west. Despite the redeployment of some forces from the 47th brigade, they made another attempt in the midst of the Russian offensive toward Avdiivka. The AFU launched an attack near Kopani and to the southwest of Verbove, using Leopard tanks, which hadn’t been involved in combat in recent weeks. Judging by the videos posted, the offensive failed; several Leopard tanks were lost, and Ukrainian forces were unable to advance very far.
  • The Ukrainian command (the Tavria operational-strategic group commands near both Orikhiv and Avdiivka) must soon decide if they will continue attempts at breaking through to Tokmak during the winter. Their other option would be to dismantle the assault group in the Zaporizhia region and reinforce other directions with the freed-up forces, including in the direction of Avdiivka. In the latter case, the efforts of AFU units, which supported the offensive at Orikhiv with their attacks across the Dnipro River in the Kherson region, would go to waste.

The eastern bank of the Dnipro River

  • Throughout the summer, AFU stormed the islands in the lower Dnipro River using relatively small forces and established temporary bridgeheads on the marshy eastern bank, which relatively weak Russian forces attempted to thwart. At none of these bridgeheads — not the Antonov Road Bridge over the Dnipro or the village of Kozachi Laheri — were the AFU able to expand their offensive deep into Russian defenses. They were also unable to eliminate the threat of new Russian landings on the eastern bank.
  • The problems Russian forces face include difficulty holding the bank under Ukrainian artillery fire and an overall shortage of troops, preventing them from covering the entire length of the riverbank. As for the Ukrainian landing forces, they were unable to transfer heavy equipment to the bridgeheads. They also faced the danger of advancing deep into Russian defenses, where the landing forces would lose artillery support, which was operating on the Dnipro’s western bank.
  • In October, the AFU withdrew part of its Marine Corps from the front lines, which had previously been advancing in the area near Velyka Novosilka on the border between the Donetsk and Zaporizhia regions. These forces were redeployed to Kherson and are now participating in new landing operations on the eastern bank (previously, special forces were the primary units involved in landings).
  • Ukrainian forces have captured bridgeheads near the railroad bridge next to the villages of Poima and Pishchane, as well as further upstream near the village of Krynky. Since then, a heavy battle has been ongoing in the area — a familiar scenario dating back to the summer. Under artillery fire from the western bank and facing drone strikes, Russian forces have been unsuccessful in their attempts to push the landing forces into the river. Ukrainian forces are trying to establish their positions on the bridgeheads despite aerial bombings and missile strikes. They are being supplied by small boats. There is currently no mention of transferring heavy equipment to the bridgeheads or advancing deeper into Russian defenses.
  • All these operations on the eastern bank (without the success of the Ukrainian advance into the Zaporizhzhia region) serve one purpose for the AFU: With enough persistence, they can force the Russian command to redeploy reserves to this area, which are intended for operations in other directions.
Развернуть

The red dots show recent events, and the gray dots show earlier events. Black indicates the approximate contact line as of the last update; the red and blue areas mark places occupied (since early September) by Russian and Ukrainian forces. Clicking on them will provide additional information. Air strikes are marked with a special icon, ground operations with dots. Click on the point on the map to pull up source links.

Meduza is careful in working with data, but mistakes are still possible, and perhaps even inevitable. If you spot one, please let us know by sending an email to reports@meduza.io. Thank you!

Translation by Sasha Slobodov